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CIVIL-MILITARY ROLES OF INDIGENOUS ARMED FORCES
(CRIAF). VOLUME I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. VOLUME II.
MAIN REPORT. VOLUME III. APPENDIXES

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CIVIL-MILITARY ROLES OF INDIGENOUS ARMED FORCES

(SHORT TITLE: CRIAF)

FINAL REPORT

VOLUME I - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

VOLUME II - MAIN REPORT

VOLUME III - APPENDIXES

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651

COMPLETED BY
354TH CIVIL AFFAIRS, AREA B, USAR
JULY 1974

(MONITORED BY USAIMA
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA)

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PREFACE

This study was performed by the 354th Civil Affairs Area B Reserve Unit. As such it was conducted entirely by USAR personnel as time and resources were available. It was monitored by active Army personnel who worked in conjunction with consultants during the process of the study. Due to the conditions under which the study was developed it was found impractical to adhere strictly to the tenants prescribed in CDC Pamphlet 71-16 or TRADOC Regulation 71-3.

The CRIAF Study is forwarded to interested agencies and activities for use as reference material for students performing research in the subject matter concerned and for such use as may be deemed appropriate by active Army and reserve units.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

ABSTRACT

Civil Military Roles of Indigenous Armed Forces (U), a study conducted by the 354th Civil Affairs Area (B), was designed to examine the civil military roles of indigenous armed forces under varying conditions of internal and external threats. The study consists of an Executive Summary and the Main Report and its findings are based on an extensive search of the unclassified literature listed in the bibliography.

By isolating concepts applicable to the conduct of civil military relations by the indigenous armed forces of developing nations the study derived generally valid principles that govern the interaction between the IAF and their civilian environment. From these operational principles the study formulated guidelines for U.S. Army doctrine that will make more effective the Army's advisory and assistance role with indigenous armed forces in stability operations.

The main body of the study analyzed political, economic, public service and security roles engaged in by 40 indigenous armed forces in developing countries in four world areas: Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Near East. It reviewed these under normalcy and threat conditions based on actual experience and concluded that the representative IAFs studied show a vastly greater degree of involvement in the entire range of politicoeconomic, public administration and security functions under varying threat conditions than is the case in the United States. From this finding, implications for U.S. Army advisory and assistance operations with indigenous armed forces under conditions pertaining to the entire threat spectrum were derived. Given the pervasive interactions among the IAFs and their civilian environments the study attempted to elaborate a theory that views internal conflict as a contest for the control of the mobilization base between the indigenous armed forces and the insurgent.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SECTION I. Identification of the Study

1. PURPOSE. This chapter gives a summary description of the study "Civil-Military Roles of Indigenous Armed Forces (CRIAF)."

2. OUTLINE.

    a. Purpose of study. To examine the civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces in developing nations.

    b. Study sponsor. HQ USATRADOC.

    c. Objectives. See Section II of this chapter.

    d. Scope. The study considers 40 developing countries selected from the following areas: Latin America (13), Sub-Sahara Africa (5), Moslem countries and Israel (13), Asian countries (9).

    e. Study output. Contribution to US Army doctrine on civil-military operations and low intensity warfare.

    f. Proponent agency. HQ CA 354th Civil Affairs Area (B).

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SECTION II. Identification of the Problem and Tasks

1.   PURPOSE. This section explains the need for studying, conceptualizing, and proposing doctrine on the subject of the civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces of less developed countries (LDC).

2.   OBJECTIVES.

   a.   To present the requirements of the USATRADOC study directive.

   b.   To define the tasks addressed by project CRIAF.

   c.   To explain the concern of the US Army for the civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces.

3.   ASSUMPTIONS.

   a.   Notwithstanding the political, economic, and sociocultural differences which exist among LDCs, it is scientifically valid to search for the general principles governing civil-military relations and their impact on the military posture and capabilities of indigenous armed forces (IAF).

   b.   Political, economic, sociological, or psychological factors which relate to military objectives need to be integrated into the body of military science.

4.   STUDY DIRECTIVE.

   a.   The USATRADOC study directive formulates the purpose of the project as follows:

> The purpose of this study is to examine the civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces in developing nations. This study will contribute to the development of Army doctrine for advice and assistance and for stability operations, and will make possible a significant increase in the Army's ability to implement the Nation Building policy recently promulgated by the Department of the Army.

   b.   The study directive identifies the problem which CRIAF is to consider:

> A coherent concept regarding civil-military roles appropriate to indigenous armed forces in underdeveloped countries has not been developed. The lack of such concept impedes the development of valid comprehensive Army doctrine for Stability Operations, and hinders the commanders of MAAG's,

MILGROUPS and Military Assistance Commands from developing optimal policies as to desired civil-military roles for host-country armed forces. The lack of this concept also impedes the compiling of information and experience in a systematic fashion to improve future operations.

c. The study directive defines the principal objective of CRIAF:

To develop a general concept of the civil-military roles appropriate to indigenous armed forces under various economic, social and security circumstances.

d. The second objective is to:

Derive from the general concept and its specific applications recommended changes in Army doctrine for stability operations, with emphasis on the fields of civil-military operations, and advice and assistance.

e. The general concept and applications developed by CRIAF must be valid for the 1976-1982 time frame.

5. DEVELOPMENT OF CRIAF STUDY PLAN. The study plan, as approved by USATRADOC on 6 January 1972, contains the following research tasks:

a. Analyze the effect of possible and desirable civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces, including paramilitary forces, in circumstances of standard normality, civil disturbances, insurrection and rebellion, insurgency and low intensity warfare; and the impact of those roles in internal defense, internal development, stability operations, nation building, deterrence of insurgency and favorable results of low intensity warfare.

b. Develop a general conceptualization of civil-military roles appropriate to indigenous armed forces under various political, economic, sociological and security conditions.

c. Derive from the concept, and its specific applications, recommended changes in Army doctrine for Stability Operations, with emphasis on civil-military operations, advice and assistance.

6. METHODOLOGY. An outline of methodological processes employed in developing project CRIAF can be summarized as follows:

a. A literature search for existing hypotheses applicable to CRIAF.

b. Formulation of new hypotheses from research findings in the existing literature.

c. Integration of several tested hypotheses into a system of theoretical models.

d. Refinement and reduction of models into a master working model against which empirical data from countries under observation could be assessed.

e. Identification of problems experienced by IAFs in performing civil-military roles.

f. Area and country studies on 40 developing nations based on a detailed plan and format approved by USATRADOC.

g. Detailed analysis of existing civil-military roles, relations and operations found in the 40 developing nations.

h. Assessment of the beneficial or detrimental effects of civil-military roles, relations, and operations by utilization of the "theoretical interpretative working model" as a standard.

i. Distillation of all findings into concise conclusions that can be utilized to formulate a US Army doctrine applicable to a "realistic deterrence" posture for the 1976-1982 time frame.

7. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON CIVIL MILITARY ROLES OF ARMED FORCES.

a. Existing literature. The initial literature search showed that studies on civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces were abundant. The DA Pamphlet 550 Series contains numerous descriptions of such roles. The Internal Defense Bibliography published by the US Army Command and General Staff College lists hundreds of works related to the subject. Since 1960 more than 3,000 US Army generated or sponsored studies have dealt with different aspects of the same matter. There is, moreover, a vast body of academic research focusing on various civil-military activities of foreign military forces, and most area and country studies include an analysis of the impact of the military on political affairs. These studies fall into two categories: descriptive and analytical.

b. Current concepts concerning civil-military roles of armed forces. The literature on civil-military roles of armed forces may be divided into three categories: non-military literature dealing with "The Military and Society," the writings of military and civilian strategists, and US Army doctrine.

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(1) Social science contributions on "The Military and Society." The social science contribution is primarily concerned with the beneficial or detrimental effects of the military upon society. In general, this literature does not give proper emphasis to the primary mission of the military which is national defense. Despite the merits of its contributions, this approach has been as imbalanced as a study of "University and Society" which would ignore the educational purpose of the university, or a study of "Hospitals and Society" that would not consider the medical purposes for which hospitals exist. The literature on "The Military and Society" may be divided into "Studies on Militarism" and "The Military as Agents of Modernization."

(a) Studies on militarism. Militarism was intensively studied in the last century by Friedrich Engels[1]. The theory of Engels is that the military is the instrument of the exploiting classes and provides the element of force to suppress and enslave the proletariat. This general theme has pervaded many current works[2]. From another perspective, Communist authors when writing on Communist armed forces and their employment include elements of strategic thinking which are absent when these authors write about the forces they consider their ideological enemies[3].

(b) Studies on the military as agents of modernization. Another group of writers has been concerned with the capabilities of the military for modernizing their nations: Morris Janowitz[4], Samuel P. Huntington[5], John J. Johnson[6], and Henry Bienen[7] belong to this group. These writers have devoted considerable attention to military civic action. They place special emphasis on the performance of the military, and on analytical classification of diverse types of armed forces to explain which type is more likely to be a force for modernization. Considerable attention is paid to the social origins of military officers as an indicator of a modernizing force. The controversy over whether the military is an agent of development and whether it has such requisite skills continues to this day. Basically writers[8] have studied the military in peacetime, but not in war, thus missing the most significant aspect of civil-military relations. They have not considered the deterrent function of the military in the prevention of war: that is, to make violent aggression costly and uncertain. Some, have presented as new "findings" venerable principles of military science. Thus, George Kelly concluded:

> The military as a group feels instinctively
> that it is the best judge of the national
> security interest; it refers to this pre-
> science as part of its 'raison d'etre."[9]

Members of the military in all ages have held that threat evaluation is their key peacetime function.

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(2) Military and civilian strategists' contributions. Unlike their Communist counterparts, modern western strategists have not been especially concerned with civil-military relationships, except with the industrial and technological requirements of modern armies. The overriding preoccupation of these strategists has been with the issues evolving from nuclear capabilities and nuclear deterrence.[10] Traditionally, military strategy studies[11] since the nineteenth century have been predominately concerned with the conduct of war, while "grand strategy" studies, which cover the national potential for war, and its overall application, have taken a secondary place. It is in the grand strategy that the relation of military and society must be sought. It is interesting to note that while Clausewitz devoted considerable attention to the national potential for war in relation to the attitude of society in Books I and II of his Treatise On War[12], his better known writings deal with field strategy, or military strategy, which he defines as "the art of making use of given means in combat."[13] General Moltke refined it as "the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general's disposal to attain the objective in view."[14] By this definition of strategy. the strategist is directed toward the application of those means given him by his government. This limited concern for a military or field strategy characteristic of the military of his time was challenged by General Ludendorff, who in his book Der Totale Krieg[15] presented the theory that "not armies, but nations, wage war." The contemporary military aspects of the relation between society and its armed forces have been developed mainly by the geopolitical school[16] and by the Marxist-Leninist strategists.

(3) US Army doctrine on civil-military relations. It is necessary to distinguish between two contrasting aspects of the current US doctrinal approach to civil-military relations. One may be termed the "orthodox approach," which existed prior to the Vietnam conflict. The second is the "unorthodox approach" applied to stability operations, which was generated in response to overseas insurgencies.

(a) Characteristics of the "orthodox approach." The orthodox approach evolves around the axiomatic basis of the "ubiquity of conflict"[17] and the doctrine of "national power." Conflict between nations is felt to be continuous,[18] although "it may vary from mere disagreements and conflicts of interest to basic and irreconcilable differences."[19] In the pursuit of national ideologies and objectives nations rely on their national power, which "includes all the means available, i.e., political, economic, military, and psychological."[20] Specifically, the five factors of national power are geographical, demographic, organizational, psychological, and military.[21]

1. Strategy[22] is the art and science of combining all the above factors and using them effectively to achieve national objectives, while military strategy is concerned with the employment of the military factor.[23]

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2. The Army definition of strategic mobilization[24] includes all factors of national power. The concept of mobilization base[25] includes the full extent of civil-military coordination for war and other emergencies. Implicit in the concept is the interdependence between the civilian and military factors of national power in the pursuit of national objectives, which realistically determines the overlap between the military and the civilian sectors of a society. The concepts of political warfare,[26] economic warfare,[27] and psychological warfare,[28] as well as the concept of strategic vulnerabilities,[29] complete the doctrinal recognition of the relation of nonmilitary factors to the defense posture of a nation and to its military strategy. Although the orthodox approach encompasses a whole range of factors relevant to military science, one factor is left to governments and the art of politics, namely, obtaining popular support of national policy and national defense.

(b) Characteristics of the "unorthodox approach." This approach is tailored to developing nations friendly to the US and facing insurgency conditions. It does not always give sufficient recognition to the fact that the country to which it is directed has an independent national policy, a grand strategy, and a military strategy of its own. This approach tends to assume that there is an identity of interests and objectives between the recipient country and the US. In this context, Chapter 4 of FM 31-23 (Stability Operations US Army Doctrine) states:

> The primary objective of these governments
> normally will be the attainment of internal
> security through stability operations programs
> which will permit economic, political and
> social growth.

Stability operations doctrine does not recognize internal hostilities as a war. Its primary techniques for achieving internal security are economic, political, and social growth. Economic growth may be measured by increases in the production and consumption of goods and services. Social scientists differ on the definition of social and political growth. How can military operations seek an objective that defies precise definition? FM 100-5, Operations of the Army in the Field, describes the relation between war and national objectives:

> Because the purpose of war is to attain
> national objectives, national strategy must
> be geared to these objectives. The national
> objectives of the United States are to in-
> sure its security and freedom, and to main-
> tain world-wide conditions of peace, security
> and justice.

There is little doubt that any country would subscribe to the thesis that its principal national objectives are security and freedom. As mentioned above, the doctrine of stability operations emphasizes economic, political

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and social factors as the primary means of obtaining internal security. Thus, the doctrine of stability operations tends to create a double standard since the paramount goal for the US is security and freedom, and the goals for LDCs, economic, political, and social growth. The reason behind this contradiction lies in the assumption that economic, political, and social growth leads to satisfaction and support for the government. This has been popularly referred to as "the hearts and minds" doctrine. The orthodox approach does not speculate on what gives rise to satisfaction and popular support, or lack of support, for the government in power. It says that when an armed aggression is taking place, the primary concern is to thwart it by decreasing the force available to the aggressor, not by increasing economic, social, and political growth. Conversely, the unorthodox approach defines civil-military relations as follows:

> Gaining the support of the population is of utmost importance. It is not enough merely to deprive the insurgent of population support through control measures. Since populace and resources control operations tend to be restrictive and repressive, they must be offset by vital and dynamic programs aiming at winning the active support of the people.[30]

    (c) Discussion of the orthodox and unorthodox approaches to civil-military relations. The orthodox approach has not been developed to cover situations of internal war, or insurgency war. This shortcoming was pointed out by Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley in their official study of the United States Army in World War II:[31]

> In the analytical and interpretative literature on war by professional military writers since the middle of the nineteenth century, the expanding role of the non-combatant services has received only perfunctory recognition, while scarcely any of the writers have chosen to describe the actual mechanics of administration. Among professional officers of the US Army, at least until recently, indifference to logistics was widespread and traditional--a striking paradox in an Army that claims some of the most spectacular advances in that field.

The Clausewitz emphasis on battle in the orthodox approach has tended to neglect the importance of noncombatant rear elements. When the US was faced with high intensity conflicts calling for the dispatch of expeditionary armies overseas, this was not a major problem. However, when it had to advise and assist allied and friendly governments waging a war without fronts on their own territory, against insurgents, the orthodox approach proved inadequate.

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SECTION III. The Environment of the Less Developed Countries

1. PURPOSE. The proponent unit was instructed by USATRADOC to "analyze the effects of stability, avoidance of conflict, and the legitimacy of the host country government on possible civil-military roles which may be required or adopted by the armed forces, including paramilitary forces of developing nations." In order to fulfill these requirements it was necessary to summarize the general characteristics and problems of LDCs.

2. THE CONCEPT OF LDC.

    a. Economic definition of underdevelopment. The US Army uses the term "developing countries" interchangeably with "less developed countries." The United Nations established three different criteria for measuring development: (1) amount of production, (2) industrialization, and (3) the population's standard of living. The first two can be measured by statistics of Gross National Product, Gross Domestic Product, National Income and their "per capita" equivalents. It is much more difficult to measure the "standards of living" of the population. Attempts have been made to compare them in terms of family income distribution, wages paid by different economic sectors, percent of unemployment and underemployment, and through health, education and labor statistics. The United Nations has made two attempts to formulate measures for standards of living but without much success.

    b. Military definition of underdevelopment. FM 31-23, Stability Operations, defines a developing country as one "which has advanced beyond a traditional society and is striving towards an advanced economic system and an efficient, popularly supported government." The definition distinguishes between "traditional" and "developing" societies and assumes a correlation between an economic condition--"striving towards an advanced economy," and a political condition--"efficient and popularly supported government." However, the definition does not specify what is meant by these two conditions.

    c. Proposed criterion for identifying LDCs. It was felt that a new military definition of underdevelopment was needed. Such a definition should have taken into account the economic concept of underdevelopment, as measured by the amount of goods and services a country is capable of producing, because part of these goods and services constitute the economic potential of a country for war. Accordingly, the following definition is proposed: An LDC is one in which the potential for war, as measured by the resources available in the mobilization base, is insufficient to cope with major internal or external threats.

3. GEOGRAPHIC AND POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

    a. Geographic characteristics. One-fifth of the world's land mass is under the sovereignty of the LDCs. The following characteristics differentiate LDCs from developed countries:

(1) LDCs, lacking the means to improve soil resources, have a smaller proportion of cultivated land than the developed countries. LDCs have a higher proportion of desert, inhospitable and barren land, particularly in the Moslem area, but also in Asian and Sub-Saharan countries. The dense forested areas in Southern and Southwestern Asia are swampy. Communications are hindered by heavy undergrowth.

(2) The economic significance of these geographic aspects of LDCs partly accounts for the poverty of their rural populations and for their meager food reserves. In spite of this, some LDCs produce very specialized crops which they export to the world markets.

(3) Politically, the LDCs often include large remote areas where communications are poor and the government finds it difficult to assert its authority. This, combined with the ethnic divisions typical of many LDCs, likewise tends to fragment the population.

(4) Considerable portions of their national territory cannot be effectively guarded, controlled, protected, or defended. The extended boundaries of many LDCs coincide with barren, mountainous, desert or heavily forested areas, which may easily become infiltration routes or sanctuaries for insurgents. The combination of these factors increases the problem of national defense. However, the scarcity of resources would hinder an aggressor trying to solve his logistical dependence on local supplies, thus deterring potential conflict in those areas.

b. Population distribution and growth. Table 1-1 shows that each year the LDCs represent a larger percentage of the world's population. In 1965 LDCs had 68 percent of the total world population and by 1985 three out of every four persons will be inhabitants of LDCs. Table 1-2 compares crude birth and death rates for developed regions and less developed regions since 1850 and shows the natural increase for both regions.

(1) LDC population growth. If current trends continue, the population of the LDCs will double in 30 years. This means that by 2001 there may be 5.5 billion persons in the LDCs. Such an expansion of the population of the LDCs may be a predictor of conflict, as high rates of population growth tend to produce competition for available land.

(2) Consequences of population growth. One consequence of a high birth rate is a lowered age of the population. Table 1-3 gives a regional breakdown between four age groups. The LDCs have the highest percentage of population in the "less than 14" age group. Demographically, this implies continued high birth rates. Economically, it means a higher ratio of dependents to the working population. Militarily, it means that LDCs will have large surpluses of manpower. Table 1-4 presents the 1982 population estimates for the 40 countries considered by this study.

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c. Population growth in rural settings. Table 1-5 gives statistics for rural and urban growth in LDCs to 1980. According to United Nations statistics, in 1960 67 percent of the world's population was rural. Estimates for 1980 show that the percentage of rural population will be 59 percent, but in absolute numbers the rural population will have increased by over one-third to 3.12 billion. The economic aspects of this problem are illustrated by the case of Morocco where, in 1970, 80 percent of the population, or a total of 12.1 million, was engaged in agriculture. The population density was 48 persons per square kilometer. By 1982 it is estimated that the Moroccan agricultural population will have declined to 70 percent, but the absolute number of people engaged in agriculture will have increased to 15.9 million, with a resultant density of 61.7 persons per square kilometer.

(1) Capital accumulation and agricultural reform. Of the 40 countries studied, 38 have agrarian reforms underway. Most of them are land redistribution programs. However, redistribution without capital investment cannot solve the agricultural problem. Capital is scarce in LDCs since returns from capital financing are higher in commercial and industrial ventures. Agricultural investment is not attractive to the private sector. Moreover, modernizing governments tend to concentrate their resources in industrial expansion.

(2) Impact on traditional forms of society. Increases in rural densities require new social and economic organizations. Anthropological research shows that rural, communal, or tribal organizations tend to disintegrate when an increase in numbers prevents the organizations from providing for their members.

d. Population growth in urban settings. Table 1-6 gives estimates on world trends in city growth. The growth of cities accelerates in the modernization process as rural workers migrate to the cities and the urban born population increases at a rapid pace. Currently, the city population doubles every 7 years. According to projections for the LDCs, the 1980 increases over the 1960 population will be: 382 million more people living in cities up to 500,000; 191 million more people in cities up to 2,500,000 inhabitants; and 121 million more people in metropolitan areas up to 12,500,000 inhabitants. This growing population will need jobs, housing, water, sewers, electricity, streets, public transportation, schools, and hospitals.

(1) From an economic point of view the problem of urbanization has no immediate solution, because fiscal resources of the LDCs are not sufficient to cover the growing costs of urbanization.

(2) Large slum and squatter urban populations create serious political difficulties. Uprooted from their rural settings, they are relatively easy to mobilize for political purposes, particularly as the problem of urban poverty cannot be solved in short order by any LDC government.

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(3) Urban riots generally present no serious threat to the internal defense of a country, unless they are a part of a well-organized movement against the existing order. However, governmental instability in the presence of adverse socioeconomic conditions tends to alienate IAFs from the government, without whose support internal urban disturbances cannot be controlled. This accounts for the dependency of governments on their armed forces, and for the dominance of military establishments in the LDCs.

4. SOCIOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LDCs.

a. The diversity of sovereign states. If all sovereign states were true "nations," internal tensions and conflicts would take place within the context of a common set of aims and values. However, sovereign states include "nations," "national groups," and other religious, ethnic, linguistic, and ideological groups whose goals and aims are by no means similar or even compatible. The analysis and forecasting of internal stability must consider this internal characteristic of sovereign states.

b. Internal conflict within homogeneous and heterogeneous states. Internal conflicts in homogeneous or "continuous" states differ from those of the discontinuous or heterogeneous states. In the former, beginning in a political form, internal conflict rapidly becomes a struggle between political or ideological groups to gain access to full governmental power. The population is mobilized slowly into the political debate, and few participate directly in the fray. No homogeneous state whose constituted government has the ability and will to resist a rebellion may be overthrown. In heterogeneous states, conflict is at the grass roots based on latent tensions between different nationality, religious, ethnic, and linguistic or ideological groups. Competition for power among small political elites is brought about by the weakness of the government of the sovereign state. When the government weakens, the different groups and nationalities begin to separate, to fight each other, seeking dominance or secession. These conflicts are difficult to control or reduce, and tend to involve neighboring sovereign states.

c. Regional summaries of sociological discontinuities.

(1) Moslem countries. Of the eleven Moslem countries included in this study, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan will continue to be threatened by the profound discontinuities which exist in them. While religious, ethnic, and linguistic differences within a sovereign state may lead to internal conflict, a lack of differentiation between two neighboring sovereign states may also lead to conflict between those states. If the populations are practically identical, some political sectors will favor the union of the two states, while other political sectors may oppose union. The government of the sovereign states will usually react against union since organizations generally seek to protect themselves.

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(2) Asian countries. Practically all Asian countries covered by this study exhibit significant discontinuities, with the added problem that some of the ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups living in their territories have members in other countries. These "minorities" operate like bridgeheads between countries. India's discontinuities will become a threat if the central government loses the power to control secessionist tendencies manifest or latent in several political subdivisions.

(3) Sub-Saharan countries. The Sub-Saharan countries also show deep and troublesome internal discontinuities. The ethnic, religious and linguistic differences between Ibos and Housa-Fulani in Nigeria has already resulted in a war. In Liberia, a relatively more modernized minority amounting to no more than 5 or 6 percent of the population controls the state. The progressive secularization of native religion, and the breaking down of traditional tribal bonds due to modernization and population growth, will inevitably produce conflict between ethnic groups and the government.

(4) General observations.

(a) The sovereign states try to prevent fragmentation and secession using power, authority, and administrative controls. When administrative action, authority, and the exercise of power are insufficient to prevent disintegration, IAFs are called to intervene. The IAFs in the LDCs play political roles by opposing fragmenting factions in these countries. Without the action of the IAFs or the deterrent effect of their very existence, LDCs would probably split into opposing factions, and, in many, conditions would become chaotic.

(b) When government positions in the sovereign state are occupied by members of one ethnic group who attempt to destroy the ethnic, religious or national identity of other groups, an internal revolt is predictable.

(c) The distribution of capital investment for development purposes is planned and executed by national agencies under the direct supervision of the highest levels of government. In the application of resources to improve different territories and groups, these agencies have biases which stem from economic and political causes. Under strictly economic criteria, it is desirable in terms of cost-effectiveness to give priority to those areas containing important natural resources where the investment will have maximum cooperation of the population, where it will multiply the efforts of an already active and industrious population, and where it can produce larger returns in terms of the gross national product. Politically, it may be advantageous to prefer one ethnic group over others. Thus, the process of development tends to widen the gap between rich and poor. Table 1-7 indicates where different territories of India have been given differential treatment with respect to agricultural and land development, roads, medical, and educational facilities. These differences do

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not contribute to an increase of ethnic tensions as long as the less privileged groups remain locked in traditional patterns, but once the traditional structure breaks down, tensions increase with the rate of change. State organs no longer can count on consensus of the ethnic and other groups. Modernization, by no means, brings political stability: it results in higher levels of strife that call for stringent government control.

(d) The highest vulnerability of the LDCs lies in their internal discontinuities. The efforts to reduce or check the forces of secession and the conflicts between groups will increase in intensity as de-tribalization and modernization increase. The traditional tribe will become the sectional political party with a totally different orientation from the political parties of Western democracies. It will retain its tribal characteristics and apply itself to the attainment of power with the intensity of former tribal strife. Therefore, the level of internal conflict within most LDCs may increase during the 1976-1982 time frame. The hasty introduction of Western political concepts into countries with totally different sociological characteristics will accelerate the erosion of present traditional structures. The pressure of population growth will speed up this conflict. Given the strategic importance of many LDCs, the major powers will not be able to remain indifferent to those internal conflicts, which will be the major sources of international tension during the 1976-1982 time frame.

5. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LDCs.

a. Statistical measures of wealth and production.

(1) Gross National Product. The Gross National Product (GNP) of a country measures the value of goods and services it produces and obtains. Table 1-8 presents the GNP of the countries considered in this study in terms of US dollars at constant 1970 value. As compared to the GNP of such countries as the United States, West Germany, or Japan, the production of the LDCs is quite small. The total of their GNP is only 30 percent of the US GNP.

(2) GNP as an indicator of government resources. The GNP is an important indicator of what a government can do. The economic resources available to the government come from taxation and are a fraction of the GNP. The lower the GNP, the smaller the fraction which the government can tap. In the LDCs many are too poor to contribute through taxation to governments. The effort a government can sustain for national defense depends on the GNP. For example, the United States expends on national defense 9 percent of its GNP, or $77 billion (1970), while India, which also allocates 8 percent of its GNP for national defense, spends only $4 billion, and Iraq, with about the same allocation (8.2% of GNP) spends only $221 million.

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(3) Classification of countries by GNP. Table 1-8 classifies countries into seven groups—A to G—according to their GNP. This distinction is relevant to a further classification based on the per capita GNP criterion. Table 1-9 classifies selected countries by per capita GNP. This adjustment indicates constraints set by the needs of the population on the total wealth or production. For example, India, which in 1970 had a GNP of $52.9 billion, has only $96 per capita GNP, one of the world's lowest. Even though India controls a large amount of wealth, given the needs of its population, the amount is minimal. However, the Indian government has more means at its disposal than a smaller country, and in an emergency it can use part of those means for national defense. Since India would soon feel the economic and social impact of such a reallocation, it cannot follow this course of action for a prolonged period of time.

(4) Ranking of LDCs by GNP. Table 1-9 indicates that most Sub-Saharan and Asian countries fall into the lower per capita GNP groups. The Moslem countries are somewhat higher while the Latin American countries generally fall into the highest groups.

b. The prospects of economic development in the LDCs. The assumption that socioeconomic development is a requisite to political stability may not be valid in the LDCs because of the social dislocations associated with economic development. The assumption that economic development can be accelerated by appropriate governmental measures is questionable. A government can contribute, and almost all governments attempt to contribute, to economic development. There are limits to governmental efforts to promote economic acceleration. Promises to improve standards of living which fail have negative consequences.

(1) LDC GNP growth. Recently, the United Nations estimated that the average rate of GNP growth in the LDCs was 6 percent (Table 1-10). At this rate, it would take the LDCs 12 years to double their GNP. It is doubtful that an average 6 percent GNP increase can be sustained because when industrial output is low, any increase causes considerable percentage increase. Moreover, the drop in agricultural surplus due to population growth and the consequent increase in those living on subsistence levels will have an adverse effect on economic growth. Real increases in wealth are more realistically described by the per capita GNP. Since the rate of population growth varies between 2.5 and 3 percent per year, most of the GNP increases listed in Table 1-10 do not amount to any increase in national wealth. For example, Indonesia with a 6.7 percent GNP growth and 2.8 percent population increase has a real growth rate of 3.9 percent. Tables 1-10 and 1-11 present estimates of GNP and per capita GNP growth respectively for 1976 and 1982. The countries which are poor in 1973 will continue to be poor in 1976 and 1982. The reason is simple: all countries with per capita GNP of less than $100, growing at a rate of 3 percent will take 24 years to double their per capita GNP. After 24 years of effort, they will have a GNP per capita of $100 to $200.

(2) Presently there are 22 countries with per capita GNP between $100 and $200: 5 Asian, 4 Moslem, and 13 Sub-Saharan. By 1982 these countries may have a per capita GNP between $200 and $300. At the same time the 17 countries with a per capita GNP between $200 and $299 may reach a per capita GNP between $300 and $500. It is doubtful that these increases will be felt in terms of improved standards of living. The dislocation due to changes in economic production will be felt in urban and rural sectors. The countries reaching a GNP of $300 to $500 by 1982 will probably be in a worse position than those which currently have the same per capita GNP.

c. <u>Some correlations of various levels of economic development.</u> A given level of per capita GNP is generally associated with other economic and social characteristics in such a way that rough forecasts can be made, as summarized in Table 1-13.

(1) The "size of national population" forecasts a rapid rate of growth in the countries between $500 and $1000 per capita. The dislocations produced by this phenomenon are likely to have considerable impact in the internal security situation of the LDCs.

(2) The "degree of industrialization and economic diversification of production" will remain low in the group between $100 and $300 per capita GNP, resulting in high rates of urban unemployment, which can be exploited for political purposes.

(3) The "importance of the marginal strata within the urban population" will increase political tensions which no government shall be able to solve economically. Totalitarian countries have attempted to solve it by harsh measures.

(4) The "proportion of the population able to participate in the political process through votes and organized demands" and the degree of inequality in income distribution tend to increase with economic development, with the latter increasing more rapidly. Thus, a population politically organized and able to make demands faces a situation in which income inequalities are more visible and frustrating.

(5) Economic development is likely to produce social disorganization, political conflict, and mass alienation. Internal disturbances lead local investment capital to leave the country thus paralyzing the process of economic growth at the most dangerous phase.

(6) While the real wealth and standards of living in LDCs will not alter substantially during the 1976-1982 time frame, growing GNP will increase the states' economic potential for war.

6. GENERAL POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LDCs. The political characteristics of developing countries reflect their development process.

a. <u>Trends in political development.</u> The transition from the traditional political forms toward the political institutions prevailing in

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the developed countries, and in the Western democracies in particular, is by no means a straight line of progress. The process is characterized by the following stages:

(1) A deliberate attempt by traditional governments to modernize the political structure of the country by adopting the constitutional forms of the leading world powers, in particular those of Great Britain (parliamentary system), United States (presidential system), and the variations of the Belgian, Swiss, and French constitutions.

(2) In the newly-independent states that emerged after World War II, the colonial countries provided constitutions to the new sovereign states modeled on their own. Most of these constitutions proved to be unworkable and resulted in bloody civil wars, secessions, and conflicts.

(3) With the emergence of independence, political power rested in coalitions of national liberation movements led by national heroes and manned by members of the local intelligentsia and the emerging middle classes.

(4) The competition for power among the elite tended to split the coalitions into conservative "nationalists" and radical "reformers," to which neo-Communist groups, frequently associated with World War II guerrilla movements, were added.

(5) Increasing political strife, and the ensuing urban violence, resulted in coups d'etat by which leaders of the "reformers" groups established single party rule under appropriate "socialist revolutionary" labels. At times political strife was ended by a military coup.

(6) The civilian leader in power, with the support of his single party, tended to increase the strength and severity of government controls to suppress the opposition and to implement reforms leading to an increase in state power, as well as to foster economic development. The administrative inefficiency or the arbitrariness of the civilian leaders prompted military coups.

(7) Several military governments succeeded each other as different cliques within the armed forces vied for power. This stage tended to end with the emergence of a forceful military leader. Otherwise, the armed forces themselves would try to reestablish civilian government.

(8) Reestablished civilian governments tended to implement constitutions based on broad representation of the traditional forces of the country. These systems soon met with the opposition of urban based, small, aggressive "doctrinal" parties which, with the support of the urban mass media, discredited them and opened the way for new civilian "social reformers."

(9) The civilian "social reformers" tended to be overthrown by a civilian strong man, who would rule again with a "single party," to be overthrown in turn by the armed forces.

b. <u>Determinants of political trends</u>. Each of the countries ·in this study followed the process mentioned above. The order of events may have varied, but usually the instability process was cyclical, unless a government emerged which had the power to control the conflicts and struggles in progress and thus stabilize the political rotation.

(1) The sources of conflicts and struggles are basically two: elements of the elite competing not for a share of, but for the total power, and elements of the ethnic, religious, and cultural groups attempting to gain dominance, or to secede. The more "modernizing" elements are those more likely to engage in the political power play leading to the paradox that at the intermediate levels of political development the "modernizing" elements are the major sources of instability.

(2) In Volume II of this study, the "power of a government" is defined as the "ability to influence persons, organizations and events toward some desired goal by the manipulation of alternatives." The manipulation of alternatives consists in the selective allocation of rewards and punishments. To allocate rewards a government must have resources. To inflict punishment, or the threat of it, it must have force. The police support given to a government in general is inadequate to face insurgent attacks. Ultimately, governments must depend upon the armed force as their principal support. The armed forces may oppose some governmental decisions and are generally unwilling to be used as blind instruments of unstable governments. In most cases they insist on exchanging their support for a higher role in policy making. When governments become unpopular, or engage in controversial policies, or put excessive demands on the armed forces to maintain themselves in power, rifts between the men in power and the armed forces are likely to appear. When the governmental team is weak or inefficient, unable to maintain law and order, or when the state faces an external threat which the governmental team is unable to reduce, the armed forces tend to overthrow them. Civilian governmental leaders often hesitate to entrust their political fate to the good will of the armed forces and tend to rely on paramilitary organizations. The armed forces are generally unwilling to share their "monopoly of force" with paramilitary civilian organizations and tend to overthrow governments which support these paramilitary organizations.

(3) The political instability of the LDCs cannot be evaluated out of context. The characteristics of the situation account for political instability rather than the shortcomings of political leaders. The dilemma of the governments of LDCs rests in the need to control and unify the adversary forces of the society. Control and unification policies are resented by emergent elements in quest of power.

(4) Many LDCs have been, or are, governed by their IAFs, or by teams under the direct control of the IAF. Military governments within the last 20 years show a tendency toward successive military coups, as various cliques within the armed forces displace members of other cliques in their quest for governmental power.

(5) The rotation of military teams in power eventually ends in the establishment of the personal rule of a leader who achieves control of the IAF and, through it, of the country. Such leaders tend to disassociate themselves from their former fellow officers and establish neocivilian governments under a party which responds to their political and personal views. If such a leader does not emerge, the rotation of military governments produces a political exhaustion within the IAF which results in transferring political power to a civilian group. The new civilian government team must face the problem of its predecessors, and eventually it may be overthrown again by a military coup.

(6) These events can be partly explained by the demographic, sociological, and economic problems affecting LDCs and partly by the strong ideological forces existing in the world today. The ideological tensions were magnified during World War II, when internal revolts against enemy rulers were considered honorable and dignified. The moral imperative to use force against "oppressors" which was then established has continued to be invoked against any political opponent. The favorable connotations given to the concept of "revolution" by Western public opinion has been and is being used to justify any attack against Western values and beliefs. Generally, every minority claims to be oppressed, and the end result is that in most LDCs all political elites which are out of power claim to be oppressed and feel the moral right to revolt. These psychological factors are used to legitimize violent conflict among political elites. It has not improved the well-being of the populations in whose name the self-proclaimed liberators were acting. It has legitimized rule by violence--generally on behalf of exalted social principles--and spread governmental and general instability in most LDCs.[32]

c. Political systems and military involvement.

(1) FM 31-23 has incorporated James H. Billington's thesis[33]of revolutions from above" and "revolutions from below." The basis of the classification is whether the "revolution" involves many people (in which case it appears to be "from below") or a few (in which case it appears to be "from above"). This approach is equivocal because no matter whether few or many people participate, the real leaders are always a few. Revolutionary leaders may opt for consolidating a large following or for achieving their ends with a small but selected group. The most successful strategy is that of the Communist Party: a small and disciplined cadre, leading as many people as possible. In LDCs the number of people that can be incorporated into political, social, or ideological platforms depends on the extent to which people are already politically mobilized. Thus, large followings can be obtained in times of internal unrest, in war and its aftermath, and during nationalistic agitation and labor unrest.

(2) The aftermath ~~of World War~~ II has led to internal violence. Table 1-14 presents information on the number of countries in which acts of internal violence occurred, which required the presence of IAF. The tabulation does not measure the intensity or duration of the conflict. It simply records the number of countries in which the IAFs were called upon to restore public order. The caption "Civil Disturbances" includes riots, disorders and other localized acts of violence of a more or less spontaneous or nonorganized nature. The increase in these incidents is comparatively small with almost a diminishing trend. "Subversions and Rebellions" include small scale urban violence unleashed by highly disciplined organizations and aimed at overthrowing governments. The data show that subversively organized "demonstrative" violence has increased. The information collected in Volume III of this Study suggests the following generalizations:

(a) The majority of rebellions were conducted by elements of IAFs. None of them took place in time of domestic tranquility. All of them followed periods in which public order was affected by civilian strife.

(b) About 70 percent of all civilian-conducted subversions have failed. Failure can be attributed to decisive action taken by the military. Those civil subversions which succeeded had the implicit support of the IAF or their benevolent neutrality.

(c) By contrast, about 80 percent of all military moves against governments succeeded in their objectives. The cases in which they did not succeed were instances in which the military elements participating in the move were marginal and unsupported by the rest of the IAF.

(3) Table 1-14 indicates that the number of insurgencies has remained fairly constant, which suggests that the underlying causes were always present. In most cases, conditions favoring insurgency were a progressive weakening of the government, the presence of strife, a split between government and the IAF, or substantial external support.

(4) There are four types of political military activism. In Type I there is no career officer corps. In Type II the IAFs are potentially a significant force but the civilian groups are the dominant political force. In Type III countries the IAFs play the role of arbiter but otherwise do not exercise governmental functions. Whatever the form of government, the IAFs exercise veto authority. In Type IV countries IAFs exercise extended and direct rule, and an executive led by the military looks to the officer corps as the basic constituency. Civil groups and institutions have influence but no powers of decision.

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The preceding discussion of the geographic, demographic, sociological
and political characteristics of the LDCs has shown their complexity
and diversity giving rise to problems which can lead to internal strife,
instability, and possibly insurgency in the time frame under discussion.

Table 1-1. Projection of world's population 1965-1985 (millions)

Year	World	Developed	Less Developed
1965	3,289	1,037	2,252
1970	3,632	1,090	2,542
1975	4,022	1,147	2,875
1980	4,457	1,210	3,247
1985	4,934	1,275	3,659

Source:

UN 1970 Report on the World Social Situation, New York, 1971

Table 1-2.   Estimated and projected average annual crude birth rates, crude death rates, and rates of natural increase for more developed and less developed regions, 1960-1967, and selected periods

Period	More Developed Regions (crude rates)			Less Developed Regions (crude rates)		
	Birth	Death	Nat. Increase	Birth	Death	Nat. Increase
1960-1967	20	9	11	41	18	23
1865-1900	37	27	10	41	36	5
1850-1865	39	30	9	40	41	-1
Decades						
1900-1910	34	21	13	41	34	7
1910-1920	26	23	3	40	37	3
1920-1930	28	16	12	41	31	10
1930-1940	22	14	8	41	29	12
1940-1950	20	15	5	40	28	12
1950-1960	23	10	13	41	21	20
1960-1970	19	9	10	40	18	22
1970-1980	19	9	10	37	15	22
1980-1990	19	9	10	33	12	21
1990-2000	18	9	9	29	10	19

Source:

UN 1970 Report On The World Social Situation, New York 1971, p. 146
Rates per 1,000 population per year.

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Table 1-3. Percentage of total population in four age groups in eight major world areas, 1965

	0-4	5-14	15-64	65 +
North America	10.6	20.4	59.8	9.2
Europe	8.7	16.7	64.1	10.4
Soviet Union	10.2	20.4	62.1	7.4
East Asia	12.9	24.0	59.0	4.1
South Asia	16.9	26.1	54.0	3.0
Latin America	16.5	26.0	53.8	3.6
Africa	17.7	25.8	53.7	2.8
Australia and Austral	11.8	21.0	59.9	7.3

United Nations, op. cit., p. 147

Table 1-4. Estimates and projections of population for the CRIAF 40 countries: 1976-1982 (in thousands)

	1976	1982
Latin America		
Argentina	25,330	28,170
Bolivia	5,718	6,797
Brazil	113,794	139,956
Cuba	9,451	10,856
Dominican Republic	5,317	6,764
Ecuador	7,490	9,529
Guatemala	6,196	7,620
Haiti	5,481	6,296
Mexico	66,330	87,409
Panama	1,624	1,930
Peru	16,223	19,951
Uruguay	3,109	3,392
Venezuela	12,183	16,264
Sub-Saharan Africa		
Kenya	13,429	16,516
Liberia	1,700	1,903
Nigeria	63,854	75,909
Sudan	18,473	22,334
Zaire	27,234	35,910

	1976	1982
Asia		
India	604,715	694,939
Indonesia	142,650	172,465
South Korea	36,870	43,827
North Korea	15,642	17,971
Malaysia	12,894	15,858
Philippines	43,998	54,131
South Vietnam	21,260	25,257
Singapoore	2,371	2,771
Thailand	44,800	55,100
Moslem Nations		
Afghanistan	19,527	22,818
Algeria	17,710	23,859
Iran	35,964	45,756
Iraq	11,271	13,862
Jordan	2,888	3,611
Lebanon	3,328	4,093
Lybia	2,382	3,031
Morocco	18,537	22,793
Pakistan*	128,600	147,715
Saudi Arabia	9,108	11,316
Syria	7,678	9,770
Tunisia	6,134	7,544
Israel	3,475	4,273

*Includes West Pakistan and Bangla-Desh.

Source: Compiled from studies prepared by the CRIAF Functional Study Teams.

Table 1-5. Rural and urban distribution of the world's population by developed and less developed countries* 1960-1980 (millions)

1960	Rural	% Rural	Urban	Total
Developed Countries	396	41%	580	976
LDC	1605	80%	410	2.015
Total	2001	67%	990	2991

1980				
Developed Countries	344	29%	850	1194
LDC	2194	70%	930	3124
Total	2538	59%	1780	4318

Most countries consider "urban" population centers of 2000 to 3000 inhabitants, which according to sociocultural standards ought to be considered rural. The result of those definitions is that the total population engaged in agriculture is larger than the "rural" population.

Source: Adapted from UN 1970 Report on the World Social Situation New York, 1971, p. 153.

Table 1-6. United Nations estimates of world trends in city growth

1960	Cities			
	20-500	500-2,500	2,500-12,500	÷12,500
Developed Countries	450	221	98	28
LDC	311	131	44	--
Total	761	352	142	28
1980				
Developed Countries	661	343	186	60
LDC	693	322	165	27
Total	1354	665	351	87

Source: UN 1970 Report on the World Social Situation. New York, 1971, p. 146.

Table 1-7. India--indicators of inequality between states
in the distribution of developmental benefits

Indicators	Highest value	Lowest value
Percentage of agricultural land irrigated	42.0 (Punjab, 1959-1960)	5.9 (Maharashtra, 1959-1960)
Kilometers of rural roads per 100 km^2 of rural area	49.9 (West Bengal, 1960-1961)	4.4 (Jammu and Kashmir, 1963-1964)
Number of hospitals and dispensaries per 100,000 rural population	12.4 (Jammu and Kashmir, 1963-1964)	1.4 (Rajasthan, 1964)
Percentage of children, aged 6-11, enrolled in classes I to IV of primary school	95.5 (Madras, 1963-1964)	45.0 (Bihar, 1961-1962)

Source: Government of India, Planning Commission, Regional Variations In
Social Development and Levels of Living: A Study of the Impact of Plan
Programmes (New Delhi, 1967), vol. I.

Table 1-8. Classification of selected countries by gross national product (GNP)

Group A Countries (100 Billion +)

Country	GNP	GNP/Cap.
W. Germany	186,300	3019
Japan	197,180	1307
U.S.A.	974,000	4670

Group B Countries (50-100 Billion)

Country	GNP	GNP/Cap.
India	52,920	96

Group C Countries (10-50 Billion)

Country	GNP	GNP/Cap.
Iran	10180	198
Philippines	10230	266
Venezuela	10300	990
Pakistan	17500	134
Argentina	23030	989
Mexico	33000	651
Brazil	35440	372

Group D Countries (5-10 Billion)

Country	GNP	GNP/Cap.
Cuba	5200	612
Israel	5500	1897
Nigeria	5300	105
Thailand	6510	174
Indonesia	7600	64
S. Korea	8213	258

Group E Countries (2-5 Billion)

Country	GNP	GNP/Cap.
Uruguay	2145	740
Iraq	2693	355
Jordan	2750	250
Saudi Arabia	3140	581
Libya	3140	1653
S. Vietnam	3200	175
Morocco	3341	210
Malaysia	3837	352
Algeria	4180	303
N. Korea	4500	317
Peru	4800	353

Group F Countries (1-2 Billion)

Country	GNP	GNP/Cap.
Panama	1016	726
Tunisia	1225	236
Singapore	1247	638
Domin. Rep.	1500	357
Afghanistan	1500	89
Lebanon	1525	526
Kenya	1732	141
Syria	1590	261
Guatemala	1786	337
Ecuador	1800	295
Sudan	1890	120
Zaire	1947	109

Group G Countries (less than 1 Billion)

Country	GNP	GNP/Cap.
Liberia	352	235
Haiti	360	73
Bolivia	976	208

Note: All estimates are in current U.S. dollars (1970). The currency of most countries was converted into dollars at the official exchange.
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 1971, pp 10-13.

Data for Singapore are for 1967; they were obtained from World Economic Survey, 1969-1970, p. 178.

Table 1-9. Classification of nations by per capita GNP

Under $200		$200-500		$ Over 500	
Upper Volta	60	Bolivia	208	Lebanon	526
Indonesia	64	Morocco	210	Costa Rica	532
Somali Repub ic	65	Liberia	235	Mongolia	569
Ethiopia	69	Tunisia	236	Jamaica	578
Malawi	71	Ghana	249	Saudi Arabia	581
Chad	72	Jordan	250	Cuba	612
Laos	72	Paraguay	250	Gabon	618
Haiti	73	Honduras	254	Mexico	651
D.R. Vietnam	75	Turkey	255	Chile	717
Burma	75	Korea Rep.	258	Panama	726
Niger	79	Rep. of Congo	259	Uruguay	740
Nepal	80	Syrian Arab Rep.	261	Trinidad & Tobago	773
Guinea	81	Philippines	266	S. Africa	830
Afghanistan	89	S. Rhodesia	269	Argentina	989
Dahomey	94	Iraq	278	Venezuela	990
India	96	El Salvador	293	Greece	1067
Mali	100	Ecuador	295	Romania	1099
Tanzania	100	Algeria	303	Bulgaria	1153
Nigeria	105	Guyana	313	Poland	1212
Zaire	109	Korea D.R.	317	Hungary	1388
Cambodia	110	Colombia	335	Ireland	1414
Yemen	120	Guatemala	337	Libya	1653
Sudan	120	Ivory Coast	339	Italy	1739
Malagasy Rep.	120	Malaysia	352	E. Germany	1889
Centr. Afr. Rep.	133	Peru	353	Israel	1897
Uganda	134	Iran	355	New Zealand	1903
Pakistan	134	Dominican Rep.	357	Japan	1907
Togo	141	Albania	364	Austria	1932
Kenya	141	Brazil	372	USSR	2047
P.R. China	144	Taiwan	374	Czechoslovakia	2103
Mauritania	150	Zambia	400	U.K.	2168
Sierra Leone	157	Nicaragua	406	Finland	2170
Ceylon	169			Netherlands	2400
Cameroon	171			Iceland	2500
Thailand	174			Australia	2639
R.V.N.	175			Belgium	2649
Senegal	179			France	1904
Egypt	198			W. Germany	3019
				Denmark	3120
				Switzerland	3254
				Luxemburg	3333
				Norway	3430
				Canada	3651
				Kuwait	3929
				Sweden	4025
				U.S.A.	4758

Source: Compiled from studies prepared by the CRIAF Functional Study Teams

Table 1-10. Selected Developing Countries Growth in Physical Production 1960-68

| | Percentage Contribution to Gross Domestic Product | | | | | | Average Annual Rate of Growth | | | |
| | Agriculture[b] | | Industry[c] | | Physical Production[d] | | 1960-1962 | | 1966-1968 | |
	1960 1962	1966 1968	1960 1962	1966 1968	1960 1962	1966 1968	Gross Domestic Product	Physical Production	Gross Domestic Product	Physical Production
Latin America										
Argentina..............	16.9	16.4	39.2	42 5	56.0	55.7	3.0	4 3	4.7	5.0
Barbados..............	26.5	25.4	25.3	24.4	51.8	49.8	5.0	4 7	..	...
Bolivia...	28.8	23.1	28.1	55.4	56.9	58 4	5.2	5 6	7.2	7.0
Brazil................	22.3	20.7	25.1	25.8	47.4	46.4	4.3	3 7	...	...
Chile.................	11.2	9.4	40.0	45.4	51.2	54.9	6.8	7 1	1.6	3.5
Colombia..............	33.7	30.8	25.0	25.8	58.8	57.5	4.7	4 1	6.3	6.4
Costa Rica............	27.8	25.4	22.5	24 0	50.3	49.2	6.1	5 1	6.1	12.4
Dominican Republic.....	25.9	22.5	22.8	24 0	48.6	46.6	2.5	1 7	3 1	0.3
Ecuador...............	37.4	33.9	22.9	22 5	60.3	56.4	4.6	4 3	...	...
El Salvador...........	32.8	26.2	19.5	23.8	52.3	50.0	6.7	6 5	...	...
Guatemala.............	27.7	26.1	15.9	18.2	43.6	44.3	5.1	5 1	5.6	5.3
Honduras..............	44.1	36.6	18.1	23.6	62.2	60.1	5.7	5 2	4.9	7.0
Jamaica...............	11.8	10.9	36 1	37.4	47.8	48.4	4.2	4 5	...	...
Mexico................	18.8	16.2	32.5	36.1	51.3	52.3	6.3	6 5	...	...
Panama................	24.3	22.0	22.5	25.7	46.8	47.8	8.2	6 7	7.3	8.0
Paraguay..............	36.1	32.9	19.0	20.0	55.1	52.9	4.1	4	5.1	2.6
Peru..................	21.9	17.7	28.9	30.7	50.8	48.5	6.0	5 3	3.4	...
Uruguay...............	20.0	20.6	26.7	27.2	46.7	47.8	0.1	0.1	1.2	2.0
Venezuela.............	7.2	7.8	43.5	42.4	50.7	50.2	4.5	4 5	5.8	4.9
Africa										
Ethiopia..............	63.9	56.1	12.6	16.2	76.5	72.3	4.9	7	...	...
Ivory Coast...........	46.2	41.4	16.4	17.5	62.6	58.9	9 5	4 4	...	...
Kenya.................	39.3	37.3	16.5	16.2	55.8	53.4	6.1	4 6	6.6	5.4
Libyan Arab Republic...	9.3	3.4	36.1	67.0	45.4	70.1	36.0	40.0	35.7	43.3
Morocco...............	31.0	31.6	27.2	27.7	58.1	59.3	3.0	3 1	12.7	16.7
Nigeria...............	61.5	55.0	11.7	17.5	73.2	72.5	4.0	3 7	...	...
Sierra Leone..........	34.5	34.1	28.2	27.9	62.7	62.0	2.9	6	7.0	8.5
Tunisia...............	24.2	15.9	26 0	30.9	50.2	46.8	3.7	2 4	8.2	11.1
Uganda................	60.4	58 3	12.3	13.1	72.7	71.4	3.7	4	...	...
United Republic of Tanzania.............	58.0	57.2	8 2	9.3	66.2	66.5	3.6	3 4	...	...
Asia										
Ceylon................	48.0	41.8	12.3	15.9	61.2	57.7	3.7	4 6	7.6	8.8
China (Taiwan)........	29.9	23.9	25.8	30.4	55.7	54.3	9.8	9.0	8.7	9.9
India.................	49.4	43.6	20.9	23.8	66.2	66.6	3.2	4	...	...
Indonesia.............	52.5	52.6	14 7	15.2	67.2	67.9	2	2 1	6.7	6.7
Iran..................	28.1	22.4	31.2	39.4	59.3	61.8	7.6	8.4	...	...
Iraq..................	19.2	19.9	46.7	46.1	65.9	66.0	5.8	5.9	15.8	15.7
Israel................	10.3	8.3	32.3	31.4	42.6	39.7	7.3	5 4	14.9	20.9
Khmer Republic........	41.5	41.9	16.6	16.1	58.1	58.0	3.7	3.5	...	...
Malaysia..............	37.9	35.2	19.6	22.6	57.4	57.8	5.0	6.3	...	...
Pakistan..............	52.3	46.3	13 3	17.1	65 6	63.4	5.6	5.3	5.2	4.8
Philippines...........	31.3	30.8	27.8	27.8	59.2	58.8	5.2	4.9	6.0	6.9
Republic of Korea......	40.1	32.7	19.4	28.6	59.5	61.3	7.5	7 6	13.0	3.4
Syria.................	32.8	25.7	14.5	16.8	47.3	42.5	4.9	2 7	8.6	6.0
Thailand..............	38.5	31.2	16.1	21.2	54.7	52.4	7.1	6.2	8.0	7.9

Source: Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies of the United Nations Secretariat, based on the Statistical Office of the United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. The countries included are those for which data are available on production by industrial origin. Both gross domestic product and physical product are expressed in constant (1960) factor costs. For Barbados, China (Taiwan), Ivory Coast and Mauritius, sectoral data were available only at current prices and the implicit gross domestic product deflator was used to convert them to 1960 prices.
  b. Including forestry, hunting and fishing.
  c. Including manufacturing, mining, construction, electricity, gas and water.
  d. Agriculture plus industry.

Table 1-11. Projected GNP for 1976 and 1983

Moslem Countries and Israel	1976 GNP	1983 GNP
Jordan	646	744
Tunisia	1,550	2,040
Lebanon	1,820	2,240
Afghanistan	2,010	2,829
Syria	2,191	3,180
Iraq	3,821	5,744
Morocco	4,226	5,562
Saudi Arabia	5,601	10,586
Algeria	5,601	7,882
Israel	8,800	15,300
Lybia	13,175	70,206
Iran	17,073	31,211
Sub-Sahara African Countries		
Liberia	528	848
Zaire	1,729	1,504
Kenya	2,373	3,812
Sudan	2,835	4,554
Nigeria	7,553	10,266

Asian Countries	1976 GNP	1983 GNP
Singapore	2,085	3,348
S. Vietnam	3,820	4,699
Malaysia	5,142	7,235
N. Korea	6,750	10,845
Indonesia	9,074	11,161
Thailand	10,446	18,136
Philippines	13,708	19,293
S. Korea	16,385	36,678
Pakistan	24,129	35,000
India	65,091	82,000
Western Hemisphere Countries		
Haiti	424	512
Bolivia	1,385	2,081
Panama	1,594	2,655
Dominican Republic	1,689	1,941
Guatemala	2,197	4,793
Uruguay	2,278	2,441
Equador	2,340	3,186
Peru	6,400	9,052
Cuba	6,698	9,805
Venezuela	14,626	24,823
Argentina	30,152	39,677
Brazil	46,153	62,806
Mexico	49,500	79,500

1. The projected gross national product for each country was obtained by first calculating the compounded real growth rate (inflation is excluded) from 1961 to 1970, then compounding this growth rate to the 1976 and 1983 gross national products. The monetary unit is 1970 U.S. dollars.
Sources: (Current) Gross National Product 1961-1970; Table V; World Military Expenditures, 1971 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C. pp. 22-25. "Consumer Price Index Numbers" Statistical Yearbook, 1971, United Nations, New York, 1971, pp. 549-556.

Table 1-12. Projected per capita GNP for 1976 and 1983

Country	1976 GNP/Cap.	1983 GNP/Cap.
Moslem Countries and Israel		
Afghanistan	103	124
Morocco	227	244
Jordan	227	206
Tunisia	253	270
Syria	285	325
Algeria	316	330
Iraq	332	408
Iran	475	682
Lebanon	546	547
Saudi Arabia	922	1,580
Israel	2,472	3,362
Libya	5,531	23,162
Sub-Sahara African Countries		
Zaire	63	42
Nigeria	118	135
Sudan	154	203
Kenya	177	230
Liberia	310	446

Country	1976 GNP/Cap.	1983 GNP/Cap.
Asian Countries		
Indonesia	64	65
India	107	119
S. Vietnam	179	186
Pakistan	188	236
Thailand	233	333
Philippines	311	356
Malaysia	399	456
N. Korea	432	603
S. Korea	444	837
Singapore	879	1,208
Western Hemisphere Countries		
Haiti	77	81
Bolivia	242	306
Ecuador	312	334
Dominican Republic	317	287
Guatemala	349	364
Peru	395	453
Brazil	405	449
Cuba	728	892
Uruguay	732	720
Mexico	820	1,035
Panama	981	1,376
Venezuela	1,144	
Argentina	1,188	1,526

The projected per capita gross national products for 1976 and 1983 were obtained by dividing the projected gross national product by the projected population. The projected populations were obtained by first calculating the compounded population growth rate from 1961 to 1970, then compounding this growth rate to the 1976 and 1983 populations. The monetary unit is 1970 U.S. dollars.

Sources: "Table VII, Population: 1961-1970," "World Military Expenditures, 1971, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1972, pp. 30-33.

The manner and sources used to obtain the 1976 gross national product are explained in the previous footnote.

Table 1-13. Some Internal Characteristics of Countries According to Their Degree of Development as Measured by Their Per Capita GNP

	OVER 1000	500-999	300-499	100-299
Level of per capita product...	High	Medium	Low	Low
Rate of growth of per capita product....................	Low	Medium-high	Medium-high	Low
Size of national population...	High-low	High	Low	Low
Rate of national population growth.....................	Medium-low	High	High	Medium
Proportion of population in the lowest age groups (0-14)......	Medium-low	High	High	Medium
Degree of Industrialization and economic diversification............	Medium-high	Medium-high	Low	Low
Level of urbanization and size of urban middle strata........	High	Medium	Low	Low
Rate of urbanization and growth of urban middle strata.	Medium-low	High	Medium	Low
Importance of regional strata within urban population.	Medium-low	High	Medium-high	Medium-high
Percentage of population in agriculture	Low	Medium	High	High
Proportion of population able to participate in the political process through votes and organized unions	High	Medium	Low	Low
Degree of development and income inequality between internal regions	Medium-low	High	Medium	Low
Degree of inequality in income distribution.	Medium-high	High	High	Medium-high
Absorptive capacity for professions and specialized skills	Low	High	Medium	Low
Importance of the public sector as a source of employment and investment...	High	Medium-high	Low	Low
Coverage of educational and other social services and proportion of national products allocated to such services..............	High	Medium	Low	Low
Rate of growth of coverage of such services..........	Medium-low	Medium-high	Medium-high	Low
Internal pressures for growth of services along present lines.....	High	Medium-high	Medium	Low
Pressures for reform and equalization of services. .	Medium-low	High	Medium-low	Low
Technical capacity for planning and reform of services..	High	Medium	Low	Low
Ability of public sector to increase allocations to social services.	Low	Medium	Medium-high	Low

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Table 1-14. Internal conflicts in 121 countries which required the intervention of the indigenous armed forces

Number of countries in which internal conflicts took place	1961-62	1964-65	1967-69	1970-72
	85	89	85	92

Type of Conflicts

	1961-62	1964-65	1967-69	1970-72
Civil Disturbances. Riots, disorders and other localized acts of violence which required the intervention of troops.	76	83	85	92
Subversions and Rebellions. Relatively small scale urban violence engineered by political or other highly disciplined organizations, aimed at overthrowing governments. Military coups included.	22	27	30	36
Insurgencies. Highly organized large scale violence conducted by large organizations in different places, to overthrow the government or to secede from it.	38	39	37	40
Insurgency War with tactical operations involving paramilitary units.	3	4	5	5

Sources: New York Times Index, Catalogue of Foreign Newspapers, various sources. The coding includes incidences in which military forces were present, but excludes those which may have been of a larger scale, but in which military forces did not appear.

SECTION IV. Civil-Military Roles of IAFs

1. PURPOSE. This chapter presents a general description and analysis of civil-military roles and the major characteristics of IAFs.

2. POLITICAL CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. Political civil-military relations result from interactions between the political forces of a society and the IAF.

   a. Political orientations of IAF. The information gathered in this chapter is based on data obtained from 40 countries. Volume III of this study contains those country studies. In the developed countries, armed forces conform to the broad political ideologies of the sovereign state. The military may be called upon to prevent violent interference with elections or to support, with force if necessary, the performance of those political acts recognized as constitutional and legal by the sovereign state, even against the population. An example is President Eisenhower's decision to federalize the National Guard of the State of Arkansas to enforce desegregation of a university, in accordance with a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court.

   (1) In the LDCs the IAFs also engage in political civil-military roles and maintain political attitudes and behaviors; however, the consensus on what is politically appropriate is not always unanimous. There is no fixed pattern of IAF behavior with respect to civil authority. Therefore, political attitudes and activities of IAFs can only be understood within the context of their own societies.

   (2) An analysis of the data collected in the country studies indicates that in 75 percent of these countries, the IAFs maintain some levels of distinct political involvement. The intensity of the political involvement of the IAF is correlated with the level of political tensions in the country as well as with the level of internal or external threat.

   (3) Political orientation of IAFs is presented in Table 1-15. In 33 countries modernization is a predominant feature of political orientation by the military, and in 22 countries the officer corps is basically oriented toward nationalistic goals. A conservative orientation by the military was found in only 6 of the 40 countries involved in the study. In 10 countries, a considerable fraction of the officer corps--generally the youngest--belongs to a different political orientation than the majority of the officer corps in that country.

   b. Avoidance of direct military control. The study revealed that in most cases the IAF tends to avoid establishing military government or total military control over government. The reason appears to be that when the officer corps of an IAF is given direct governmental responsibility, it tends to split into "civilian administrators" and "military commanders." This split reduces the effectiveness of the officer corps.

It also erodes the reputation of the "civilian administrators" who, as time goes by, become separated from the troop commanders. Since the power ultimately resides with troop commanders, many officers avoid long term civilian administration assignments. The evaluation of the political and government activities of the officer corps in IDCs requires a careful distinction beyond simply counting instances in which officers exercise direct governmental or political power. For example, in most LDCs high ranking officers hold cabinet positions either as military service ministers or as ministers of the interior-- the ministry generally responsible for internal law and order and internal security and control. The desire of civil authority to benefit from the presence of the military in the cabinet is instrumental in assigning these positions to the officer corps. Members of the active military hold cabinet positions in three-fourths of the countries under study, as Table 1-16 shows. This reflects the influence of the military, as well as the widespread custom that active military membership does not disqualify officers from holding such cabinet-level positions. Also, in a number of countries, military officers can be elected or appointed to membership in legislative bodies; in others, military commanders are allowed to issue decrees and proclamations in matters affecting the civilian population. Further, in a majority (27) of the countries under study, military commanders have demonstrated their ability to mobilize large segments of the population in their favor. Finally, in 23 countries the IAF has formulated political ideologies, generally consisting of nationalistic and social doctrines, stressing modernization.

3. ECONOMIC CIVIL-MILITARY ROLES OF IAF.

    a.   The economic roles of the IAFs were evaluated in terms of their contributions to economic stability and development rather than to national defense. Table 1-17 presents a variety of economic civil-military roles. The most frequent activities of IAFs include health, education, public communication and transportation, and public utilities. IAFs are used by governments to accomplish a vast variety of tasks because of their capabilities in manpower, equipment, organizational and administrative skills, and technical expertise.

    b.   Table 1-17, in referring to economic roles, does not specify the objectives of these roles so that an analysis of military objectives is not feasible. One trend, however, is clear. In those countries where the threat is high, the objectives of economic roles of IAF are basically military in order to increase the defense posture of the country or reduce its strategic vulnerabilities. In most cases the execution of these strategic economic operations is a reaction to problem situations. Strategic economic planning for national defense purposes is not a frequent activity of LDCs.

4. CIVIL-MILITARY ROLES OF IAFs RELATED TO NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY.

a. Table 1-18 shows that the IAFs are engaged in a large variety of civil-military roles related to internal defense and security. In 33 of the 40 countries considered, the IAF has primary responsibility for the whole range of activities related to population and resources control in emergency situations. In any emergency beyond the control of the police forces and civilian authorities, military assistance is required except where paramilitary formations are used to reduce the involvement of the IAF in population and resources control. For example, Zaire assigns those responsibilities to a very large gendarmerie, in Kenya, the national security forces under the political leadership of the single party have primary responsibility; in Brazil, this responsibility has been given to the military police; and in North Korea, the security services have primary responsibility in population and resources control.

b. However, all of these countries have provisions for the declaration of martial law which permits use of the IAF. In 30 countries, the IAF has primary responsibility over border and desert areas, and military officers head gendarmerie units. In all but Uruguay, the IAFs maintain territorial or area commands, which, in emergency situations after the declaration of martial law, become the territorial or area commands with the capability to exercise military government functions.

5. CIVIL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS OF IAFs. The study revealed that IAFs have the capability to carry out civil government functions. This is reflected by Table 1-19. All IAFs have a public safety capability. At best, about three-fourths of the 40 IAFs studied have the capability to perform civil defense, public health, and public utilities functions. This is followed closely by capabilities in public education and civilian supply. Also, more than half of the IAFs have the capability to perform labor relations, public welfare, food and agricultural civil information, and displaced person and refugee functions. Further, over 15 of the IAFs have the capability to perform legal, public finance, property control, public transportation, arts, monuments and archives, and economic and commerce functions. This is again followed closely by public administration. Finally, only eight countries have a capability to perform religious relations functions.

6. SPECIFIC FINDINGS.   •

a. Civil-military roles of IAFs fall into two classes:

(1) Civil-military roles relevant to civilian objectives.

(2) Civil-military roles relevant to military objectives.

b.   Assignments given armed forces by the government contribute, support, or implement civilian national policy objectives.

c.   Civil-military roles relevant to military objectives are the missions assigned to armed forces in civil-military affairs by the national military strategy of a country.

d.   Civil-military roles in support of civilian objectives are different from civil-military roles in support of military objectives and have to be considered separately.

e.   Civil-military roles with a civilian objective are classified into:

(1)   Those governmental roles which support political and administrative objectives of the government.

(2)   Those economic roles which support national economic development plans and local improvement and civic action programs.

(3)   Those technological roles which support public works, communications, transportation, and technological development.

(4)   Those sociological roles which support manpower and human resources development for non-military purposes.

(5)   Those psychological roles which support nonmilitary operations.

f.   Civil-military roles are implemented by civil-military operations. Civil-military roles relevant to military operations are classified in accordance with the army classification of operations. Therefore, civil-military roles relevant to military operations are:

(1)   Strategic civil-military roles.

(2)   Logistic civil-military roles.

(3)   Combat service support civil-military roles.

g.   Strategic civil-military roles support national military strategic objectives of a country. To do this, IAFs:

(1)   Plan and direct strategic civil military operations for the political, economic, and psychological mobilization of the country for war.

(2)   Plan and supervise the reduction of political, economic, technological, sociological, and psychological strategic vulnerabilities.

(3) Plan and direct operations to safeguard and increase the resources of the mobilization base.

(4) Plan, supervise, or direct defense against enemy political, economic, and psychological warfare.

(5) Plan and direct strategic military support to civilian populations in economic, public utility, sociological, and psychological matters.

(6) Plan and supervise civilian police and security operations on a country level.

(7) Contribute to civil-military intelligence operations.

(8) Provide local military government support to civilian authorities under the provisions of martial law.

h. Logistics civil-military roles support the logistical requirements of the armed forces. They consist of:

(1) The transformation of national power into military potential for war and combat power.

(2) The direct manpower and resources control to meet the logistics needs of the armed forces.

(3) Grass root civilian support to the logistics requirements of particular combat units.

i. Combat service support civil-military roles consist of:

(1) Provision of civilian support for and prevention of civilian interference with tactical operations.

(2) Provision of civil affairs support for tactical intelligence activities.

(3) Assistance to the tactical commander in the attainment of his political-military objectives.

(4) Assistance to the tactical commander in the discharge of his legal responsibilities towards the civilian population.

(5) Assistance in the detection and neutralization of insurgent organizations and activities in the combat zone.

(6) Conduct of tactical psychological operations.

(7) Provision of essential facilities for displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees.

j.   Political, economic, and social development of a country is a civilian objective. The development of these sectors without the adequate mobilization and control supplied by the defensive and offensive civil-military operations will increase the resources of the enemy.

k.   The double emphasis on internal defense and internal development predicated by stability operations doctrine is based on the assumption that people revolt and support the insurgents because of dissatisfaction with economic and social conditions. Data obtained from CRIAF suggested that subversion and insurgency are more likely to appear in areas where economic and social development are taking place, and are caused by the dislocations produced by development.

l.   Civil-military roles of the IAFs were found to be pervasive, and the study indicated that there was a substantial involvement of the IAFs in political, economic and internal defense matters of LDCs.

Table 1-15. Political orientations of the IAFs

	Basically Conservative	Nationalistic & Modernizing	Radical & Modernizing	Socialistic & Modernizing
Afghanistan	X	XY		
Haiti	X			
Jordan	X			
Liberia	X			
Malaysia	X			
Saudi Arabia	X			
Argentina		X		
Brazil		X		
Dom. Rep.		X		
Ecuador		X		
Guatemala		X		
India		X		
Indonesia		X		
Iran		X	XY	
Israel		X		
Kenya		X	XY	
Lebanon		X		
Mexico		X		
Morocco		X	XY	
Nigeria		X	XY	
Pakistan		X		
Singapore		X		
South Korea		X	XY	
South Vietnam		X	XY	
Thailand	XY	X		
Tunisia		X		
Uruguay		X	XY	
Venezuela		X		
Zaire		X	XY	
Algeria			X	
Bolivia			X	
Iraq			X	
Lybia			X	
Panama			X	
Peru			X	XY
Philippines			X	
Sudan			X	
Syria			X	
Cuba		•		X
North Korea				X

Note: X = Predominant political orientation.
        XY = Secondary orientation of a considerable portion of
             the officer corps--generally consisting of the younger
             members.

Source: Compiled from studies prepared by the CRIAF Functional Study Teams.

Table 1-16. Involvement of the military in
governmental activities in
LDCs

	Holding Cabinet Positions	Legislative Positions	of Decrees and Proclamations	Political Mobilization	Formulation of Politica Ideology
Sub-Saharan	3	3	2	3	3
Asian	12	13	4	7	6
Latin American	5	8	7	10	9
Moslem	9	8	4	7	5

Source: Compiled from studies prepared by the CRIAF Functional Study Teams.

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Table 1-17. Civil-military roles of IAFs related to internal defense

Role	Number of Countries
1. Population and resources control in emergency situations.	33
2. Border security and safety operations.	30
3. Conduct of tactical counterinsurgency operations.	22
4. Assignment of officers to paramilitary forces.	30
5. Administration and control of intelligence operations.	25
6. Exercise of governmental function.	19
7. Civil defense, disaster control and relief.	38
8. Operation of territorial commands.	39

Source: Compiled from studies prepared by the CRIAF Functional Study Teams.

Table 1-18. Economic civil-military roles in selected countries

	Role	Number of Countries
1.	Participation in economic planning.	16
2.	Ownership or administration of public communications, transportation, and public utilities.	28
3.	Administration of regional economic development programs.	21
4.	Conduct of military civic action programs at local level.	35
5.	Conduct of public works programs to include housing and squatter relief.	23
6.	Planning and administration of land reclamation projects.	20
7.	Administration of agrarian reform and agricultural extension programs.	18
8.	Colonization and development of remote areas.	16
9.	Provision of technical personnel to governmental economic services.	23
10.	Educational development in rural areas.	30
11.	Provision of health services to the civilian population.	32
12.	Provision of custom services to the government.	3

Source: Compiled from studies prepared by the CRIAF Functional Study Teams.

Table 1-19. Civil-military roles of IAFs classified by civil government functions

Classifications	Yes	No	No Data
Governmental Functions			
Civil Defense	38	2	
Labor Relations	23	16	1
Legal Affairs	16	23	1
Public Administration	14	23	3
Public Education	29	9	2
Public Finance	18	20	2
Public Health	31	3	6
Public Safety and Security	40		
Public Welfare	23	13	4
Economic Functions			
Civilian Supply	28	11	1
Economics and Commerce	15	21	4
Food and Agriculture	25	13	2
Property Control	19	20	1
Public Facilities Functions			
Public Communications	25	15	
Public Transportation	18	22	
Public Works and Utilities	33	7	
Special Civil Affairs Functions			
Arts, Monuments and Archives	15	21	4
Civil Information	21	19	
DP's, Refugees and Evacuees	22	17	1
Religious	8	32	

Source: Compiled from studies prepared by the CRIAF Functional Study Teams.

SECTION V. Conclusions and Recommendations

1. PURPOSE. This chapter will present conclusions concerning the LDCs, the IAFs, and the civil-military roles of the IAF, as well as recommendations based on those conclusions pertinent to Army doctrine concerning civil-military roles of IAFs.

2. THE LDC AND THE IAF.

   a. LDCs are composed of diverse and often antagonistic ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural groups. Inhospitable terrain complicates their control and defense. Internal or external aggressors will need outside support to meet logistical requirements.

   b. The population of most LDCs will double every 20-24 years, causing profound social, economic, and political dislocations. The growth of the rural population wil increase competition between ethnic and tribal groups for available land. In most urban concentrations, the population will double within 12-18 years overtaxing all available services. Governmental efforts to provide services will fall short of basic requirements.

   c. Economic growth in the LDCs will not bring about internal stability. Population dislocations, social disorganizations, and political conflict will lead to internal disorder and strife. In the 1976-1982 time frame, LDCs will realize a 6 percent annual increase in GNP. This will not be enough to solve the economic problems of the growing population. It may even lead to a decline in living standards. However, increases in GNP will develop the internal strength of the governments and their economic potential for war.

   d. Agrarian reforms, overwhelmed by rural population growth, will do little to motivate the beneficiaries toward their governments while antagonizing those forced to share their land. Problems fostered by rapid urban growth will decrease public acceptance of governments and require continuing reliance on force to maintain law and order.

   e. Widening differences in income distribution coupled with increasing political activity will motivate displaced members of the middle class, intellectuals and youth to organize national movements, hostile to Western countries, which will continue operating wherever governments are unwilling or unable to use strong and efficient police controls.

   f. The process of modernization will increase the strife within the LDCs. The gradual transformation of inward-looking traditional tribal and ethnic groups into outward-looking politically conscious pressure groups will foster higher levels of political competition, struggle, and violence. Too rapid an adoption of Western political philosophies by the middle class, superimposed on indigenous group differences, may increase political unrest and violence and reduce the probability of governments holding countries together.

g.   The ideology of over half of the IAFs tends toward moderni-
zation which leads to competition or hostility between soldiers and
civilians with respect to who will lead the nation. Relations among
groups deteriorate as modernization proceeds. As groups develop self
awareness, they will try to secure dominance over the others.

h.   When two sovereign states are culturally homogeneous, there
will be a tendency toward their unification either by negotiation or
annexation.

i.   Attempts to establish coalition governments will fail if
the ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural groups strive for a
position of uncontested dominance over other groups.

j.   This instability is not to be attributed to shortcomings of
governments, but to disruptive forces of change which cannot be pre-
vented by the economic aid efforts of the developed countries.

k.   Governments will increasingly resort to force to check threats
to their unity and internal security. A l .DCs will have their social
institutions threatened with totalitarian governments having a better
chance to check such threats.

l.   Realizing that economic improvement is beyond their capability,
LDCs will continue pressure on developed countries for better terms of
trade and other economic advantages. This may affect world-wide distri-
bution of strategic raw materials used as bargaining tools with a re-
sulting increase in international tensions.

m.   Political activity of the IAF is accepted by the population and
increases with the level of political tension and with the perception
of internal or external threats.

n.   Conflicts between governments and their IAFs generally ori-
ginate from different views on how to keep the sovereign state united.
There has been a growing tendency toward military intervention in govern-
mental affairs, particularly when:

(1)   The government is unable to counter an internal or ex-
ternal threat.

(2)   The government is unable to oppose a threat of secession.

(3)   A war has become unpopular.

(4)   The political situation is chaotic.

(5)   A weak government is controlled by an unpopular minority.

(6)   The government is unable to control a conflict between
factions within the armed forces.

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(7) There is external support to the military.

3. CIVIL-MILITARY ROLES.

   a. <u>Inadequacy of the current concept</u>. The CRIAF study indicates that the current concept of civil-military roles of IAFs is inadequate. While those roles have been studied in the context of insurgency, they have not been related to the accepted principles of war. Although IAFs can be a positive factor in the process of modernization, their principal mission is the defense of their country against external, internal, or mixed forms of aggression. Any analysis of civil-military roles must recognize this primary mission of the IAF.

   b. <u>Types of civil-military roles</u>. The scope and magnitude of civil-military roles are determined by the intensity and characteristics of the threat. They can have both civilian and military objectives which must be considered separately.

      (1) Roles with civilian objectives. Civil-military roles with civilian objectives fall into five categories: governmental, economic, technological, sociological and psychological.

      (2) Roles with military objectives. Civil-military roles with military objectives are strategic, logistical, or combat service support.

         (a) Strategic civil-military roles include:

            1. Planning and directing civil-military operations for political, economic, and psychological mobilization.

            2. The reduction of strategic vulnerabilities.

            3. Operations which safeguard and increase the resources of the mobilization base.

            4. Strategic military support to civilian populations.

            5. Defenses against psychological warfare.

            6. Civilian police and security operations on national levels.

            7. Civil-military intelligence operations.

         (b) Logistical civil-military roles consist of:

            1. Transforming national power into military potential for war.

        2.   Directing manpower and resources efforts to meet the logistic needs of the IAF.

        3.   Developing civilian support for the logistic requirements of combat units.

        (c) Combat service support civil-military roles include:

        1.   Developing civilian support for tactical opera-tions.

        2.   Providing support for tactical intelligence activities.

        3.   Assisting the tactical commander to attain his political military objectives.

        4.   Assisting the tactical commander in discharging his legal responsibilities to the civilian population.

        5.   Assisting in the detection and neutralization of insurgent organizations and activities in the combat zone.

        6.   Conducting tactical psychological operations.

        7.   Providing for the needs of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees.

    c.   <u>Stages in insurgent warfare</u>. The principal objective of in-surgent warfare is to seize control of the government while avoiding direct confrontation with its armed forces. This objective is achieved in three stages:

    (1) Stage One is the precombat stage and consists of enemy civil-military operations conducted to control, organize, and discipline the population of an area to secure manpower, money, and materiel, and to consolidate logistical bases.

    (2) Stage Two is a nonclassical warfare stage consisting of offensive enemy civil-military operations conducted to mobilize the population to attack governmental organizations and reduce the effec-tiveness and morale of the armed forces.

    (3) Stage Three is the combat stage consisting of a combi-nation of enemy offensive civil-military operations and tactical opera-tions which use the newly gained combat power to defeat the armed forces piecemeal or to erode their will to fight.

    d.   <u>Offensive civil-military operations</u>. The success of a typical insurgency is dependent on the effectiveness of the enemy's civil-military operations. To oppose enemy offensive civil-military operations, the

government and the IAF should not rely exclusively on defensive civil-military operations but should seize every opportunity to take the initiative with their own offensive civil-military operations. These should seek:

(1) To destroy the enemy's logistical bases, sources of supply and organization for conscription of manpower. The enemy's manpower and resources come from the civilian mobilization base. An effective government mobilization will preempt the chances of the enemy to secure these resources.

(2) To identify and destroy the enemy organizations which plan, direct, and control the actions of a mobilized population against the government and the political, economic, sociological, and psychological structures of the country.

e. Need for mobilization and control roles. The political, economic, and social development of a country is a civilian objective. However, the development of these sectors without the adequate mobilization and control supplied by the defensive and offensive civil-military operations will increase the resources of the enemy.

f. Efforts of economic development. The double emphasis on internal defense and internal development fostered by stability operations doctrine is based on the assumption that people revolt and support the insurgents because of dissatisfaction with economic and social conditions. Data obtained by the CRIAF study suggest that subversion and insurgency are more likely to occur in areas where economic and social development are taking place and that the problems are caused by the dislocations produced by the development.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. IAF domestic involvement. U.S. military advisors need to be aware that the IAFs are far more involved in domestic affairs than are the U.S. armed forces. The strict separation of the military from the civilian sector in peacetime and the unquestioned subordination of the former to the latter does not form part of the tradition of the LDCs.

b. Population control. Population control rather than control of territory is the key to the success of civil-military operations. The civil-military roles of the IAFs are an integral part of the LDCs. In developing a doctrine for civil-military operations for IAFs, the United States should focus on helping IAFs support their local populations. The development of such a doctrine must be based on the economic and cultural systems of each LDC.

c. <u>Reduction of strategic vulnerabilities</u>. U.S. military advisors operating with the IAFs should encourage those civil-military roles of IAFs that reduce strategic vulnerabilities of the LDCs and discourage those that clearly tend to increase the vulnerability of the people and the institutions to insurgent action. Conversely, U.S. advisors should assist the IAFs in increasing and exploiting the vulnerabilities of the insurgents through the pursuit of mission-related civil-military roles.

d. <u>IAF planning</u>. The IAFs in the LDCs provide the governments with deterrent elements of force. They support the government in insurgency situations by mobilizing and controlling internal resources. The IAFs should be assisted in planning for military political roles to assure the success of civil government functions.

e. <u>U.S. Army planning capability</u>. Instability in the LDCs, associated with modernization, is likely to become more widespread. Since the IAFs are generally deficient in planning for civil-military operations, the U.S. should maintain a planning capability to assist IAFs to meet internal threats.

f. <u>Urban insurgency</u>. The explosive population growth and the increasing migration from country to city will cause future military-political conflicts to be urban centered. The U.S. Army needs improved strategy to counter urban insurgency.

g. <u>Effects of economic development</u>. The assumption that economic development has beneficial effects on political stability should be reassessed in the light of experience.

h. <u>Prevention of military-led insurrection</u>. Since most civilian-led insurrections fail while most military-led succeed, it is essential that channels of communication to the officer corps of IAFs be kept open.

i. <u>Proposed definitions</u>. The following definitions should be considered for adoption:

(1) Civil-military relations: All interactions, formal and informal, friendly, neutral, or hostile, which exist between elements of the armed forces and the governmental, political, economic, sociological, and psychological components of the same or of another country.

(2) Civil-military roles: The mission, mandate, or responsibility given the armed forces of a country or elements thereof to augment, develop, organize, or control the physical, political, economic, sociological, or psychological forces and processes to secure national, strategic, logistic, or tactical objectives.

(3) Civil-military operations: Those military operations consisting of the employment of armed forces to service, augment, develop, or control civilian forces, processes, or organizations of a physical,

economic, political, or psychological nature, during peace and war, to secure or support national, strategic, tactical, or logistic objectives.

(4) An LDC is one in which the potential for war, as measured by the resources available in the mobilization base, is insufficient to cope with major internal or external threats.

j. Nonclassical land power warfare concept. The extensive civil-military roles of IAFs should be assessed from the military perspective of the proposed doctrine of nonclassical land power warfare which views internal conflict as a contest for control of the mobilization base between the IAF and the insurgents. The key elements of this doctrine follow:

(1) In the past, conflicts originating from internal sources have been variously defined as "subversive," "insurgency," "insurgency warfare," and unofficially as "peoples liberation wars." These concepts are not military but political. They stress that people have rebelled against their governments and dwell on the political, economic, and psychological motivations of the rebellion. Military science has long recognized that the causes of war are political, but military concepts of warfare cannot be based upon the "causes" of war. Once warfare has commenced and armed force is employed, it is not the cause of war that makes a difference, but enemy capabilities in terms of firepower, materiel, morale, employment doctrine, force structure, and logistic facilities.

(2) If the primary objective of a government is the reduction or elimination of the causes of an insurgency, then the military defeat of the insurgency, a prerequisite to the survival of the government, will be neglected. Current stability operations doctrine is not conducive to military planning required to defeat insurgencies, as it focuses primarily on reducing the causes of insurgency. The principles of "insurgency warfare" and "stability operations" must be combined under the concept of nonclassical land power warfare. This concept is a departure from the classic principles of war because it involves the avoidance of direct confrontation in battle with the adversary and attempts to exploit instead the strategic vulnerabilities of rear areas.

(3) The principal objective of the concept of nonclassical land power warfare is to gain direct, continuous, and comprehensive control over the inhabitants. It proposes the optimum use of manpower which is the most abundant resource of LDCs to counter the armed forces of adversaries whose strategy is based on superior firepower and logistics. It recognizes that no matter how skillfully deployed, armed forces with inferior weapons cannot achieve decisive combat superiority and, therefore, are required to maximize other combinations of the physical and psychological means available.

(4) The nonclassical land power warfare concept suggests that certain classical warfare assumptions are no longer tenable. No longer is it true that "combatants are soldiers who fight other soldiers" but instead "combatants may be civilians or soldiers fighting other civilians or soldiers." Commanders in internal wars combine the principles of offensive, mass, and surprise in new ways. For instance, the element of surprise can be obtained when soldiers are confronted with hostile military actions by those who are ostensibly civilians. Usually, soldiers are not prepared for this, and it can have demoralizing effects. Moreover, the combat environment in internal wars is displaced to rear areas permitting insurgent commanders to attack civilian installations and settlements to inflict damage and gain resources.

(5) The assumption that "combatants are uniformed soldiers assigned to military formations" is obsolete. Insurgency experience demonstrates that combatants wear whatever clothing is at hand and form part of both military and nonmilitary formations. This shift allows new applications of the principles of security, maneuver, and economy of force. The concealment of forces optimizes security. Commanders of insurgent forces with a firepower disadvantage apply the minimum force consistent with their hit and run objective.

(6) Classical theories of warfare hold that the civilian population is a passive, noncombatant element which cannot be used for military operations. Under the nonclassical concept, the civilian population cannot be allowed to remain passive or neutral and must be recruited, organized, disciplined, and controlled to serve strategic, logistic, and tactical objectives. The coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal requires the total mobilization of the civilian base by the combatants. Both the government and the insurgents draw their supplies and manpower from the same civilian mobilization base.

(7) Insurgent strategy aims at the envelopment of the rear areas. In pursuit of this objective, insurgents attempt to control the population in order to secure intelligence, recruit manpower, and obtain resources. Direct confrontation with the IAF is avoided while at the same time the insurgents seek to subvert and immobilize governmental institutions through terror, threats, and infiltration.

(8) The concept of nonclassical land power warfare is not original to this study. Though not called, such, it appears in the application of orthodox principles of military science by predominantly Marxist strategists in what is often referred to as "wars of national liberation." Insurgent movements that failed generally disregarded the nonclassical concept or were launched at a time or in an area where the preconditions for the successful prosecution of an internal war

were not present. These preconditions include a weak government unable
to or unwilling to identify the insurgency as an internal war requiring
decisive military action. They also include the incapacity of the IAF
to apply the principles of nonclassical land power warfare to defeat the
insurgent forces. Current stability operations doctrine, derived from
the traditional Western subordination of the military to civilian control,
invites a misjudgment of the military requirements in internal war and
insurgency. To defeat insurgent threats, IAFs must appreciate and use
this concept.

 (9) Nonclassical land power warfare utilizes the accepted
principles of war for internal conflict and insurgency. It meets the
requirements of forces abundant in manpower but deficient in combat
power. It allows for the application of a doctrine of force employment
that responds to the military needs of the situation. It suggests that
the causes of conflict become immaterial when the internal violence
reaches a level that threatens the survival of government. A decisive
application by IAFs of these general principles will greatly improve
their chances to defeat insurgencies. The concept is ignored at the
peril of LDC governments.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Friedrich Engles, "The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State," in Marx and Engels, <u>Collected Works</u>, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955, Vol. II, pp. 170-326.

2.   Wilson C. McWilliams, <u>Garrisons and Governments</u>, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1967; Alfred Vagts, <u>A History of Militarism</u>, New York: Free Press, 1967.

3.   Sigmund Neumann, "Engels and Marx: Military Concepts of the Social Revolutionaries," and Edward Meade Earle, "Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin: Soviet Concepts of War," in E. Meade Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.

4.   Morris Janowitz, ed., <u>The Military in the Political Development of New States</u>, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.

5.   Samuel P. Huntington, ed., <u>Changing Patterns of Military Politics</u>, New York: Free Press, 1962.

6.   John J. Johnson, <u>The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries</u>, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964.

7.   Henry Bienen, ed., <u>The Military and Modernization</u>, Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971.

8.   Stainslaw Andreski, <u>Military Organization and Society</u>, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.

9.   George Kelly, "The Global Civil-Military Dilemma," <u>Review of Politics</u>, 25 (July 1963) p. 297.

10.   William R. Davet, et al, <u>Strategic Considerations for Increased Readiness</u>, RAND HI-477-D, January 1964; Herman Kahn, <u>On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios</u>, New York: Praeger 1965; Henry A. Kissinger, ed., Problems of National Strategy, New York: Praeger, 1971; Kenneth E. Boulding, <u>Conflict and Defense: A General Theory</u>, New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

11.   In this discussion 'national strategy' will be considered as synonomous with 'grand strategy,' and 'military strategy' with 'field strategy.'   This change in terms is deemed necessary to preserve the terms 'national strategy' and 'military strategy' as strictly US armed forces terms.   Thus the 'national strategy of country X' will be called 'the grand strategy of country X,' and the 'military strategy of country X, the 'field strategy' of country X.

12. Quoted from War, Politics and Power, Chicago: Regnery Co., 1962.

13. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, New York: Random House Inc., 1943, pp. 61-66.

14. Quoted from R.M. Leighton and R.W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1950, US Army in World War II, Washington, DC: 1955, p. 9.

15. General Erich Ludendorff, Der Totale Krieg, Munich 1934, pp. 17-18.

16. Derven Whittlesey, "Haushofer, The Geopolitician," in E. Meade Early, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.

17. This term was coined by sociologist Rolf Dahrendorf in his article "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict." The Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI, (1958), 2, pp. 170-183.

18. ROTCM 145-45, Readings for the Defense Establishment in National Security, September 1969, p. 173.

19. FM 100-5, Operations of the Army in the Field, (I-II-1).

20. FM 100-5, (I-I-5).

21. ROTCM 145-45, op. cit., p. 173.

22. AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Strategy: The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat."

23. AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Military Strategy: The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force."

24. AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Mobilization: The act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national resources."

25. AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Mobilization Base: The total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs. Such resources include the manpower and material resources and services required for the support of essential military, civilian and survival activities; as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness such as (but not limited to) the following: manning levels, state of training, modernization of equipment, mobilization of material reserves and facilities, continuity of government, civil defense plans and preparedness measures, psychological preparedness of the people, international agreements, planning with industry, dispersion and standby legislation and controls."

26. AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Political Warfare: aggressive use of political means to achieve national objectives."

27. AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Economic Warfare: The defensive use during peacetime, as well as during war, of any means by military and civilian agencies to maintain and expand the economic potential for war of a nation and its (probable) allies, and conversely, the offensive use of any measure in peace and war to diminish or neutralize the economic potential for war of the (likely) enemy and his accomplices."

28. AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Psychological Warfare: The planned use of propaganda and other measures, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitude and behavior of enemy, neutral or friendly groups in support of current policy and aims of a military plan."

29. AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Strategic Vulnerability: The susceptability of vital elements of national power to being seriously decreased or adversely changed by the application of actions within the capability of another nation to impose. Strategic vulnerability may pertain to political, geographic, economic, scientific, sociological or military factors."

30. Chapter 4, FM 31-23, Stability Operations, paragraph 30B.

31. R.M. Leighton and R.W. Coakley, op. cit., p. 8.

32. CF. Colonel Sam C. Holliday, USA, "Terminology for the Spectrum of Conflict," Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1 December 1968.

33. James H. Billington, "Six Views of the Russian Revolution" World Politics, sviii, April 1966, 452 ff.

MAIN REPORT

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

SECTION I. Concepts and Guidance of the U.S.
National Strategy of Realistic
Deterrence Applicable to Study

1. OBJECTIVE. To present an outline of the U.S. National Strategy
of Realistic Deterrence and its major concepts in relations to the
objectives of the study of civil-military roles of indigenous armed
forces (IAFs).

2. GENERAL.

a. The objective of the analysis of civil-military roles of
IAFs is to propose doctrine which can provide effective operational
guidance to elements of the U.S. Army. Although military concepts
may be universal in nature, the range of possible actions and re-
sponses available to the U.S. Army are broadly determined by the
National Military Strategy. Solutions outside the scope of the
National Military Strategy may have a theoretical but not an opera-
tional value.

b. A literature search reveals that most academic area and
country studies include analyses of civil-military roles and relations
of armed forces. Since 1960 more than 3,000 U.S. Army generated or
sponsored studies have dealt with civil-military relations and opera-
tions. All that wealth of descriptions and assessments is not directly
usable by staffs and units of the U.S. Army. It would have great in-
direct value, if it were properly integrated into appropriate doctri-
nal formulations which must take into account and be guided by the di-
rectives of the National Military Strategy.

3. OBJECTIVES OF U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY. The National Strategy has
the following objectives:

a. To assure that strategic areas do not fall under unfriendly
control and that free countries remain able to preserve their indepen-
dence.

b. To discourage and eventually to eliminate the use of military
force as a means by which one nation seeks to impose its will upon an-
other.

c. To deter war through the realistic deterrence capabilities of the United States and its allies. The deterrence capability includes all elements of the national power of the U.S. and its allies. Although the National Strategy seeks to deter war, it also provides for the protection of the U.S. and its national interests should deterrence fail. The Department of the Army has recognized that:

> Only true capability is truly deterrent, and the principal purpose of the military of this non-aggressive nation--in the United States-- is its role as a realistic deterrent to potential aggressors.[1]

4. THE BASES OF NATIONAL STRATEGY. The National Strategy is based on three key elements of the Nixon Doctrine, three basic planning criteria, and the major types of military conflict constituting the current spectrum of war.

a. The three key elements of the Nixon Doctrine.

(1) The United States will honor treaty commitments.

(2) The United States shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of an ally or of a nation whose survival is vital to United States security.

(3) In cases involving other types of aggression the United States shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. However, the nation directly threatened is responsible for providing for the manpower for its defense.

b. The three National Strategy basic planning criteria.

(1) Maintenance by the United States of an adequate strategic nuclear capability as the cornerstone of the Free World's nuclear deterrent.

(2) Development and/or continued maintenance of Free World force to minimize the likelihood of requiring the employment of strategic nuclear capability should deterrence fail.

(3) A program of assistance for international assistance that will enhance the self-defense capabilities of the free world and which, when coupled with diplomatic actions, will encourage regional cooperation and/or security agreements among our allies.

c. The spectrum of war.

(1) Theater and tactical nuclear. U.S. theater and tactical nuclear forces serve an essential role in deterrence. To be a realistic deterrent those forces must possess a credible and effective theater nuclear capability backed by U.S. strategic forces. While these forces are designed primarily to deter nuclear conflict, they also serve to help deter conventional aggression because of the uncertainty surrounding the circumstances under which theater nuclear weapons might be employed.

(2) Theater conventional warfare. U.S. force planning hopes to provide for adequate ground, air, naval, and mobility forces--active and reserve, allied and U.S.--which in combination with U.S. nuclear forces will deter theater conventional conflict. This requires an effective and visible U.S. and allied capability to cope with major aggression against any country or area vital to U.S. interests.

d. Subtheater or localized warfare. Since subtheater/localized conflict cannot be controlled or prevented by unilateral fiat of any major power, and since such conflicts can erupt periodically and, in some cases, unexpectedly, The National Strategy has established the following guidelines:

(1) Friendly countries should be encouraged to increase their regional self-defense efforts, with due regard for maintenance of international economic stability.

(2) Security assistance should help foster regional security arrangments so that individual country defense burdens are kept within practicable limits and regional arms races avoided.

(3) Allied forces may be structured in anticipation of a unilateral defense or of a defense in conjunction with U.S. support forces.

(4) The form of security assistance will be chosen in accordance with local requirements and costs.

(5) The U.S. general purpose force structure can be adjusted when allied defense assets can perform the same function adequately. Similarly, future allied capabilities often will be able to substitute for U.S. forces. Where possible, the United States will support local force development with the appropriate security assistance.

(6) Redevelopment of U.S. forces will be carried out consistent with the maintenance of adequate Free World Forces to support U.S. interests and those of U.S. allies.

5. THE NATIONAL STRATEGY CONCEPT OF NET ASSESSMENT.

a. Definition. Acceptable planning must be based not only on a definition of U.S. National strategy objectives, but also on a sophisticated analysis of the nature and relative importance of the various impediments and obstacles to the achievement of those objectives--be they economic, political, technological, or military. This is the problem covered by the concept of Net Assessment which is defined as:

> the comparative analysis of those factors,
> military, technological, political and eco-
> nomic which impede or have a potential to
> impede the United States national security
> objectives with those factors available or
> potentially available to enhance the accomp-
> lishment of those objectives. Through this
> process we are able to determine how to apply
> our resources most effectively in order to
> improve our total capability to accomplish
> United States national security goals.

The Net Assessment of the military, technological, political and economic factors which enhance or impede U.S. national security operations is carried out in terms of immediate as well as longer range phased objectives. Long range national strategy planning includes the military and nonmilitary resources of the U.S. and its allies. It is the direct responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. The Department of Defense Director of Net Assessment is supported by an Assistant for Long Range Planning in order to secure effective coordination of planning functions throughout the Department of Defense.

Net Assessment plays a critical role in the U.S. Total Force Planning and in the development of forces necessary to maintain U.S. national security. Net Assessment weighs the capabilities of potential enemies against the capabilities of the United States and its allies. Careful consideration is given not only to the strength of potential adversaries, but also to their defects and the various constraints with which they must cope. Net Assessment provides a basis for judging whether the United States and its allies will be able to sustain U.S. national objectives and protect U.S. vital interests.

b. Any comprehensive net assessment related to national security planning must take into account four major problem areas:

(1) The Strategic Reality includes all elements of strategy and is determined by the threats faced by the United States and its

allies which vary from strategic nuclear to subtheater warfare, from communist military assistance to the Soviet challenge to United States technological superiority.

(2) The Political Reality refers to the national and international political realities that confront the United States.

(3) The Fiscal Reality. From 1965 through 1972, the Soviets have had substantially more funds available to apply to the development of their total military capacity than the U.S. which has been restricted in its ability to invest in more modern and improved military capabilities due to an increasing need to commit resources to urgent domestic needs. Since 1966 when the net available to the Soviet Union first exceeded that for the United States, the Soviet Union has had some $21 billion more available for modernization than the U.S. This difference has had significant and adverse impact on the military posture of the United States relative to that of the Soviet Union.

(4) The Manpower Reality refers to the manpower possibilities available. The manpower reality of the United States in conjunction with the fiscal reality has generated a powerful pressure for smaller forces.

6. THE NATIONAL STRATEGY CONCEPT OF TOTAL FORCE.

a. The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence emphasizes the need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of world security. The sum total of those military and nonmilitary resources determines the scope of the Total Force Concept which was defined in 1971 by the Department of Defense as follows:

> TOTAL FORCE: The Free World military and related resources include both active and reserve components of the United States, those of U.S. allies, and the additional military capabilities of U.S. allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs. It calls for the use of all appropriate resources for deterrence of the United States and the Free World to capitalize on the potential for available assets.

b. The concept of Total Force Planning extends the mobilization base of the United States to include that of its allies. It recognizes the strategic, logistic, and tactical doctrines of allies as constituent parts of U.S. global strategic, logistic, and tactical perspectives. U.S. long range "net assessment" planning includes the economic, technological, political, and economic forces of the United States and its allies.

> The integration of available Free World resources will require many changes in U.S. national military strategy. These changes pose difficult problems in both understanding and implementing effective programs.

7. FOUR GENERAL CATEGORIES OF U.S. MILITARY PLANNING UNDER THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT. In the total force concept there is planning for military commitment in an orderly progression from heavy reliance of U.S. forces to increased reliance of IAFs. These varying balances fall into four general categories:

a. Combined Force Planning calls for the integration of U.S. forces with local forces. Examples include NATO, Korea, and Vietnam through the completion of Phase I of Vietnamization in 1971. This planning conducted with U.S. allies reflects detailed consideration of all assets available to the various countries in fulfilling the requirements for deterrent forces in peacetime and combat forces should deterrence fail.

b. Complementary Force Planning assumes some U.S. military obligation to help defend a country under attack but generally does not include prepositioned, integrated U.S. forces on the ground during peacetime. The planning also is developed in close consultation with allies. Examples include Thailand, Japan and Vietnam until Phase II of Vietnamization is completed. The primary consideration is the role that U.S. forces would play in the event of conflict in augmenting national forces with low or marginal capabilities. Primary emphasis should be placed on the development of self-sufficient local capabilities to be used against external aggression, with the U.S. providing specialized support and necessary assistance to augment local forces.

c. Supplementary Force Planning calls for the U.S. to supplement local capabilities primarily through the provision of appropriate security assistance. This planning emphasizes making available training, equipment, and supplies to improve the deterrent forces of our allies. Examples include Indonesia, Cambodia, and certain countries in the Middle East.

d.   Unilateral U.S. Force Planning provides for U.S. response to contingencies where U.S. interests or obligations are at stake without active support from our allies.

8.   TOTAL FORCE PLANNING AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

a.   President Nixon has indicated that in the future the United States would look to its allies to deal with subtheatre or localized warfare. However, he emphasized that the United States can and will furnish military and economic assistance to supplement this local effort where U.S. interests are involved. In reshaping the foreign aid program, the President directed that the planning for all security-related aid must be integrated. Security assistance planning continues to be an interagency effort within the Executive Branch. This procedure insures that the Department of State is able to exercise its statutory responsibilities for policy guidance of security assistance while the Department of Defense will continue to manage the military program, thus permitting more effective use of all defense resources. When the FY 1973 security assistance budget was being constructed, security assistance was treated as an integral whole, although the MAP and FMS programs were administered by AID. For the first time the planning for the FY 1973 military assistance and credit sales took place within the Department of Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). Another important step was the creation of the Defense Security Assistance Council and the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

b.   The four elements of the U.S. Military Assistance Program.

(1). Military Assistance Program (MAP). Covers grants of military weapons, other equipment, and military training.

(2) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Credit. Government-to-government or commercial sales of defense material financed by U.S. government or by government-guaranteed credit.

(3) Security Supporting Assistance. Aid intended to offset, in part, the impact of exceptional defense costs of the recipient country on its civilian economy.

(4) Non-Funded Security Assistance. Transfer of material declared excess to U.S. requirements; equipment loans and leases--primarily ship leases; FMS cash and commercial military sales.

9.   SUBTHEATRE/LOCALIZED WARFARE THREATS IN THE STRATEGY OF REALISTIC DETERRENCE.

a.   Allocation of responsibilities. It is recognized that subtheatre/localized conflict cannot be controlled or prevented by unilateral fiat of any major power, and that such conflicts can

erupt periodically and, in some cases, unexpectedly. The U.S. objective is to shift primary responsibility, particularly in manpower, for deterring or fighting subtheatre or localized conflicts to its allies and friends. Although U.S. help will be primarily in a form other than ground elements, it could include force deployments under special circumstances.

b. The mission of U.S. Strategic Mobility Forces. A major requirement of U.S. national military strategy is a capability to deploy initial or augmenting U.S. forces to cope with aggression which cannot be met by local forces. While U.S. forces deployed forward in peacetime are an essential contribution to deterrence, a major portion of U.S. forces are based in the U.S. The objective of U.S. Strategic Mobility Forces is to provide flexibility of deployment so that appropriate military forces can be positioned and supported where and when necessary.

c. The impact of Communist military assistance programs on subtheater threat.

(1) General. Communist military assistance programs, as important instruments of Communist foreign and military policies, impact directly upon U.S. security interests and upon the maintenance of international stability. There are gaps in information about the purpose and actual scope of Communist military assistance effort, and its impact cannot be precisely measured. However, it is evident that the assistance is supplied to areas of obvious strategic importance to the donors and is clearly security as well as politically oriented.

(2) Scope and Purpose. Since 1955 Communist governments have supplied about $26 billion in military aid. The Soviets have supplied more than 85 percent of this aid, the Eastern European countries 8 percent, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) about 7 percent. Of the total, $16 billion (61.5%) has been supplied to other Communist governments--most notably those of Eastern Europe, North Vietnam, and North Korea. Almost $10 billion has been supplied to the LDCs, primarily in the Middle East, and to India and Pakistan. Almost 90 percent of Communist military assistance to non-Communist governments during the 1955-1971 period has been Soviet. Of this, over one half has gone into the Middle East--to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Chinese military aid to LDCs has been given to countries situated in an arc running from the Eastern Mediterranean through the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea. In this arc are countries which either control the Suez Canal, contain the bulk of Free World's oil reserves, or are adjacent to the southern borders of the USSR.

(3) Major Characteristics. Communist military assistance programs are selective and provide the Communist with a direct conduit to the centers of authority in the recipient nations. Such aid has served to increase Communist political leverage and to affect the behavior of assisted governments. Furthermore, when tactically directed to particular nationalistic governments, Communist support can contribute substantially to the weakening or elimination of western influences in target countries. In the past decade it has facilitated an expansion of Communist commercial and diplomatic presence in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa.

(4) Impact of IAFs. Having procured Soviet arms, a number of states now are heavily dependent on their donors for logistical and technical support. At the same time, military assistance has enabled the Communist countries to establish rapport with recipient country military leaders and junior officers and to gain improved access to recipient country ports, airfields and other facilities. A major part of the Communist assistance programs consists of low-interest long-term loans which, while attractive, are tied to purchases from or barter agreements with the donor, thus restricting the recipient's flexibility in economic development. Most military assistance includes the services of training teams from the donor nation, thus exposing IAFs to Communist political as well as technical influence. The number of Communist military personnel in LDCs increased by about 40 percent between 1969 and 1971--from approximately 7,000 to over 10,000.

10. DISCUSSION.

a. The capabilities of IAF are determined by governmental, political, economic, fiscal, psychological, and demographic factors. If a potential U.S. ally or friend fails to transform its mobilization potential, the capabilities of its armed forces will be reduced, and, consequently, the burden of the United States will be increased.

b. Deterrence of low intensity warfare threats, including subversive insurgency, requires that IAF be capable of engaging in appropriate stability operations roles to include both civil-military and strictly military operations.

c. If IAFs are unable to perform satisfactorily any of those roles as required to counteract a security threat, the U.S. burden will increase accordingly.

11. CONCLUSIONS. Before rendering U.S. military assistance, either in the form of supplementary or complementary cooperation, it is necessary to understand the nation's capabilities to increase the

effectiveness of its IAF and to know what the IAF can do in both
military and civil-military roles. Once that assessment is made,
it will be possible to estimate realistically what may be expected.
Previous attempts to consider civil-military relations were largely
unsuccessful because of the complex interrelation between those
areas. If an IAF does not receive political approval from its own
governmental authorizations, fiscal appropriations, economics re-
sources, qualified manpower, and minimal psychological support to
conduct civil-military roles, it will not be successful. This
underlines the need to know which courses of action the IAF cannot
realistically undertake because of existing conditions within its
own society.

SECTION II. Factors Delimiting Civil-Military Roles

1.   GENERAL. The basic question is how to mobilize political, econo-
mic, psychological, and military forces. The basic military problem
of "identifying means to serve given ends" confronts cultural, consti-
tutional/legal, and policy-determined constraints on the "pure strategic"
approach. Any measure to be considered in the field of military science
must pass military and nonmilitary basic tests. The military test asks
if it is possible and will it lead to the objective without unfavorable
aftereffects. The nonmilitary test asks whether it can be accommodated
within cultural, constitutional/legal, and policy-determined constraints.
It may be that none of the militarily feasible measures or missions pass
the nonmilitary constraints. At this point IAFs must make a choice: to
accept defeat or to break the nonmilitary constraints. The consequences
of breaking those constraints vary, but there is always a cost attached
to them. The cost is determined by the characteristics of the system
of civil-military relations which make the cost peculiar and relative
to each society. Therefore, foreign criteria should not be allowed to
affect the evaluation of the nonmilitary costs, unless overriding nation-
al policy considerations dictate the contrary.

2. THE NATURE OF THE CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS.

   a. Cultural constraints upon military choices are positive or ne-
gative forcing upon IAFs some courses of action and prohibiting others.
The violation of the system of values, beliefs, traditions, customs, and
mores can be "doing something" or "failing to do something" in a given
situation. Islamic countries have traditions which do not forbid mili-
tary intervention in civilian affairs and allow forceful measures against
enemies. Asian cultures allow paternalistic attitudes on the part of
their armed forces and tend to recognize the legitimacy of force. African
countries accept much higher levels of permissiveness in both military
and civilian actions. Many Latin American countries recognize military
roles in civilian affairs which would not be tolerable in the United
States.

   b. These generalizations are valid for the larger segment of the
populations, but not for the elites of developing countries who tend to
be "outside" the local value system and are more bound to international
ideological positions. The pronouncements of these elites tend to be
confused by outsiders with the attitudes of the general population, be-
cause they often claim to speak for the whole country. This is the usual
operating procedures of elites. It is illustrative to consider the follow-
ing quote:

The representatives (of country X) were
five journalists, three professors and
two lawyer politicians. Upon being in-
vited to the meetings of the Associa-
tion, they presented the views of the
grievances and dissatisfaction of the
real people of their country, in utter-
ly convincing ways. The principles of
the democratic faith, the lofty concepts
of the liberty of man, and the credo of
government of, by and for the people
were sustained in ways which gained to
their favor the totality of the audience.
Every one became convinced that those
were selfless patriots, moderate reform-
ers, whose interests were to warn their
government and the American revolution
was to implement urgently needed social
and economic reforms to alleviate the
plight of the impoverished people. Once
the meeting was over an American profes-
sor who had attended the session said
to his professorial counterpart: "How
can you say such things? Are you kid-
ding?" The other answered: "Of course
I am kidding but if you want to gain
'gringos' to your cause you have to
talk to them in the stupid way they are
accustomed to." [2]

Or as Gil Carl AlRoy stated in his study on the involvement
of peasants in internal wars:

Determining the aims and roles of peasants
caught up in a rebellion seems to be risky
business. Peasants, as rebels or otherwise,
have almost everywhere been notoriously in-
articulate, if not wholly illiterate. The
outsider has almost always had to speak for
the peasants, to record their deeds. How
reliably have the mean of the cities per-
formed this historical role? There is cer-
tainly good reason to doubt, for suspecting
unsympathetic bias, and most recently for
suspecting sentimentality and the fanciful
bias of romance. [3]

AlRoy mentions the case of Che Guevara, who after the revolution, has to "tell the peasants of the goals of the revolution, explain why they fought, why their comrades died." While U.S. Army studies, particularly DA Pam 550 Area and Country Studies series, have emphasized the role of value systems, apparently no study has been made on the constraints posed by those value systems on the implementation of stability operations. While the issues of "poverty," "impoverishment," and "grievances of the people" against their governments have been overemphasized--despite the fact that poverty has existed in most of those countries for all their historical existence--the ability of their value systems to accept political and national mobilization under military control has been ignored. Ultimately, the ability of the value system rests on the behavior of the population. Value-legitimation does not preclude irritation or even furor on the part of the loser or the aggrieved. With respect to the constraints set by the value system, indigenous personnel must be the last arbiters, and any interference by foreigners is likely to be resented. U.S. military and security assistance personnel should not decide upon the constraints set by local values on military options. When local values conflict with the values, aims, policies, and practices of the United States, the problem falls within the jurisdiction of the U.S. diplomatic representatives.

3. THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL/LEGAL CONSTRAINTS. Most countries define the permissible role and establish boundaries for their armed forces through law. Almost every country provides for emergencies, variously called "states of emergency" or "states of war" or "martial law," in which legal guarantees affecting political, economic, and civil rights are temporarily suspended. IAFs frequently question measures established for national defense by national law. The U.S. has the oldest constitution in the world and the respect by the American people for the constitutional system is unique. In most countries the constitution is a political covenant which ranks below the salvation of the country, the principle of nationality, or the cultural entity upon which the constitution rests. The breaking of the provisions of the constitution is considered in many countries as just another political crisis without any deep emotional involvement. Despite this, the possibility that U.S. Army operations might result in unconstitutional actions is serious, because it is likely to be construed as an infringement on national sovereignty. Some of the policies recommended under the label of "internal development" by FM 31-23 would be clearly unconstitutional in many countries. No matter how well meaning those measures might be, they are likely to be resented because they are proposed by "foreigners."

4. THE NATURE OF THE POLITICAL AND POLICY CONSTRAINTS.

a. Political and policy constraints on possible military alternative in the area of civil-military relations are of extreme importance. The interplay between political and military factors is constant. As Clausewitz indicated:

> The war of a community always starts from
> political conditions and is called for a
> political motive. It is, therefore, a
> political act. It is also a real politi-
> cal instrument, a continuation of politi-
> cal relations, a carrying out of the same
> by other means. All beyond this which is
> strictly peculiar to war relates merely to
> the peculiar nature of the means we use.[4]

This statement has two meanings. What is peculiar to war is the use of organized and controlled force, and the selection of weapons to obtain victory. Within the domain of weapons militarily available, some are forbidden by political or by formal statements of national policy. However, not everything forbidden to U.S. military is forbidden to IAFs and vice versa. Secondly, the political intentions of the United States might be different, sc that an identity of interests cannot be assumed.

b. Perhaps the major shortcoming of FM 31-23, Stability Operations, is in its failure to recognize that political and policy constraints and objectives of an ally and of the United States might differ and the obvious consequences for military and civil-military operations. The U.S. scenario on stability operations is simplistic. It presents a government under internal attack both politically and militarily by insurgent forces. There is one enemy—the insurgent. Internal opposition to the government is ignored. It is the responsibility of the government to achieve a compromise with various internal opposition elements. Should the government fail to reach this compromise and "broaden its base of popular support," it is branded "unresponsive to popular demands and to the grievances of the people." The naivete of this scenario is obvious. In practice, internal opposition to the government will increase, rather than decrease, while the insurgent is being opposed. It is a matter of U.S. national policy to decide on whom to support, but it is a military problem to operate with a scenario that is obviously invalid. While the U.S. Army incorporates U.S. national strategy and national policy decisions in its military strategy, its manuals do not take into consideration that other armed forces will also be incorporating their own national strategy and policy. Ultimately, political considerations may require military solutions which may not be favorable. These political considerations are likely to be of paramount importance in the area of civil-military relations, roles, and operations of IAFs.

5. DISCUSSION ON CULTURAL, CONSTITUTIONAL/LEGAL, AND POLICTICAL CONSTRAINTS.

a. The legal system sets the boundaries of the military according ' the generalized expectations of the population on ·what the military should be and do. Civil-military roles are defined in terms of the competition for political power that may exist in the country, the political views of policy makers, and their external and internal political goals. These definitions vary from country to country. Constitutional, cultural, and political definitions in many cases are mutually exclusive and contradictory causing discussions and debates pervaded by philosophical, ideological, and legal concerns which obscure the basic problem.

b. In the field of civil-military roles and operations the literature constantly confuses the military definition with the constitutional and the cultural. As a result, it is never clear whether IAFs should do something because it leads to success or whether it should do something--or avoid doing it--to comply with cultural or constitutional definitions of permissible military or civil-military roles.

c. It is fruitful to start with the military definition common to all armies and then proceed to the constitutional, cultural, and political definitions. In this way constitutional, cultural, and political definitions can be taken as constraints upon the military role. These constraints are real but changeable. A constitutional definition of the role of the military changes as often as constitutions are amended, superseded, or abridged. Cultural definitions change in accord with the philosophical, ideological, and political modifications that take place in countries. Political definitions are even more changeable.

d. The military definition of the role of the military remains constant. It changes only in its applications as new theories of warfare succeed old ones. Because of this stability the military definition provides a better common ground. It constitutes the common denominator among professional soldiers.

e. It should be noted that in tactics and theater strategy there is a degree of commonality among professional soldiers. Tactical and logistical considerations apply to both friend and foe. This commonality does not exist·in the area of civil-military operations because of basic differences in constitutional, cultural, and political definitions of civil military roles. Thus, a basic concept of civil military roles of general validity to both U.S. and foreign military can only be grounded in military science.

f. A military concept of civil-military roles valid to all armed forces is based on the fact that armed forces receive their resources from the civil society. Thus, the degree of force which armed forces can maintain is dependent on the availability of resources in the civil society and on the extent to which these resources can be readily transferred to the military organization. The civil-military role of armed forces is based on the need to increase resources and apply them to the mobilization base. These resources are political, economic, social, and geographic, and the limits of their use are determined by the minimal requirements of the civil society, beyond which it would cease to function. In each particular country cultural, constitutional, and political constraints determine the real scope of permissible military roles. If those constraints reduce the level of military force below the requirements posed by a given threat, military science allows us to predict that the government will fail to attain its objective. This is an extremely important prediction since it allows us to estimate when the use of force is useless to achieve national political objectives.

g. It is difficult for the U.S. Army to develop doctrine or civil-military roles appropriate to IAFs of LDCs: the doctrine is not to be applied by the U.S. Army, but by foreign governments and forces.

(1) Various U.S. Army agencies, including the Command and General Staff School, have criticized FM 31-23, "Stability Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine," on the grounds that the doctrine appeared to be directed to the U.S. Army, the host country government, the IAF, and eventually some U.S. government agencies. Some recommendations of FM 31-23 have been termed unfeasible by U.S. Army field commanders due to political and other conditions in particular countries.

(2) U.S. Army field manuals relating to civil-military operations tend to assume that host country governments can solve all political, economic, and social problems of their country, thereby establishing the conditions whereby an insurgency can be defeated and a low intensity threat neutralized. The increasing realization that countries face problems which cannot be solved requires a study of how to face insurgency and low intensity warfare threats despite the persistence of problems. There are indications that although some problems cannot be solved they can be controlled.

h. Current U.S. Army doctrine assumes that the means to face insurgency and low intensity warfare threats are fixed. This unfounded assumption directs U.S. military advisors to recommend fixed procedures to host country governments, even though given various cultural, constitutional, and political definitions of permissible military roles, the means allowed one IAF may not be allowed another.

A solution to this problem would require an analytical differentiation of ends to be achieved and means to achieve them. While ends may be constant as gaining the support of the population, the means to achieve it may vary according to cultural variables.

i. Some of the current U.S. Army doctrine on stability operations, nation building, and internal defense and development (IDAD) are not determined by military considerations but by the cultural, constitutional, and political definition of permissible military roles existing in the United States. For example, FM 31-23, under the heading "Legal Status of Insurgencies and Insurgents," rules that inhumane treatment of belligerents, even under stress of combat and with deep provocation, is a serious and punishable violation. This rule precludes the use of exemplary punishment, which is customarily used as a deterrent in many countries.

(1) When cultural, constitutional, and political definitions of permissible military roles differ, each party will be motivated to reject those doctrinal principles of the other that are either irrelevant or in conflict with its own.

(a) It can also be anticipated that those differences will create antagonisms between armed forces, between foreign armed forces and native population, and between governments.

(b) When one military party perceives that cultural, constitutional, or political constraints affecting the other military party interfere with the application of military principles, it will tend to accuse the other party of political interference with planning and operations.

(c) The problem is compounded because the actions of the IAF of LDCs receiving U.S. assistance will be appraised by U.S. public opinion in terms of U.S. standards of permissible military roles.

(2) IAFs have proven historically their capabilities to engage in a series of operations which ultimately caused the defeat of local subversive insurgencies. While many rebellions against governments have succeeded, most insurgencies against IAF were supported by strong paramilitary elements, provided with quasi-military organization, command and control, and endowed with solid political structures. Those insurgencies which succeeded against IAF belong to two classes: either the IAF were so weakened or divided that their forces potential was minimal, or the insurgents achieved a political success which caused the IAF to disintegrate through command and control failures. One way or another, successful insurgency requires the military defeat or the political neutralization of the IAF.

6. CONCLUSIONS.

   a. A concept of civil-military roles appropriate to all IAF must be developed from a general concept of the role of the military.

   b. The role of the military can be defined in terms of requisite resources, organization, and operations needed to achieve military and political objectives through the use of threat of force.

   c. Cultural, constitutional, and legal definitions of the role of the military are constraints impinging upon the military definition of the role since they set limits to what could be militarily possible.

   d. It's convenient to start with the military definition which is basic to all armies, and then consider the cultural, constitutional, legal, and political constraints which vary from one country to another.

   e. A military concept of civil-military roles appropriate to all armed forces is based on the fact that the civil society is the military mobilization base, and armed forces require sufficient resources to overcome external or internal threats, or to achieve military and political objectives through the use or threat of force.

   f. The problem is who is the intended user of U.S. Army doctrine on internal defense and development, stability operations, and nation building.

   g. The approach to the subject must consider insurgency and low intensity warfare threats from the point of view of civil-military roles and operations, while recognizing that insoluable political, economic, and social problems will persist in most LDCs. However, some problems which cannot be solved can be controlled.

   h. The means to face insurgency and low intensity warfare threats in LDCs are not fixed and the means which are available to some IAFs are not available to others.

   i. Some elements of current U.S. Army doctrine on internal defense and development, stability operations, nation building, and advisory assistance do not respond to military requirements but to the peculiarities of U.S. cultural, constitutional, legal, and political definitions of the role of the military. Some IAFs and LDCs will reject those characteristics and insist that their own be respected.

SECTION III.   Search of the Literature

1. CRIAF POINT OF DEPARTURE.

a.   The initial literature search showed that studies on civil-
military roles of IAFs were abundant. The DA pamphlet 550 Series
contains numerous descriptions of such roles. The Internal Defense
Bibliography published by the United States Army Command and General
Staff College lists hundreds of works related to the subject. Since
1960 more than 3,000 U.S. Army generated or sponsored studies have
dealt with different aspects of the same matter. There is, moreover,
a vast body of civilian academic research focusing on various civil-
military activities of foreign military forces. Most area and coun-
try studies include an analysis of the impact of the military on po-
litical affairs.

b.   The bulk of these works have not been integrated into military
science, as they had been developed in the context of what became known
as insurgency warfare which became separated from the body of orthodox
military science as if it were another kind of warfare. The great
majority of studies were not written by professional soldiers, and,
therefore, their authors did not look for military applications. The
concept of "threat," basic to all military studies, was absent from
their analyses, and they missed, therefore, the functional relation-
ship between civil-military roles of armed forces and national defense.
The confusion then started, which continues to this day, involving what
IAFs normally do in the area of civil-military affairs, and what they
ought to do to counteract a threat.

2. PRESENT ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CIVIL-MILITARY ROLES OF ARMED FORCES.
The literature on civil-military roles of armed forces may be divided
into three classes: academic literature or otherwise nonmilitary lit-
erature concerned with "The Military and Society," the writings of
military and civilian strategists, and U.S. Army doctrine.

a.   Social science contributions on "The Military and Society."
The social science contribution is primarily concerned with the bene-
ficial or detrimental effects of the military upon society. Interest
in this type of study began in the early 1960's, coinciding with Edwin
Lieuwen's Arms and Politics in Latin America,[5] who explained his con-
cern:

> The displays of hostility and violence that
> marked the tour of Vice President Richard
> M. Nixon through South America in 1958
> bluntly demonstrated that all was not well
> in relation with other American republics.
> As a consequence, United States policy in
> Latin America is currently undergoing a
> thorough reappraisal... A key element in

the picture is the role of the armed
forces. How it has affected the policies
of Latin American governments and the at-
titudes of their peoples? And how it has
influenced the interests and the policies
of the United States?[6]

He describes how it had been suggested that the role of the mili-
tary in Latin America should be studied.

In 1957 the Council of Foreign Relations,
convinced that a thorough analysis of these
questions would throw light on problems of
great importance to the security of the
hemisphere which have been especially trouble-
some in our relations with Latin America, de-
cided to embark on a study on the role of the
military in Latin America and its implications
for United States Policy.[7]

Clearly, the underlying assumption of the author is that the dif-
ficulties of the U.S. government with Latin America stem from its
support of military regimes. In general, this whole body of re-
search tends to ignore that the basic purpose of the military is
national defense. Despite the merits of its contributions, these
studies have been as imbalanced as a study of the "university and
society" which ignores the educational purpose of the university,
or a study of "hospitals and society" that does not consider the
medical purposes for which hospitals exist. The literature on
"The Military and Society" can be roughly divided into "studies
on militarism" and on "the military and modernization."

(1) Studies on militarism. A considerable number of
studies center on the subject of militarism, the threat of mili-
tary interference, or military control of civilian government.
This subject was intensively studied in the last century by
Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx's friend and coworker.[8] The thesis
of Engels is that the military is the instrument of the exploiting
classes which provides them with the element of force needed to
suppress and enslave the proletariat. Although not necessarily
Marxist, this general theme has pervaded many current works.[9]
From another perspective, the works of Communist writers on Communist
armed forces and their employment contain elements of strategic
thinking which are absent when the authors refer to armed forces
they consider their ideological enemies.[10]

(2) Military capabilities and modernization. Another group of writers have been concerned with the capabilities of the military for modernization and development of their nations. Morris Janowitz,[11] Samuel P. Huntington,[12] John P. Johnson,[13] and Henry Bienen[14] belong to this group. This approach has devoted considerable attention to "military civic action." Special emphasis is put on the performance of the military and in analytical schemes aimed at classifying diverse types of armed forces to determine which types are more likely to be a force for modernization. Considerable attention is paid to the social origins of military officers as an indicator of a modernizing disposition. The controversy on whether the military is an agent for development and whether it has the requisite skills continues to this day.

b. Comments on "The Military and Society" approach. With remarkable exceptions,[15] the writers included in this approach do not consider the empirical fact that all societies, from the most primitive to the more complex, maintain armed forces and that there must be some reason for it. They have studied the military in peacetime but not in war, thus missing the most significant aspect of civil-military relations. They have not considered the deterrence function of the military in the prevention of war, that is, making violent aggression costly and uncertain. At times they "rediscovered the wheel" and have presented as new "findings" venerable principles of military science. Thus, George Kelly reports:

> The military as a group feels instinctively
> that it is the best judge of the national
> security interests; it refers to this pre-
> science as part of its 'raison d'etre.'[16]

It would have been simpler to state that threat evaluation and interpretation is a key part of the military profession the world over.

3. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STRATEGISTS. Unlike their Communist counterparts, modern western strategist have not been especially concerned with civil-military relationships, but with the industrial and technological requirements of modern armies. The overriding preoccupation of modern western strategists has been on the issues evolving from nuclear capabilities and nuclear deterrence.[17] There is also the fact that under established rules[18]--ever since the nineteenth century--"military strategy" studies have been predominantly concerned with the conduct of

war, while "grand strategy" studies, which cover the national potential for war and its overall application, have taken a secondary place. It is in the latter studies, however, where the relation of the military and society must be sought. It is interesting to note that while Clausewitz devoted considerable attention to the national potential for war in relation to the attitude to society in Books I and II of his treatise on War,[19] his better-known writings deal with field strategy, or military strategy, which he defines as "the art of making use of given means in combat."[20] General Moltke refined it as "the practical adaption of the means placed at a general's disposal to attain the objective in view."[21] By this definition the strategist is directed toward the application of those means given him by his government. This limited concern for military or field strategy characteristics of the military of his time was challenged by General Erich Ludendorff, who in his book Der Totale Krieg[22] (1935) presented the thesis that "not armies but nations wage war." The contemporary military aspects of the relationship between society and its armed forces have been developed mainly by the geopolitical school[23] and by the Marxist-Leninist strategists.

4. THE U.S. ARMY DOCTRINAL APPROACH TO CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS.

a. Currently there are two contracting U.S. doctrinal approachs to civil-military relations: the "orthodox" and "unorthodox." The orthodox approach existed prior to the Vietnam campaign and the stability operations doctrine and still exists independent of and opposed to the unorthodox approach which was generated ad hoc and piecemeal under the influence of political views and ideological positions when the United States was confronted with overseas insurgent wars.

(1) Characteristics of the "orthodox approach." The orthodox approach is based on two ideas--the "ubiquity of conflict" and the doctrine of "national power."[24] Conflict between nations is felt to be continuous,[25] although "it may vary from mere disagreements and conflicts of interest to basic and irreconciliable differences."[26] In the pursuit of "national ideologies and objectives"[27] nations rely on their national power, which includes all the means available.[28] The factors of national power are geographical, demographic, organizational, psychological, and military.[29] Strategy, in the meaning of "grand strategy,"[30] is the art and science of combining all these factors and using them effectively to achieve national objectives, while military strategy is concerned with the employment of the military factor.[31] The Army definition of strategic mobilization[32] includes all factors of national power. The concept of mobilization base[33] shows the interdependence and areas of overlap between the civilian and military factors of national power in the

pursuit of national objectives. The concepts of political warfare,[34] economic warfare,[35] and psychological warfare,[36] as well as the concept of strategic vulnerabilities,[37] complete doctrinal recognition of the relation of nonmilitary factors to its military strategy. The orthodox approach is based on experiences drawn during World War II, when the nation was engaged in a general war, and suggests a whole range of factors relevant to military science. One subject, however, that is not covered in the "orthodox approach" is the basis for the population's support of national policy and national defense. This problem is left to governments and the art of politics.

(2) The "unorthodox approach" to civil-military relations. This approach is tailored to LDCs friendly to the U.S. that are facing what appear to be Communist-inspired insurgencies. The whole approach is a sequel to a theory of revolution and insurgency. It is designed for the use of an expeditionary force or a military assistance force. It does not recognize that the country to which it is directed could have its own national policy, grand strategy, and military strategy but assumes what they might be, and presumes that there is an identity of interests and objectives shared with the U.S. This assumption is unwarranted. Chapter 4, "United States and Host Country Objectives," of FM 31-23, Stability Operations, states:

> The primary objective of these governments
> normally will be the attainment of internal
> security through stability operations pro-
> grams which will permit economic, political
> and social growth.

Stability Operations doctrine does not recognize some forms of warfare. Webster defines war as "an open armed conflict between countries or between factions within the same country," with the latter part of the definition referring to civil war. Although the doctrine of stability operations covers strike and consolidation campaigns and mobile tactical operations it does not state anywhere that the host nation is involved in an internal war. The "unorthodox approach" derives from this failure to recognize internal hostilities as war. By Army definition, the objectives of war are to implement national policy to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory, and to reduce the chances of defeat. Victory, in this sense, is the achievement of national policy objectives through force. The defeat to be avoided is the denial of the national governmental objectives which required the employment of force and violence. But stability operations doctrine does not mention victory nor defeat. Its objectives are economic, political, and social growth which may be equated to increases in the production and consumption of goods and services. What are "social" and "political" growth? "Social" and "political" growth are defined and used by various social scientists to mean quite different things.

b. How can military operations seek an objective that defies precise definition? FM 100-5, Operations of the Armed Forces in the Field, details the relationship between war and national objectives:

> Because the purpose of war is to attain national objectives, national strategy must be geared to these objectives. The national objectives of the United States are to insure its security and freedom, and to maintain worldwide conditions of peace, security and justice.[38]

There is little doubt that any country would subscribe to the thesis that its principal national objectives are "security and freedom." But the doctrine of stability operations asserts that the principal objectives of a country are "economic, political, and social growth." Thus the doctrine of stability operations creates an unrealistic double standard. The paramount goal of the U.S. is "security and freedom" and the goal of the LDCs is "economic, political, and social growth." This contradiction is based on the unsubstantiated assumption that economic, political, and social growth (whatever those two last terms may mean) leads to satisfaction and support for the government, which the government needs to oppose an insurgency. This is "the hearts and minds" doctrine.

c. The orthodox approach does not speculate on what gives rise to satisfaction and popular support or lack of support for the government in power. It says that when an armed aggression is taking place, the primary concern is to thwart it by decreasing the force available to the aggressor, not by increasing economic, social, and political growth. Conversely, the unorthodox approach defines civil-military relations as follows:

> Gaining the support of the population is of utmost importance. It is not enough merely to deprive the insurgent of population support through control measures. Since populace and resources control operations tend to be restrictive and repressive, they must be offset by vital and dynamic programs aiming at winning the active support of the people.

The double standard is evident here. In the U.S. it is expected that the resources of the mobilization base should be devoted to national defense. In LDCs it is the other way around: it is the national defense effort which must provide benefits to the population. As stated more precisely in FM 31-23:

> The objective of internal defense plan-
> ning is to provide for the efficient em-
> ployment of military resources to support
> both internal defense and internal deve-
> lopment programs.

The orthodox approach visualizes the military as depender:dent on the
civil society for its material and psychological resources, while
the civil society is dependent on the military for defense. That
is, it establishes the principle of interdependence between the
military and society. The unorthodox approach states that the
society depends on the military for resources, as a price for its
willingness to be defended. How will the military or the govern-
ment obtain the resources needed to wage a defensive war and at
the same time to initiate sweeping social programs? The resources
will come from U.S. assistance, plus those national resources to
be obtained through planning for internal development. This plan-
ning is not, as in the orthodox approach, the economic mobiliza-
tion of the country to increase the economic potential for war,
it is

> The process of preparing for and carrying
> out such changes in the organization and
> functioning of the national economy as are
> necessary to provide for the most effective
> use of resources in a national emergency.

The purpose is to increase

> The share of the total economic capacity
> of a nation which can be used for the
> purposes of war.

The objective of internal development in stability operations
doctrine is

> To organize and motivate civilians to as-
> sist the government and military forces.
> The operations are directed at eliminat-
> ing or reducing political, economic and
> sociological problems.

The approach that we call unorthodox sees civil-military relations
as motivating people to support their government, the government's
policies, and the armed forces. These are subjects which the
orthodox approach does not cover, for the orthodox approach states
what has to be done, but not how to move people to do it. It

assumes that aggression, be it external or internal (civil-war),
is sufficient to move people to defend themselves. The un-
orthodox approach takes a psychosocial stand on motivation but
fails to recognize the fact of war, or civil war. Civil-military
relations are seen as a function of government regardless of their
economic feasibility. The stress on "economic, social, and po-
litical growth" implies that the host government was previously
unable or unwilling to achieve it. This sets the stability ope-
rations officer automatically against the government he is sup-
posed to defend, rather than against the insurgent. The emphasis
on "political growth" tends to cast aspersion on the present po-
litical leadership of the country. The "hearts and minds doctrine"
likewise assumes that the economic, social, and political doctrines
valued by a foreign power and imposed on a host country will not
offend national values, beliefs, and traditions. In essence, the
unorthodox approach is the ultimate in paternalism. It holds that
the military may be either a "militaristic threat to the people"
or "an agent of modernization and growth." The unorthodox ap-
proach strives to avoid the former and to motivate leaders to pur-
sue the latter. With this thought in mind it is possible to under-
stand the proposition that:

> Since populace and resources control tend
> to be restrictive and repressive, they must
> be offset by vital and dynamic programs.

The whole philosophy of the unorthodox approach may be summarized
in the following sentence:

> When revolution occurs, it is not the people
> who must conform to the demands of governments,
> but governments who must conform to the demands
> of the people.[39]

    d. Discussion of the "orthodox" and "unorthodox" approaches.
The "orthodox" approach has not been developed to cover internal
war or insurgency war. The Clausewitz emphasis on battle in the
"orthodox" approach has tended to cause the importance of non-
combatant rear elements to be neglected. In war scenarios calling
for the dispatch of U.S. expeditionary armies overseas, noncombat
rear elements were not considered to be a major problem. When the
U.S. had to advise and assist allied governments waging a war without
fronts on their own territory, against insurgents, the orthodox ap-
proach was not helpful. This lag was signalled by Richard M. Leighton
and Robert W. Coakley in their official study of the United States Army
in World War II, who when discussing the Global Logistics and Strategy
said:[40]

In the analytical and interpretative
literature on war by professional
military writers since the middle of
the nineteenth century, the expanding
role of the noncombatant services has
received only perfunctory recognition,
while scarcely any of the writers have
chose to describe the actual mechanics
of administration. Among professional
officers of the U.S. Army, at least
until recently, indifference to logis-
tics was widespread and traditional -
a striking paradox in an army that
claims some of the most spectacular ad-
vances in that field.

The vacuum created by the lack of interest of military writers in
the area of civil-military relations was filled by social scien-
tists. The social scientist tends to analyze events in terms of
his own analytical models. The reported facts are often selected
to reflect the analytical scheme of the writer rather than the full
course of events. Social scientists, in creating the unorthodox
approach for the U.S. Army, established a nonmilitary element in
a military science. The unorthodox concepts and doctrines had not
been produced by soldiers, and had nothing to do with military
science. They were not concerned with fostering the probabilities
favorable to victory, and reducing the chances of defeat. They
wanted the military to implement ideological aims and political
objectives in total disregard for the principles of military
science. The violation of the principles of military science by
social scientists resulted in a dangerously shaky doctrinal base
replete with contradictions. Unlike the Communist, who produced
sound strategy by manipulating ideological concepts, Western social
scientists manipulated strategic concepts to produce a military
ideology. Unless qualified military experts concern themselves with
the problem of civil-military relations, unsound military doctrine
will persist. Historically the problem arose because the mobili-
zation of physical scientists during World War II and its aftermath
proved to be fruitful in the development of weapons and communica-
tion systems. As an extension of this involvement, social scien-
tists were pressed into service. They introduced their own con-
cepts which were codified into military doctrine without being
integrated through the tested problem-solving approaches of the
military.

SECTION IV. <u>Frame of Reference for</u>
<u>Definitions</u>

1. GENERAL.

a. A systematic attempt to conceptualize the impact of civil-military roles of IAFs upon U. S. Army doctrine requires the preliminary conceptualization of civil-military roles of armed forces in general. This poses a distinct problem because U. S. Army definitions are for the U. S. Army and reflect U. S. Army characteristics. It was understood that CRIAF had to produce conceptual definitions about IAFs for the U. S. Army which would be compatible with U. S. Army usage. New doctrinal definitions were needed because more were available to conceptualize the range of civil-military roles of armed forces. It was found in most cases that with an extension of approved U. S. Army definitions the problem could be satisfactorily solved.

b. The civil-military roles of armed forces have been identified in several ways. One way is the "combat service support perspective," which assumes the existence of a tactical situation in progress, and asks: "Aside from the primary combat mission at hand, what auxiliary missions should armed forces undertake with regard to a civilian population in the operational environment?"[41] This approach has yielded three major missions: (a) obtaining civilian support for and preventing civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations; (b) assisting the commander in the discharge of his responsibilities pertaining to the civil population, government, and economy of the area; and (c) providing support to civilian populations by means of military civic action. Post combat scenarios include the military government mission, which has been elaborated and extended, as a basic answer to the question above. This approach characterizes the planning orientations deriving from a common military scenario: armed forces of the U. S. are sent to an overseas theater to support allies against an aggressor. Civil-military roles can also be identified with the recognition of the interdependence between the armed forces and the civilian sectors of the society and of the civil-military relations so engendered.

c. The scenario of a country under attack (external, internal or mixed) shows the IAF faced with the problems of conducting tactical operations, consolidating the resources of the mobilization base to provide essential grand logistic support, and defending the nonmilitary sectors of their country--including the government of public sectors-- against overt or covert attacks and infiltration from the enemy. The enemy's direct attack on that country is considered an indirect threat to the United States. The United States will have to support the defensive

effort of the threatened country while subscribing to the policy that the main defensive effort, including manpower and fiscal and material resources, together with the will to fight, must come from the threatened country itself. This scenario outlines the current U. S. National Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. Once the primary responsibility for defeating aggression is placed upon a country and its armed forces, the problem of civil-military interdependence comes to the fore. The armed forces of the particular country need the support of the civilian sectors of the country to face the challenge successfully. Since civilian support to military operations is not directly applied but takes place through public and private organizations (including governmental organizations), it is essential that these organizations perform their functions.

d. One of the basic concerns of the military is to protect civilian organizations, avoid their degradation, and if necessary to reinforce, augment or even substitute for them with military elements. In case of external or internal aggression, interaction between the civilian and the military sectors is increased. This interaction is civil-military relations. The mandates given the armed forces to engage in activities in the area of civil-military relations constitute civil-military roles, and the roles-performances included in, or required by, those mandates (or missions) are civil-military operations. If martial law is declared, many areas customarily the concern of civil government become the responsibility of the military.

e. It is not possible to specify the enormous variety of civil-military missions of the armed forces. In some instances an IAF may undertake military government functions in its own country. In others, it may contribute support and eventual augmentation of government operations. That title may be confusing because in the event of aggression, government operations change and expand in order to achieve higher levels of security and control.

f. Military takeover may have great political, ideological, and legal relevance--and have serious effects on the government, the military, and the country as a whole--but from the standpoint of the strategy of national defense, it is not so relevant. When soldiers take or are entrusted with governmental functions outside the institutional structure of the armed force, they are, in effect, outside the armed forces. If they have authority over the armed forces, it is the authority that members of government have upon the armed forces. They are soldiers with civilian, political, or governmental roles, and through those nonmilitary roles they exert authority upon soldiers who have remained in the institutional structure of the military. When soldiers become statesmen and politicians outside the institutional structure of the armed forces, they no longer exercise their military command roles, and their authority-- like the authority of a civilian government member--rests upon the legal or patriotic willingness of military commanders to obey. This is not the case when elements or members of the armed forces undertake civil-military roles. They are inside the military institutional structure, belong to

that structure, are within the military chain of command, and may be relieved or rotated without any political effect. These analytical considerations are critical to the assessment of civil-military roles of armed forces and to identify what is a civil-military role, as distinct from a civilian role undertaken by a member of the military. For example, a soldier who is appointed civil governor of a province holds a civilian role, not a civil-military role. When a member of the armed forces acting as military governor of a province and within the military chain of command is granted authority over civil affairs in that province, he is conducting civil-military affairs, has a civil-military role, and engages in civil-military operations. Under the U. S. Strategy of Realistic Deterrence the major role of the U. S. Army is to "complement" or "supplement" IAFs (with the exception of the "joint planning" which the Strategy provides for the European Theater). Both in the deterrence and in the violent conflict contingencies provided by the strategy, elements of the U. S. Army may be called upon to advise or support IAFs in the full spectrum of their responsibilities. Thus, indirectly, the U. S. Army will be involved--through the medium of the IAFs--in those responsibilities. It is thus that the scenarios provided by the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence demanded a new conceptual approach, more extensive and global in kind, to the civil-military roles of IAFs. The conceptual definitions developed are the basis upon which the analyses and recommendations are built.

2.   BASIC CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS.

    a.   The principle of civil-military interdependence. U. S. Army doctrine recognizes the interdependence between the military and its society in the definitions of national and military strategy. The former is defined as

> The art and science of developing and using the
> political, economic and psychological powers of
> a nation, together with its armed forces, during
> peace and war to secure national objectives.

and the latter,

> The art and science of employing the armed forces
> of a nation to secure the objectives of national
> policy by the application of force or the threat
> of force.

Military strategy applies to organized force made available by national strategy. The principle of civil-military interdependence can be formulated as follows:

Civil Military Interdependence: The posture,
morale, combat effectiveness, and capacity to
oppose different threat systems that character-
ize the armed forces of a country depend on
the levels of manpower, resources and psycho-
logical support that the armed forces can
obtain from the mobilization base of their
country. All countries need an institutional-
ized armed force to deter potential external
or internal aggressors or transgressors, and
to prevent threats or deeds of violence that
hinder national **policy** implementation.

In recent years, moralistic judgments have found their way into social
science literature. It is argued that force is self-defeating, that it
prevents consensus and agreement, and by its mere existence generates
conflict. The evidence does not bear out this contention. The President
of the American Sociological Association, Prof. William J. Goode, noted
in his 1971 presidential address:

Force constitutes one of the major foundations
of social structure. The processes by which
the command of force is expended, exchanged,
accumulated or lost, are universal in social
interaction because force is one of the funda-
mental resources people and groups need to
elicit cooperation, help, and conformity from
one another.[42]

Force or the threat of force, rather than being the antithesis of coopera-
tion and conformity, is one of the means by which these can be achieved.
The universal requirement all societies have for institutionalized force
is indicated by the fact that there are practically no countries without
a military establishment.

b. Civil-military relations.

(1) The interdependence between the military and society
creates networks of interactions between the armed forces and the various
governmental, political, economic, social, and psychological institutions
and organizations of the country, or of another country. These inter-
actions are civil-military relations.

> Civil-military relations: All interactions,
> formal and informal, friendly, neutral or
> hostile, which exist between elements of the
> armed forces and the governmental, political,
> economic, sociological and psychological com-
> ponents of the same or of another country.

The definition states the obvious fact that relations between military
and civilian elements exist even when they are unfriendly or hostile.
Civil-military relations can be divided into internal and external--out-
side the country. The major characteristic of these relations is the
overlap, or intersection, between the governmental sector; the political,
economic, and social sectors; and the military sector of a society within
the country. These overlaps range in magnitude from the individual inter-
actions between members of a military post and the surrounding community,
to purchases of goods and services by the military in government, to
civilian political impacts upon the military in general and upon individu-
al military commanders. It includes the deterrent role of the military
as the major holder of organized force in the society. More attention
has been paid in the literature to the nature and character of internal
civil-military relations than to the impact of their very existence.
Doctrinal policy in many countries emphasizes that the relations between
the military and civilian components must be friendly and that the mili-
tary must be subordinate to civilian authority, but little attention
has been paid to the scope of civil-military relations. Because this is
an important concept in the evaluation of civil-military interdependence,
it is defined here as:

> Area of Civil-Military Relations: Those parts
> of a society, governmental, political, econo-
> mic or social, in which there is a reciprocal
> overlap between civilian and military functions
> and requirements. They include, but are not
> limited to, the areas in which manpower, materi-
> al, fiscal, and psychological resources are gen-
> erated and distributed for the support of civil
> and military needs.

(2) In the presence of an external or internal threat, when
countries tend to mobilize their resources to reduce internal vulnerabili-
ties and mobilize resources to increase defensive capabilities, civil-
military relations expand. This expansion is capable of changing both
the nature and the characteristics of the civil-military relationship.
CRIAF country studies show that in sudden expansions civil-military
relations have passed from positive to negative, and the character of
military subordination to civilian authority has also changed. In
several instances members of the military who opposed the expansion be-
came unpopular with politicians and with other elements of the armed
forces. Regular armies fear mobilization because it brings into their

structure reservists, whom the regular soldiers consider civilians in uniform, while civilians resist mobilization because it brings them into the military. As the level of threat increases the force used in the resolution of conflicts, military roles increase and so does the competition for political, economic, and psychological resources. It is the area of civil-military relations that the problems of "allocation of resources" must be resolved. It means deciding which resources go to defense and which to civilian uses. It is more than an economic dilemma, as it affects the nature of the political system. To raise the level of resources requires an exercise of power and results in a higher concentration of power when the resources are obtained. The allocation of resources to the military increases not only military power but the political and economic power of the armed forces. In the presence of growing external or internal threats, governments curtail the latitude of the communication media and the permissible activities of opposition groups. When national security is threatened, governments require more stringent mechanisms of control to cope with problems of national defense. Political opponents are often inclined to deny the need for higher national security measures because consciously or unconsciously they fear the curtailment of their own activities. The increased interdependence between civilian and military components causes IAFs to become very sensitive to civilian pressures. The higher the position of a commander, the greater will be his concern with civilian affairs--a term that covers the whole range of governmental, political, economic, sociological, and psychological relations. Commanders realize that military activities are dependent on relations with the civilian sector because civilian decisions affect the capabilities and posture of their forces. In many instances national strategy decisions result in reorganizations of the political, economic, and military forces. Military forces are inevitably involved in the reorganization, which affects both force and command structures, as expanded government functions require augmentation by military components. The military thus exercises politically significant roles due to the increase of governmental-military interdependence. These complex interactions in the presence of growing threats are of paramount military concern. On the strength of those observations it is felt that a conceptual approach to civil-military affairs is needed which is different from those currently in use by, or proposed for, U. S. Army doctrine. The difference is one of basic approach. Current U. S. Army doctrine is based upon a scenario in which a U. S. force is deployed overseas for advice or deterrence purposes, or for combat should deterrence fail. Commanders confronted with the problem posed by civilians in their operational environment ask, "What are my responsibilities with respect to civilians?"

      (3) This question limits civil affairs activities to the prevention of civilian interference with military operations, the discharge of the commander's responsibilities toward the civilian environment, liaison and support to indigenous governments, and military participation in internal development. Common to these considerations is the concept of a military force operating overseas and relating to a

foreign civilian environment. The civil-military affairs that are considered are not derived from internal civil-military relations, which carry the brunt of civil-military relations, but from external ones.

(4) Our proposed scenario implies a developing country facing threatened or actual aggression from external and/or internal forces. The basic question posed by this scenario is: "What must be done in the areas of civil-military relations to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to reduce the chances of defeat?" This question reproduces verbatim the definition of strategy in the Army Dictionary (AR 310-25). By posing it, civil-military relations and civil-military affairs are brought back into the fold of strategy and military science.

(5) Military concepts are universal. They apply to one's own as well as to other armed forces, friendly or hostile. The principles of war, of offensive operations, of defensive operations, of rear area protection, or of command and staff relations belong to this class of universal military concepts. The same applies to concepts governing civil-military relations. U. S. Army doctrine has defined in an incomplete way the whole area of civil-military relations and affairs because its scenarios do not cover defensive operations within a national territory. LDCs are primarily concerned with defense within their own territorial boundaries, and therefore, they offer an excellent view of the actual interplay between civil and military factors. Since the U. S. National Strategy of Realistic Deterrence directs the U. S. Army to plan for a defense and deterrence posture in which IAFs will play a primary role in the defense of their counties, a valid understanding of civil-military affairs becomes of paramount importance to complementary and supplementary joint planning.

c. Civil-military roles of armed forces.

(1) IAFs engage in a great variety of civil-military relations.[43] To evaluate the significance of these activities it was necessary to separate the extra-military activities of the armed forces in the civilian sectors of their own societies from standard civil-military activities. The many typologies available in academic literature were of little value because they were not concerned with differentiating military from extra-military activities. They were using legal, constitutional, or cultural criteria on what is proper or improper for armed forces to do, and often they were not even the criteria of the countries concerned, but those of the U. S. or the developed industrial countries of the West. The classification criterion finally adopted by CRIAF was based on the following premise: when soldiers take or are entrusted with civilian functions and responsibilities outside the institutional and command structure of the armed forces they engage in "extra-military" roles. In some cases if their civilian functions are governmental, they

may have authority over the armed forces. They are soldiers with civilian roles (not civil-military roles) exerting authority over civilians and the armed forces. On the other hand, when soldiers undertake civil-military roles they remain inside the institutional and command structure of the armed forces and are accountable for their actions to their military superiors. For example, a military officer who is the civil governor of a province has a civilian role and is outside the military chain of command, or he may have a civil-military role if the armed forces have been given the mission of providing civil government (civil-military government) to a province. This distinction shows that the problem of soldiers taking civilian roles was not as crucial to CRIAF as the problem of the military taking civil-military roles.

(2) Civil-military roles of armed forces have two characteristics: they are undertaken within the institutional and command structure of the armed forces, and they are guided by the requirements of the mission. The U. S. Army definition of mission thus became the key to the definition of civil-military roles of armed forces. Since the concept of civil-military roles of armed forces is central to this study, it was considered necessary to present it in the manner of a formal definition:

> Civil-Military Roles of Armed Forces: the mission,
> mandate, or responsibility given the armed forces
> of a country or elements thereof to augment, develop,
> organize, or control the physical, political, econom-
> ic, sociological, or psychological forces, and pro-
> cesses to support or secure national, strategic,
> logistic, or tactical objectives.

Since the implementation of civil-military roles takes the form of civil-military operations, the objective of civil-military roles can be divided into strategic, logistic, and tactical. The country and case studies demonstrate that the civil-military roles of IAFs can be classified into strategic, logistic, and tactical objectives, except for one class of roles of armed forces which serves "national policy" objectives and does not have a direct military purpose. The empirical studies show that the mandate to undertake civil-military roles is specific when the task to be undertaken and the mode of operation is clearly fixed and general when the means to achieve an objective are not specified. Some civil-military roles are temporary, as in emergency situations, while others are permanent, such as those given commanders of "territorial" units. Some civil-military roles are limited in scope, while others are extensive covering the whole area or population. Finally, some roles are contingent, meaning that the military would be required to exercise or implement them in a given situation. Contingent roles are the most interesting but less documented, owing to the difficulty of gaining information about contingency plans of IAFs.

(a) Internal and external civil-military roles. As with civil-military relations, civil-military roles can be internal or external according to whether they involve the population of the armed forces' own country or a foreign population. Civil-military interdependence, which

is critical internally, is not as significant in external roles. All armed forces distinguish between internal and external civil-military roles, including the United States which differentiates between civil affairs in CONUS and in OCONUS. Since U. S. defense scenarios do not include defensive military operations in CONUS, internal civil-military roles have not been properly explored. Should the U. S. Army be called to provide support to the IAFs of allied nations engaged in internal defense operations, a knowledge of those roles would be required.

(b) The objectives of civil-military roles. While civil-military roles of armed forces may be directed to the civilian sector of a society, the objective may be outside those sectors. The military supervision of harvests to deny the enemy crops is a civil-military operation, the objective of which is to deny resources to the enemy, although its "area of operations" is the civilian agricultural sector. Some civil-military roles such as military civic action do take place in civilian sectors with objectives in those sectors, such as to improve levels of living, foster internal development, or gain the goodwill or allegiance of civilians.

d. <u>Civil-military operations</u>. The definition of civil-military operations is derived from the concept of civil-military roles. Civil-military operations are the activities by which civil-military roles are implemented. Some further clarification of the subject is needed because of the restricted way in which it has been customarily used. Since U. S. Army doctrine is primarily concerned with external civil-military roles (those bearing upon foreign societies), the current meaning given to civil-military operations refers to external civil-military operations. A general concept of civil-military operations must include both internal and external roles as the U. S. Army may be deployed in areas where both are taking place simultaneously. Specifically, the U. S. Army may be engaged in external civil-military operations, the IAF may be performing internal civil-military operations, and furthermore, the U. S. Army, through the support it extends to an IAF, may be indirectly engaged in supporting internal civil-military operations. This last type of civil-military operation in which one foreign army supports another's internal civil-military operations has special characteristics and requirements of its own and is classified as mixed civil-military operations.

e. <u>Identification of civil-military operations</u>. The following discussion is based on U. S. Army terms used in AR 310-25 because the issue is strictly within the domain of military science. The question to be examined is whether civil-military operations are aspects of military operations or are military operations in their own right. FM 100-20, Internal Defense and Development, indicated that "civil-military operations embrace the political, economic, social, and psychological aspects of military operations." This was not accepted as a definition but as an explanatory statement because the Army Dictionary (AR 310-25) does not include "military operations." It does define "operations" as follows:

> A military action or the carrying out of strategic,
> tactical, service, training, or administrative
> military missions.

By virtue of this definition all military actions conducted by the military are operations. Therefore, if civil-military operations involve any action at all, they must be military operations and not aspects of them. The source of confusion is an improper execution of the decision by the Chief of Staff of the Army on 26 April 1968, creating the G5/S5 ACofS for Civil-Military Operations, which indicated that "the G5/S5 staff section, responsible for all civil affairs, psychological operations, and politi-co-military staff functions, be authorized in organizations requiring staff capability for these functions." FM 101-5, Staff Officers Field Manual, translated the Chief of Staff directive as:

> The ACofS, G5, Civil-Military Operations (CMO)
> Officer, is the principal staff assistant to
> the commander in all matters pertaining to
> political, economic, social, and psychological
> aspects of military operations. (emphasis
> added)

This statement meant to define the responsibilities of the G5 with respect to other staff sections, including the G3, but it cannot be construed as implying that civil-military operations are aspects of military operations; it implies that civil-military staff functions at headquarters levels must oversee the political, economic, social, and psychological aspects of operations.

 (1) Army doctrine follows two criteria in the classification of operations. One is the purpose of the mission involved; the other is the area of operations specific to each mission, or the characteristics of the task.

 (2) The purpose of the mission divides operations into strategic, tactical, service, training, and administrative, with the term strategic including logistical operations.

 (3) The area of operations specific to each mission, or task, divides operations into airborne operations conducted in air-to-surface environments; northern operations conducted in polar or simipolar environment, etc. According to this criterion, those operations conducted primarily in civil environments by military forces are civil-military operations. That is, they are military actions which involve operations in the civilian sectors of a society.

 (4) If the two criteria of classification of military operations are combined, the following civil-military operations result:

(a) Strategic civil-military operations.

(b) Logistic civil-military operations.

(c) Tactical civil-military operations.

(d) Service civil-military operations.

(e) Administrative civil-military operations.

(f) Training civil-military operations.

Of the six civil-military operations, the strategic, logistic, and tactical have substantive importance. The service civil-military operations are in support of nonmilitary components or nonmilitary operations. Some civil-military roles have no direct military relevance but support national policies as when the military take over customs operations, as was the case in one African country, or when officers become chairmen of Peoples Revolutionary Committees of collective farms and factories, as in the case in the Peoples Republic of China.

f.   Definition of civil-military operations.

(1) On the doctrinal grounds presented above, the following conceptualization is proposed:

> Civil-Military Operations of Armed Forces:
> Those military operations consisting of the
> employment of armed forces to service, aug-
> ment, develop, or control civilian forces,
> processes, or organizations of physical,
> economic, political, or psychological nature,
> during peace and war, to secure or support
> national, strategic, or tactical or logistic
> objectives.

(2) The need to differentiate between internal, external, and mixed civil-military operation requires three supplementary definitions:

> Internal Civil-Military Operations of Armed
> Forces: Those operations conducted by armed
> forces bearing on the civilian sectors of
> their own society.

> External Civil-Military Operations of Armed
> Forces: Those operations conducted by armed
> forces bearing on the civilian sectors of
> another society.

Mixed Civil-Military Operations of Armed
Forces: Those civil-military operations
which result when the armed forces of one
nation support the internal civil-military
operations of the armed forces of another
nation.

g.   Special characteristics of mixed civil-military operations.

(1)   Whenever U.S. forces operate in an allied country still
exercising its sovereignty and support the IAF, mixed civil-military
operations will occur. The nature of these operations has not been fully
explored because the elements which compose them were not properly
identified. These elements are the "internal" civil-military operations
of the IAF and the "external" ones of the U. S. armed forces. The prin-
cipal problem in mixed civil-military operations is which military holds
the principal civil-military roles.

(2)   IAFs view their foreign allies and friends as unwilling to
take the subordinate roles they think they should have in matters of
civil-military relations, roles, and operations. Differences in values,
customs, traditions, and military style between indigenous and allied
armed forces come to the fore in the area of civil-military relations.
Disagreements may be overt or latent, and the major causes of those dis-
agreements are:

(a)   Differences on how to implement civil-military roles
(humanitarianism versus authoritarianism; populism versus elitism; modern
styles versus traditional styles).

(b)   Differences in political ideology, as manifest in
overall policies and attitudes.

(c)   Differences in the perception of the internal political
and economic problems of the host country and of ways of tackling them.

(d)   Differences in objectives (generally fighting the
enemy versus protecting the regime from internal opposition).

(e)   Differences in the perception of objectives held by
the aid-giving nation.

(f)   Differences in the weight given to technical efficiency
versus status and position.

(g)   Differences in the style of human relations of each
party.

(3)   Some of those differences are so deeply rooted that it is
not realistic to imagine they can be reduced or eliminated, but if they
become clear to decision makers, the risks and cost of disagreements can
be realistically appraised. Another critical problem occurs when the IAF

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becomes unable to perform assigned roles and the supporting foreign force takes the initiative in filling the vacuum, disregarding the sovereign prerogatives of the host country. A glaring case involves the application of martial law. If a foreign army assumes the military government functions occasioned by martial law, it will appear as an army of occupation. Military government by armies of occupation has been conducted successfully only in protectorates or colonies of conquered countries. With respect to allies, it is necessary that the :AFs perform their civil-military roles with minimal interference on the part of foreign military elements.

    h.   <u>General consideration of strategic, logistic, and civil-military roles</u>.

        (1) Definition of strategic civil-military roles:

Strategic Civil-Military Roles of Armed Forces: The mandate, mission, or responsibility given the armed forces to increase national power to achieve national objectives which may require the use or threat of force. This includes reducing the strategic vulnerabilities of the country, to any actions, by any means through which the war potential or the will to fight may be diminished.

        (2) Definition of logistic civil-military roles:

Logistic Civil-Military Roles of Armed Forces: The mandate, mission or responsibility given the armed forces to contribute to the transformation of the resources of the mobilization base into the logistical elements required by the armed forces and by national defense purposes, and to participate in all those civil-military activities conducted to secure an orderly and effective mobilization in the event of war or other emergencies.

        (3) Definition of the tactical civil-military roles:

Tactical Civil-Military Roles of Armed Forces: The mandate, mission, or responsibility given the armed forces to support tactical operations by securing favorable conditions in the civilian sectors of the operational environment, including preventing interference with the forces in the field, fulfilling the commander's legal, policy, and humanitarian obligations toward noncombatants, and relating to civilian authorities as may exist in the operational field.

(4) Definition of civil-military roles in support of National Policy:

Civil-Military Roles of Armed Forces in Support of National Policy: The mandate, mission or responsibility given the armed forces to support the nonmilitary objectives of national policy with the organized manpower, resources, technical, and administrative capabilities and elements of control available within the armed forces. The objectives to be supported or implemented generally include social and economic development programs, measures to increase the levels of living of the population, military civic action and public information campaigns, and, in general, military support to governmental action to secure law and order, unite the population in support of common objectives, and develop effective political, economic and social institutions in the context of nation building.

i. __Discussion of the definitions of strategic, logistic, and tactical civil-military roles.__

(1) Differentiation between military and nonmilitary roles of IAFs. To distinguish between civil-military roles of military significance and civil-military roles that are not of military significance the basic question is:

What is the purpose of the missions allocated to armed forces in the civilian sector?

The purpose may be the achievement of national objectives by means of organized force, in which case the civil-military roles and operations may be "strategic," "logistic," and "tactical." The purpose may be political, economic, or social development as defined by political leadership which is not of direct military significance. It has been argued that political, social, and economic development increases national power and, therefore, the potential for war. While it is true that the economic potential of a country can be transformed into war potential, the development process, per se, is not necessarily of military significance.

(2) War and defense planning versus development planning. Regardless of its level of economic growth, a country facing external or internal aggression must plan for and implement strategic, logistic, and tactical objectives and devote national resources to their implementation. These resources must be obtained from the economy and the society, except for those provided by foreign assistance. The implementation of those strategic, logistic, and tactical objectives involves a wide range of civil-military relations, roles, and operations which are not those

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involved in civilian economic and social development. Current U. S. Army doctrine on stability operations confuses the issue by maintaining that "internal development" is a requirement for successful "internal defense measures" and that no substantive economic development can be achieved under internal war conditions. It is also held that the objective of internal development is to motivate the population to support the government.

> Internal development programs, carefully planned
> and implemented, and properly publicized, can
> convince the people that the government is pro-
> moting their interests and so assist in depriving
> any insurgent of a base for popular support.
> (FM 31-23)

Viewed from this perspective, development becomes a massive psychological operation, a point which was recognized by a DA DCSPER Study:

> Civil affairs and psychological operations
> have a common objective of influencing
> people through a combination of social,
> economic, physical and psychological
> actions.

In the same spirit, FM 100-20, Internal Defense and Internal Development, while recognizing that "the basic cause of insurgency is the desire of the insurgent leadership to wrest power from one elite in order to control it themselves," magnifies the shortcomings of the host country government by such statements as:

> The government may fail to recognize the
> magnitude of the grievances of the people.
> This failure may occur because the govern-
> mental structure does not extend down to
> the local levels or is insensitive to the
> needs of the people.

> The government may recognize the grievances
> of the people but fail to provide solutions.
> This may occur as a result of strong factions
> seeking to maintain the status quo.

> The government may offer solutions the people
> consider too slow in bringing benefits.

The confusion is apparent in FM 31-23 which states:

> The military can contribute to the overall
> strategy of winning the confidence of the
> people by providing security, but their ef-
> forts must be accompanied by economic,
> social and political changes.

The insurgency approach which pervades U. S. Army doctrines appears to reject the need to mobilize the forces of the country for national defense purpose, but fosters "social change and political change projects aiming at winning the population." Underneath the philosophy is the clear implication that the United States is supporting foreign governments that lack a mandate from their people and thus the emphasis on the theme "that the government must gain popular support." The implied criticism has confused civilian economic and social development with effective strategic and logistic planning and execution for national defense purposes.

     (3) Civil affairs functions in strategic, logistic, and tactical civil-military roles. The 21 civil affairs functions cover the spectrum of civilian activities which from a strategic, logistic, and tactical support point of view are of interest to the U. S. Army. These 21 functions were originally developed for the military government missions of World War II. Although each function supports a specific military objective, Army doctrine has distorted these civil affairs functions by the setting of a general objective which is totally unrealistic:

> The overall objective of civil affairs operations
> is to organize and motivate civilians to assist
> the government and military forces. The opera-
> tions are directed at eliminating or reducing
> political, economic and sociological problems.

This confusion was well perceived by the authors of CIMO:

> Two divergent and widely held views have existed
> regarding civil affairs, based primarily on two
> different conflict experiences. One view, held
> since World War II, is that Civil Affairs re-
> sources are designed to be used primarily in a
> military government role, in occupied or
> liberated territory. The second, more recent
> trend based on the conflict of South Vietnam,
> is the concept that civil affairs unit assets and
> other U. S. Army type forces conduct military
> civic action, a subfunction of civil affairs.

It appears that in the last analysis it is military-civil action--a civil affairs subfunction--which becomes the vehicle for "eliminating or re-ducing political, economic, and sociological problems." The application of civil affairs functions to national defense thus becomes quite distinct and realistic. It is what most countries attempt with different degrees of success when under the threat of external or internal aggression. Under present U. S. Army doctrine, conducting civil-military operations will place the U. S. Army on a collision course with the government and the political system of the host country.

1. Statement of Dr. Theodore C. Marrs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate, s. 3108, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 1624.

2. Jose Miguel Ruiz, Pseudonym, <u>Memorias de un Revolucionario en Gringolandia</u>, Bogota, Colombia: (no date) p. 46.

3. Gil Carl AlRoy, "The Involvement of Peasants in Internal Wars," Center for International Studies, Princeton University, June 1966, p. 11.

4. K. Von Clausewitz, <u>On War</u>, trans. Col. J. J. Graham, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956, vol. 1, Para. 24.

5. Edwin Lieuwen, <u>Arms and Politics in Latin America</u>, New York: Praeger, 1961.

6. <u>Ibid</u>., p. vii-viii.

7. <u>Ibid</u>., p. viii.

8. Friedrich Engels, "the Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State," in Marx and Engels, <u>Collected Works</u>, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955, Vol. II, pp. 170-326.

9. Wilson C. McWilliams, <u>Garrisons and Governments</u>, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1967; Alfred Vagts, <u>A History of Militarism</u>, New York: Free Press, 1967.

10. Sigmund Neumann, "Engels and Marx: Military Concepts of the Social Revolutionaries," and Edward Meade Earle "Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin: Soviet Concepts of War" in E. Meade Earle, ed., <u>Makers of Modern Strategy</u>, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.

11. Morris Janowitz, ed., <u>The Military in the Political Development of New States</u>, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

12. Samuel P. Huntington, ed., <u>Changing Patterns of Military Politic</u>, New York: Free Press, 1962.

13. John J. Johnson, <u>The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries</u>, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964.

14. Henry Bienen, ed., <u>The Military and Modernization</u>, Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971.

15. Cf. Stanislaw Andreski, <u>Military Organization and Society</u>, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.

16. George Kelly, "The Global Civil Military Dilemma" <u>Review of Politics</u>, 25 (July 1963) p. 297.

17. Cf. William R. Davet, et. al., <u>Strategic Considerations for Increased Readiness</u>, RAND HI-477-D, January 1964; Herman Kahn, <u>On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios</u>, New York: Praeger 1965; Henry A. Kissinger, ed., <u>Problems of National Strategy</u>. New York: Praeger, 1971; Kenneth E. Boulding, <u>Conflict and Defense</u>: <u>A General Theory</u>, New York: Harper and Row, 1962; Thomas C. Schelling, <u>The Strategy of Conflict</u>.

18. In this discussion, "national strategy" will be considered with "field strategy." This change in terms is deemed necessary to preserve the terms "national strategy" and "military strategy" as strictly U. S. armed forces terms. Thus the "national strategy of country X" will be called "the grand strategy of country X" and the "military strategy"of country X, the "field strategy" of country X.

19. Karl von Clausewitz, <u>War, Politics and Power</u>, Chicago: Regnery Co., 1962.

20. Karl von Clausewitz, <u>On War</u>, New York: Random House Inc., 1943, pp. 61-66.

21. Quoted from R. N. Leighton and R. W. Coakley, <u>Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1945</u>, U. S. Army in World War II, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 9.

22. Gen. Erich Ludendorff, <u>Der Totale Krieg</u>, Munich: Altenvertog 1934, pp. 17-18.

23. Derven Whittlesey, "Haushofer: The Geopoliticians" in E. Mead Early, ed., <u>Makers of Modern Strategy</u>, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943. The neglected contribution of Alexander Hamilton, to be found in volumes 6 and 7 of his collected <u>Works</u>, New York, 1904. Hamilton presented views which later were expounded by geopoliticians.

24. This term was coined much later by sociologist Ralf Dahrendorff in his article "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict", <u>The Journal of Conflict Resolution</u>, XI, (1958), 2 pp. 170-183. After a long academic career, Prof. Dahrendorff, a German citizen, is today a German representative in the NATO council.

25. ROTCM 145-45, <u>Readings for the Defense Establishment in National Security</u>, September 1969, p. 173.

26. FM 100-5, Operations in the Army in the Field, (I-II-1).

27. ROTCM 145-45, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 173.

28. FM 100-5, (1-I-5).

29. ROTCM 145-45, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 173.

30.   AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Strategy: The art and science of develop-
ing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces as
necessary during peace and war to afford the maximum support to policies,
in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of
victory and to lessen the chances of defeat."

31.   AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Military Strategy: The art and science of
employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of
national policy by the application of force or the threat of force."

32.   **AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Mobilization: The act of preparing for**
war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national
resources."

33.   AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Mobilization Base: The total of all
resources available, or which can be made available, to meet foreseeable
wartime needs. Such resources include the manpower and material re-
sources and services required for the support of essential military,
civilian and survival activities; as well as the elements affecting their
state of readiness such as (but not limited to) the following: manning
levels, state of training, modernization of equipment, mobilization of
material reserves and facilities, continuity of government, civil defense
plans and preparedness measures, psychological preparedness of the people,
international agreements, planning with industry, dispersion and standby
legislation and controls."

34.   AR 310-25, 1 June 1972: "Political Warfare: Aggressive use of
political means to achieve national objectives."

35.   AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Economic Warfare: The defensive use in
peacetime, as well as during war, of any means by military and civilian
agencies to maintain and expand the economic potential for war of a nation
and its (probable) allies, and, conversely, the offensive use of any
measure in peace or war to diminish or neutralize the economic potential
for war of the (likely) enemy and his accomplices."

36.   AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Psychological Warfare: The planned use of
propaganda and other measures, designed to influence the opinions,
emotions, attitude and behavior of enemy, neutral or friendly groups in
support of current policy and aims, or of a military plans."

37.   AR 310-25, 1 June 1972, "Strategic Vulnerability: The susceptabili-
ty of vital elements of national power to being seriously decreased or
adversely changed by the application of actions within the capability of
another nation to impose. Strategic vulnerability may pertain to
political, geographic, economic, scientific, sociological or military
factors."

38.   "War" is not defined in AR 310-25.

39.   James B. Davies, ed., When Men Revolt and Why, New York: Free
Press, 1971, p. 3.

40. Leighton, R. M., and Coakley, R. W., The War Department: Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43, U. S. Army in World War II, Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 8.

41. The Army Dictionary (AR 310-25) defines Operational Environment: As pertains to the military, it is a composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences which affect the employment of military forces and which bear on the decisions of the commander.

42. William J. Goode, "Presidential Address: The Place of Force in Human Society," American Sociological Review, 37, 5, 1972, p. 507.

43. Cf. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964; and J. Van Doorn, Armed Forces and Society, Paris: Mouton, 1968 passim.

CHAPTER 2

CIVIL-MILITARY POLITICAL RELATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION.

    a. *Purpose, scope, and content.*

        (1) The basic objective of this chapter of the CRIAF project is to make a general examination of political relationships between the indigenous military and the civilian segments of developing nations in various world areas.

        (2) This subject encompasses a wide range of concepts documented by examples and cases from actual countries. It provides an abbreviated cross section of observations sampled from research in this field.

        (3) The opening section explores the basic nature of civil-military political relationships in developing nations. The main sections include a general survey of civil-military political relations from a historical perspective and a review of military roles impacting on the civil sector under variable political conditions. The final section of this chapter summarizes tentative conclusions regarding civil-military roles and relationship which are or may be performed by IAFs in the political life of their countries.

    b. *Patterns of civil-military political relations.* The primary approach in this chapter has been to collect and categorize information regarding the patterns of civil-military political relations in LDCs. Military institutions have left some clear imprints on the domestic political process of virtually every nation. This is particularly true during a country's early development or in periods of national crisis. There has been an enormous expansion in the volume of research and reference materials on this subject during the past decade. Researchers have begun to study the roles of armed forces in developing countries much more intensively because military establishments have a readily identifiable organization and hierarchy. More importantly, military institutions have control over the means of force and this puts them in a position to influence and often determine the political trends of the country.[1] The growing body of literature on the subject of civil-military relations also reflects changes in U.S. attitudes toward the political involvement of IAFs. The traditional posture has tended to oppose political involvement of the military. Over a decade ago, a number

of observers began calling attention to the positive contribution being made by IAFs in LDCs. Armed forces involvement has gone beyond the occasional takeover to include development and vocal participation in the major national issues. International de-' velopments have also had some impact on domestic political involvement of IAFs. Among these developments are pressures by major powers to establish areas of interest and internal separatist and secessionist trends aided from abroad. The United States has at times been required to choose between supporting stability through authoritarian military regimes or encouraging reform governments which may not be able to rule effectively. Tensions of international and domestic politics do not make this an easy choice. United States military aid efforts have political implications since policies aimed at stability, security, and opposition to communism are viewed by honest opponents as conflicting with goals of long range social and economic reform. Often U.S.-aided local efforts have been unable to cope with the "revolution of rising expectations," and growing public disillusionment with foreign involvement has led to consistently lower aid appropriations.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND TRENDS OF CIVIL-MILITARY POLITICAL RELATIONS.

    a. Domination of government by the military has often been considered as an "unnatural" rule and has even been labeled as the ultimate type of totalitarianism. Historically, however, military participation in the political processes of the nation is prevalent in varying degrees in all countries.

    b. It has become an historical trend that when civilian government collapses, the military takes control of the nation. In the past, military government has developed when a combination of the following conditions existed: civilian government disintegrated, the nation had low social cohesion, or the level or internal strife threatened national identity.

    c. Military political intervention has occurred in the recent past in most Latin American countries, 5 independent Arab states, 14 new African states, in several Southeast Asian countries, in Turkey, and in Pakistan, to name but a few geographic areas.[2] In all cases the armed forces endorsed political, economic, and social reform.

    d. The actual, as well as the potential, political-military role of the military appears to fluctuate in extent and method by geographical area and in accordance with the age and degree of development of each nation-state. The army is basically a product of the collectivity which created it, reflecting the social and political characteristics of the particular culture.

e. Significant differences among military establishments in various political systems have been noticed by perceptive observers. In early 19th century, de Tocqueville stressed the difference between the officer corps of the French Monarchy and that of the American soldiers in the then newly developing United States.

f. Historical evidence indicates that armed forces have often played a crucial role in shaping political trends and social values of all nations. Gaetano Mosca and Alfred Vagts found that the military had a significant role in the development of the European states in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries.[4] Scholars who only a few years ago were critical of military regimes and military leaders are coming to the view that the military establishment often possesses distinctive skills and beliefs likely to be important if not essential to the nation-building process.

g. This new awareness of the importance of military organizations in peacetime and of their participation in the political process leads to a review of political trends in civil-military relations. Our examination of military roles and involvements in the political process will include Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

(1) Latin America.

(a) There has been a tendency for the military to play an extensive role in the political affairs of Latin American countries.[5] The use of military force as a political factor is deeply ingrained in the political experience of these nations. Military leaders of independence movements became political leaders. They were followed by the 'caudillos' who influenced political life with their private armies. By the end of the 19th century, national governments consolidated their control over these semi-autonomous regions. Since 1953, the military has been a dominant force in Latin America and has tended to shape, direct, or control national governments even when not holding actual positions of administrative power. In Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Panama, and Peru, the military now exercises direct political control. In Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic, the military exerts strong political influence.

(b) Factors such as the lack of economic growth, inflation, negative balance of payments, flight of capital, growth of debt service requirements, and the inability of civilian governments to govern have resulted in military takeovers. In Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras, guerrilla movements or Communist threats resulted in military control.

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(c) The officer corps is no longer always aligned with traditional upper class groups but more so with the middle sector. Their level of professional skill has improved. Armies are also abandoning traditional alliances with the landed aristocracy and the Church.

(2) Asia. World War II marked the end of the colonial period in Southeast Asia. Military caretaker governments have been predominant. In some Asian countries the military took over in a period of political and administrative chaos, centralized and solidified government control, and then stepped aside. The military derives from traditional elite groups and has a limited ability to cope with economic and political problems.[6]

(3) Africa. Within the first years of their independence, the new states of Africa adopted one-party systems. By mid 1967, however, approximately one out of four former colonial dependencies had a military head of state.[7] Coups are likely to occur almost anywhere in Africa and the military usually plays an important role in such events. In the North African states[8] the military has been responsible for revisions of economic policy and is dedicated to nation building.

(4) Middle East.

(a) There is a tradition of military rule in the Middle East.[9] The many coups reflect the weakness of the parliamentary form of governments in the area.

(b) In Egypt military personnel have been involved as managers in almost every sector of society. The military regime developed a nationalistic society, gave the country a stable government, and directed its economic and social development. In Iraq the military has been in the forefront of political activity since 1936. In Pakistan the military regime has attempted to reduce corruption in government. The army engages in the construction of dams, irrigation canals, and roads. The army of Iran teaches adults as well as children to read and write and carries out extensive civil military roles.

3. BEHAVIOR OF INDIGENOUS ARMED FORCES IN POLITICAL SITUATIONS. This part of the chapter provides summary generalizations about the indigenous armed forces' political behavior. These viewpoints are grouped around six aspects of the nature and extent of military involvements in political processes as listed below in subparagraphs a through f. The coverage is a cross section of observations.

a. "National consciousness" of IAFs.

(1) The military tends to act as a positive factor in building national identity. The military organization can serve as an important socializing instrument by inculcating nation-oriented values into new recruits drawn from disparate regions and subgroups throughout society.[10] The military readily acquires a sense of national consciousness, often in advance of other elites, and becomes inimical to vested interests and secessionist tendencies.[11] Military groups have a fundamental attachment to the abstract concept of nation, which is based in part on their providing effective guardianship of what they consider to be the national essence. Thus, a cohesive military can contribute greatly to the development of nationalism by providing political leadership and stability. In addition, a cohesive military becomes an integrating force at the national level.[12] Finally, modern military techniques have acted to centralize countries by extending the authority of the Government over distant or remote regions.[13]

(2) The tendency of the military to intervene in the political order derives from its strong self-identification with national goals. The military in new states has a higher degree of "national consciousness" than most other elites--including politicians--and this involves it in politics.[14] The politics of the military are essentially nationalistic but, because of this, highly concerned with development.[15] In some sub-Saharan countries, however, the military is generally less educated, less skilled, and more lacking in national consciousness than other elite groups.[16] A contrary trend is noted in Indonesia where the armed forces led a movement of national consolidation after the overthrow of President Sukarno.[17]

b. Capabilities of IAFs as modernizing agents.

(1) There has been widespread feeling since World War II that indigenous armed forces can play key roles in helping to guide countries through the transition to modern nationhood. The military is proving to be an effective instrument for modernization in many of the emerging states. Technological requirements of military forces have made many military leaders more acutely aware of the economic and technological backwardness of their countries. The armed forces can be mobilized to achieve new modernization objectives, and they also have an organization capable of blending industrial discipline and traditional mores.[18] One reason why the military has emerged as the most progressive element in some LDCs is that it is frequently the most likely institution to seek rational solutions to managerial and developmental problems.[19] New nations

have often been able to survive the incredibly rapid transition to industrialization with major disruptions, largely because of the influence of the armed forces. But it is a mixed picture. Some reservations about the role of the military as a modernizing agent have also been expressed by students of the subject.

> It may be a coincidence, but it is certainly significant that no military regime ever seriously modified the concentration of landed property and that the only countries which managed to achieve a true land reform dissolved their army and either substituted for it a workers militia (Cuba and Bolivia) or a new army (Mexico).[20]

(2) The military can be useful as a limited instrument of economic development, but its utility and effectiveness greatly diminish as it moves toward complete control of the country.[21] Finally, the army tends to become less well organized and in some ways a disruptive force when it competes for political dominance.

c. Political posture of indigenous armed forces. In general, military officers have been regarded as being more traditional and conservative, but in recent years a number of armies have promoted radical reforms, as, for instance, in Peru. It is difficult to identify a military political viewpoint in new nations, but certain common themes seem to explain military political behavior. These include a strong sense of nationhood, a puritanical outlook, the principle of government control of social and economic change, and a suspicion of civilian politics.[22] In many parts of the world, and specially in Latin America, the armed forces have pressured the body politic for better government.[23] Military officers in Egypt have supported significant political and economic changes and have attempted to reduce inefficiency and corruption.[24]

d. Professionalism of IAFs.

(1) Discussion of the military professionalism of indigenous armed forces focuses on two basic aspects: the role of military as a modernizing agent or as a vehicle for upward social mobility, and the effect of this status on the particular civilian government with which it is involved. In reference to the first aspect, the prestige of the military has been cited as becoming increasingly identified in the public mind with technical competence.[25] This has been more noticeable in Latin America than in the Moslem countries. As Lerner and Robinson remarked: "Except in Brazil, where officers contributed significantly to technological development, natural science, and development of the hinterland, the training that the

professional soldier receives still does little to contribute con-
structively to civilian life."[26] There is little disagreement with
the statement that the military has traditionally been a vehicle
for upward social mobility, both economically and socially. The
army has offered opportunities for prestige and advancement, as
well as a more comfortable life, to the sons of middle and lower
class families.

(2) In the second area, relation of professionalism to
civilian control, contrasting viewpoints tend to emerge: some
observers feel professionalism in the military makes civilian con-
trol easier to establish, while others feel the opposite--small
or weak armies tend to further the strengthening of civilian con-
trol. In some countries officer corps belong to the governing party
but this does not seem to have affected their professionalism. In
other instances soldiers are prone to adopt the "politics of wanting
to be above politics."[27]

(3) Further generalizations about the roles of IAFs include
assertions that as the size of the military grows, so does its needs
for a hierarchial structure which tends to extend itself into the
fabric of the rest of society.[28] This is especially true in some Euro-
pean countries where posts in the civil service were graded accord-
ing to the ranks of the armed forces.[29] In some countries, the armed
forces are viewed as a political group despite their professionalism.[30]
The officer corps in the new nations have been required to exercise
skills in bargaining and political communication which are required
for sustaining their political role.[31]

e. Internal political dissension/competition within IAFs.
Most discussions of dissension and competition within IAFs have
found the degree of cohesion to be the determining factor in the
behavior of the military in relation to the staging of coups d'etat.
Internal conflict between competing cliques in a military establish-
ment has led to a proliferation of coups and political interven-
tions.[32] Often there are widening rifts within the military juntas
installed by coups, giving evidence of prior instability within the
armed forces.[33] Dissension within the military might result from com-
petition between groups of different levels or ranks, as in the
Cuban Revolution that brought Fulgencio Batista to power in 1933
when the rank and file topped the old officer corps,[34] or it may re-
sult from animosity between different branches of the armed forces,
as in Brazil, where the elitist aristocratic navy opposed the pop-
ulist army of the racially-mixed poor.[35]

f. Responsiveness/subordination of indigenous armed forces to civil authority.

    (1) There is general agreement among the writers on the subject that the military remains responsive to civilian authority as long as the civilian government continues to function effectively and maintains its legitimacy of rule. However, lack of agreement on basic constitutional principles, inexperience with government by discussion, weakness of civilian bureaucracies, and polarization of political parties and of economic interest groups all contribute to an atmosphere where force becomes the final rationale in the resolution of internal conflict.[36] In such cases, the military often emerges as the only remaining group capable of exercising political control and preserving order in a polarized society where factionalism and violence endanger the population and the interests of the society. The original entry of the military into the civilian political sphere is often initially welcomed, but difficulty almost inevitably arises in persuading the army, after it becomes substantially involved in the political process of the nation, to have its involvement kept short and transitional. Otherwise, the result can be a reduced effectiveness of the armed forces as well as the weakening of the basic civilian political structure. Newly-emerging nations are especially prone to these dangers posed by the succession of coups and counter coups among opposing military factions.

    (2) Further generalizations concerning the subordination of the military to civil authority bear directly on the civilian government's degree of political modernization. The development of an articulate public opinion has been cited as providing a constraint against military intervention into politics. Single party authoritarian regimes are more likely to establish an effective political center and to impede the military's ability to take power in new nations.[37] Finally, it has been suggested that when civilian institutions become powerful the military will tend to be pulled into politics in alliance with one or the other dominant political groups.[38]

4. ANALYSIS OF THE INDIGENOUS MILITARY AS A POLITICAL FORCE.

    a. Prevalence of political activity by the military in developing countries.

    (1) In marked contrast with the Western tradition that political activity on the part of the military is incompatible with democratic government,[39] in LDCs military officers often control or influence the activities and policies of the incumbent civilian government.[40] Because a military coup or takeover of the government is an ever-present possibility in the political life of developing nations, it is useful to explore the underlying reasons.

(2) One view of the political role of the military in developing nations sees their entrance into the political arena related to political, economic, and security threats. The political activities of the military are viewed as response to these threats. The stated rationale for a military coup is generally that the civilian government has been unable or unwilling to deal with internal emergencies.

(3) A distinction can be made between the situations in which the military actually takes control of the government, and those in which the military, while not directly assuming power, sets the conditions under which power may continue to be exercised by the civilian government. In those situations in which the military actually takes over the government, it may do so as a "constitutional caretaker," or as a "revolutionary" or reforming force. As a "constitutional caretaker," the military's purpose in seizing power during a period of turmoil in which civilian institutions seem paralyzed is to reestablish order and to establish conditions under which political power can be safely returned to legitimate civilian government. Thus, in taking power, the military's purpose is limited to stabilizing the internal situation and returning power to the civilian government within a relatively short period of time. It is not usually the military's purpose to effect basic changes in the structure of political institutions, since it regards its role as that of protector of the constitution. However, the military may also seize power with the intent of creating new political institutions which will better serve the need of accomplishing social change in an atmosphere of internal stability.

(4) The second major political role of the military is seen by some observers as the withholding of support from the civilian government. In such situations the military holds the threat of a military coup over the civilian government and in that fashion insures that the views of the military are a major force in the political environment.

(5) In this view of the political role of the military in developing nations, the military is not seen as seeking political power. Rather, the military views itself as the only viable alternative to ineffectual civilian government. It should be emphasized, however, that the military is not usually a monolithic body whose members share common goals and views. Typically, only certain elements of the military are politically active, and these are usually officers from the increasingly more powerful middle class.[41] Usually, the politically active segments of the military are fervently nationalistic; value order, efficiency, and discipline; and seek to apply these values to the political life of the country.

(6) Another explanation for the prevalence of political activity on the part of the military in developing countries is that military officers are more concerned with protecting their own prerogatives and furthering their own institutional interests. Support for this view is found in the increase in military expenditures which usually follow a military takeover of an LDC government. Even when the military permits or brings about social and economic changes while they are in control of the government, their own interests are satisfied first, and this usually results in increased military expenditures.[42] It is noted by some observers that while the military in developing countries often appears to be a modernizing force, in reality economic change and industrialization are primarily a means of strengthening the military itself by making the nation more self-sufficient and able to maintain a strong military. Because of what they believe to be an identity of interests with those of the nation, politically active military officers tend to convince themselves of the necessity and legitimacy of their actions. They do not oppose changes in the status quo and often allow and encourage the modernization process.[43]

(7) Communist analysts have recognized the political power of the military in developing countries and the value of the military as a revolutionary instrument. But while picturing the military as a valuable, even essential, ally of the working class in bringing about a successful revolution, they have viewed military leaders as too conservative in outlook to be able to guide the "struggle for national liberation" without the active participation of politically more advanced elements. The weakness of the military, in the Communist view, is that it lacks political acumen. While one small segment of the officer corps may be "progressive," other segments of the officer corps may be opposed to the revolution. Thus, the military tends to be unreliable. Depending upon which segment has the upper hand at the moment, it may either accelerate or hamper political control of the party. Consequently, while the military has an essential mission in the national liberation movement, in the Communist view it should not have political power.

b. The necessity for popular support.

(1) While it can be argued that the military can overturn its government anytime it wishes because of its near monopoly of force, experience indicates that successful military takeovers require more than simply an overwhelming preponderance of physical force. It is at least equally important that the military acts at the moment when it is backed by public opinion, or at least not opposed by it.

(2) In seeking the answer as to how a relatively small military force such as the army of an LDC can take political control of a nation, it is apparent that some other factor besides pure force of arms is involved. Most successful military coups are relatively bloodless affairs marked by little opposition on the part of the civilian sectors of the societies. It is quite evident that military coups in modern times are successful usually only when the civilian government to be deposed has lost the support of the people who will not back the discredited government against the military.

(3) Actually, military assumption of power is more closely related to the lack of legitimacy on the part of the civilian government and the appearance that the military usurpers represent the will of the people than to monopoly of force. The military establishment, although more highly organized and disciplined than the civilian institutions, is not monolithic. Only certain groups of officers, not necessarily those at the highest levels of command, are likely to be politically active and willing to plan and participate in the carrying out of a coup. Other groups of officers are likely to be neutral, at best, or to even oppose military usurpation of political power. Therefore, the plotters of a military coup generally cannot depend upon the backing of the entire military establishment should the government which they intend to topple have appreciable popular backing. Instead, the military usurpers must have support sufficient to convince both the civilian government and the non-participating members of the military that the civilian government has no real chance to survive. Many military leaders will not commit themselves to a coup unless they consider it safe to do so or dangerous not to; therefore, in modern times, military coups generally fail rapidly if the civilian government is able to arouse any significant support among the other organizations or within the military itself.

c. Legitimation of military political activity.

(1) The military generally gives as the rationale for takeover the forfeiture by the civilian government of its right to govern because of corruption, inefficiency, and failure to provide for public needs. In that sense, the military maintains that it acted legitimately to protect and not to violate the constitution.

(2) The nearly universal concept of the highest duty being loyalty to the constitution, not to the governmental leaders, requires at least the appearance of public legitimation. Consequently, leaders of military attempts to overthrow the civilian government seek public approval of their actions and are generally successful in gaining public support.

(3) In developed nations the military has remained largely subordinated to the civilian government. In part this is attributed to a strong tradition that rejects political intervention by the military.[44] A major reason is that most developed countries have developed stable political systems, and that the threat of violent disruption from internal sources is considerably lower than in LDCs.

d. **Military-political relations.**

(1) Although various political philosophies differ in detail and emphasis, in general terms most agree that governments are legitimate to the extent public opinion holds them to be so. Under natural law, for example, governmental actions are valid only when they are in harmony with a "public philosophy" while in a democracy they are supposed to represent the will of the people. Under the procedural concept, they are legitimate if they represent the outcome of a process of conflict and compromise in which all interested parties have participated. There is a body of opinion which argues that governmental legitimacy is based on the extent to which public officials represent the interests of all of the people. This attitude may result in actions that coincide first with the interests of one group and then another.

(2) LDCs strive for rapid social modernization without developing stable political institutions. Lacking stable and effective political institutions, there occurs rapid oscillation between unsuccessful representative governments and authoritarian regimes, generally in the form of military juntas. Power concentrated in a "strong man" or a "junta" tends to operate outside the legal framework of government. Therefore, when the military returns power to the civilians, the causes of political instability continue to exist and the conditions which led to the military coup soon reappear. If the military attempts to retain power, it is subjected to the same disrupting influences as the preceding civilian government, and it faces the additional problem of legitimizing and institutionalizing its power.[45] Because the coup was originally based on public approval of the military coupled with dissatisfaction with the preceding civilian government, the coup leaders sooner or later must seek continued popular support, usually in the form of a referendum or election.[46] Because military leaders usually are stymied by the nation's problems, just as their civilian predecessors, they have no greater staying power. Leaders of military coups eventually run the risk of being deposed themselves in a second military coup staged by a younger group of officers who seek to purge the government of decay and corruption. Case studies indicate that military officers in LDCs have not had any more success than civilian leaders in developing stable political institutions.

5. COMMON PATTERNS OF MILITARY POLITICAL RELATIONS IN DEVELOPING STATES.

    a. The degree and type of IAF political involvement depends on prevailing political conditions and current relationship between the military and civilian government. In many developing nations, the military has played a vital role as a revolutionary force in the struggle for independence and as an advocate of social change.[47]

    b. Except for countries in which the military has seized control of the government, the relationship between the military and the civilian regime of a developing nation falls into one of three broad categories:

        (1) The military is not politically active and is responsive to civilian control.

        (2) The military is a moderately active political force which may or may not support the civilian regime.

        (3) The military is an active political force competing with the civilian regime for power and influence.

The lines between these categories are not clearly defined and the military may move from one to the other in response to changing political conditions.

    c. It is characteristic of many of the developing countries that the officer corps is one of the best organized and educated segments of the society. It forms an elite whose efforts can have a major impact on their nation's social, economic, and political development. As a modernizing force, the military may offer a tempting alternative to civilian leadership in view of the relatively few skilled civilian politicians and trained civil servants available. Military officers, though sometimes jealous of their prerogatives and privileged status, are relatively progressive and committed to social reform and to the elimination of corruption, inefficiency, and poverty. Finally, as a modernizing force, the military has the potential of furnishing personnel with the needed technical skills in such areas as health and medicine, public works, engineering, transportation, safety, communications, and administration, all of which are vital to a developing nation.[48] From an internal security perspective, the main contribution of the military is to assure that political changes are orderly.[49] No national defense effort can be completely effective in a climate of political turmoil and internal instability.[50] Whatever the motive

of the military for involving itself in the modernization process, the departure from the military's traditional role of external defense has political consequences which may ultimately result in conflict between military and civilian elements.

    d. One of the most common internal defense problems of LDCs is the geographically limited authority of the central government. In many new nations, the central government's effective authority does not extend much beyond the major cities. In the countryside there are few government officials, inadequate or nonexistent communication facilities, and only rudimentary governmental institutions. Usually complicating the problems is the absence of popular recognition of the central government's legitimacy and a poorly developed sense of national identity.[51]

    (1) The limited authority of central government in developing countries, in addition to inhibiting economic and social development, frequently has the effect of restricting the exercise of political freedom. Because of the very limited powers which they exercise, leaders in developing countries often tend to guard what powers they have very jealously and to resist, if not suppress, criticism and political dissent.

    (2) While there are many ways to extend the power and control of the central government, the basic goal is to build administrative structures and gain the loyalty of population sectors. The problem of extending central authority is obviously closely linked to that of achieving political legitimacy, or general popular acceptance and recognition of the central government's right to govern. Though administrative structures and military forces are often enlarged to extend central authority, actual governmental control remains weak.[52]

    (3) The central government thus must gain the political participation by the various power groups within the country but it faces considerable obstacles in this effort. Many LDCs have no historical identity, and ethnic differences also pose formidable barriers to the unification process.[53]

    (4) It is in this context that the political relationship between the military and the civilian government and military involvement in the modernization process obtain nation-building significiance. Even though internal military activities will be related to public health needs, construction and public works, communication and transportation facilities, etc., their effective accomplishment will strengthen the position of the government.

e. Some of the factors which bear on the effectiveness of utilizing the military in the modernization program as a means of building popular support include the existence of requisite skills among the officer corps, the skill level of civilian organizations,[55] and the degree of internal stability.

(1) Even though the military may not be a political competitor of the civilian government, involvement of the military in modernization projects may have adverse political effects which outweigh the favorable impact. For example, the presence of military personnel in a particular area may be resented by the indigenous population, or the use of military personnel for a particular project may put civilian workers out of jobs.[56]

(2) While the military involvement in modernization may originally be nonpolitical, the possibility of adverse political consequences arises if military leaders capitalize on popularity gained from participating in a modernization program, and interject themselves into the political life of the country as an active political force.[57]

(3) Even more difficult to assess are the long term political implications of popular expectations for improved living standards. Initial success by the central government in completing civic actions projects which improve living conditions can be expected to build popular support for the government. If, however, the government is unable or unwilling to follow up with continuing programs to raise the general standard of living, popular discontent may lead to greater internal instability than prevailed before the start of the process.[58]

6. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Increased political activity, direct or indirect, is characteristic of political life in most developing countries. The army is often a key group in politics, especially if existing political parties are weak or nonexistent or if the country has only one political party.

b. Military intervention is likely to occur when the government is weak, ineffectual, corrupt, unfavorable to the military establishment, or fails to respond to the changing social and economic environment.

c. The military possesses some of the skills and organizational capabilities required for national development.

(1) The army is likely to be the most continuous organized institution in most LDCs. The army also has professional cohesion which overrides sectional and tribal interests.

(2) Army personnel often possess technical, scientific, and administrative skills and personnel may be better educated than other segments of society.

(3) The army has a history of administrative experience.

(4) The army has mobility, equipment, manpower, and fiscal resources.

d. The political interest and capabilities of IAFs vary from nation to nation.

e. Politically active military officers usually represent the interests of their class of origin.

(1) Junior officers are most likely to come from the middle class and to be dedicated to modernization and social economic reform.

(2) Senior officers tend to represent the elite and to oppose sweeping reforms which may threaten their interests and prerogatives.

f. Military regimes may establish temporary political stability but they seldom build and strengthen the institutions necessary for long range viable civilian systems of government.

g. Military regimes are likely to be of temporary nature, because of challenges to their right to govern.

(1) The army may be unable to legitimate its political power.

(2) The longer the army remains in power, the greater the chances become that it will become subject to the same influences that precipitated the downfall of the preceding civilian rule. The possibility of a military coup by younger officers also increases.

h. The selection, geographical allocation, priority assignments, and execution of military civic action projects may have a direct political effect on civilian-military relations.

(1) Some project efforts produce negative effects and weaken public support for the government.

(2) Successful, well-selected projects may unify the nation, create social cohesion, and build popular support for the government.

(3) Some elite groups within the country may oppose civil-military activities as a threat to their vested interests.

i. The military establishment can be a powerful agent for facilitating potential social, economic, and cultural changes.

(1) The army has a direct educational role in the society.

(2) The army can serve as a channel through which modern technology penetrates undeveloped communities.

j. Political turmoil may result from rising expectations and frustrations if the government, be it military or civilian, fails to proceed with reasonable speed on an announced modernization program.

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CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC ROLES

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1. INTROUCTION.

    a. Economic civil-military roles of IAFs are critically important in implementation of the US National Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. They contribute to the evaluation of and planning for the inventories covering those resources which the host country must provide and those resources that the US must contribute. In addition, they contribute to national economic development and are expected to gain the goodwill and allegiance of the population and to improve the image of the armed forces.

    b. Minimizing the cost of maintaining an army and keeping its soldiers occupied in times of peace has always been a problem for a nation. While there is no evidence that nations ever used their armies for educational or humaritarian tasks, the Biblical Ancients used them to explore new lands and to construct roads, forts, and public buildings. When they were not fighting, the Nubians in the army of Old Egypt built some of that country's most time-honored monuments. Etruscan soldiers built the water supply aqueducts around Rome. The Incan Army built roads, irrigations systems, and colonies in Peru. Moreover, Alexander the Great is credited with creating the first specialized engineering and medical units in an army.

    c. To minimize the cost of maintaining a large IAF during peacetime, some IAFs have been assigned economic development roles. The following types of units can be utilized to contribute substantially to economic development: supply and transportation, engineer, signal, medical, chemical, and vocational and adiministrative training facilities units. Future economic roles of the IAF under the three phases of insurgency must be carried out to maintain a balanced approach to internal defense. IAF ability to carry out an assignment of economic operations of the civiliar government will influence the standard of living and structure of the country's economy. Indications are that existing and past economic roles will continue in an expanded and refined fashion for future operations.

2. CIVIL-MILITARY ECONOMIC ROLES WITH AN INDIRECT OR DIRECT RELEVANCE TO DEFENSE.

    a. Civil-military economic roles which have an indirect relevance to defense may be grouped into four types: military civic action, military support to economic governmental activities, civil-military educational training, and civil-military transfer.

    (1) Military civic action refers to those activities of the IAFs which directly support the population to improve the standard of

living. It covers practically all areas of economic activity: agriculture, industry, commerce, public utilities, transportation, and community services. Specifically, those activities include manufacturing; construction of roads, bridges, harbors and railroads; the management and improvement of public utilities (electricity, gas, water and sanitary services); and the promotion of commercial activities such as banking and insurance services.

(2) Military support to economic governmental activities aims to increase the overall economic potential of the country and the government's ability to foster this potential. It operates in the same areas as military civic action with many activities in common, for whatever increases the economic potential of a country may also improve the standard of living of its citizens. However, the relationship between the two is not always consistent. Increases in economic potential frequently require drastic changes in the structure of economic relations which the public may resent since they may temporarily depress (even if they ultimately enhance) the standard of living.

(3) Civil-military educational training includes those educational and vocational training functions resulting from instruction of members of the armed forces, who, upon discharge, may use those acquired skills in the civilian economy.

(4) Civil-military transfer is yet another economic impact that the military establishment as a whole has upon the country since as a purchaser of goods and services and a consumer of technological research it contributes to the development of the industrial/technological base.

b. Three areas of civil-military roles have direct relevance to national defense: economic warfare, economic mobilization, and economic intelligence.

(1) Economic warfare is the defensive use in peacetime, as well as during a war, of any means by military and civilian agencies to maintain and expand the economic potential for war of a nation and its probable allies, and, conversely, the offensive use of any measure in peace or war to diminish or neutralize the economic potential for war of the likely enemy and his accomplice.

(2) Economic mobilization is the process of preparing for and carrying out such changes in the organization and functioning of the national economy as are necessary to provide for the most effective use of resources in a national emergency. It includes the planning and implementation of measures related to the control of the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services, as well as the socioeconomic processes by which these three economic functions are implemented. The objective of economic mobilization is to transform the elements of national power into military power, reinforce defensive economic warfare, and reduce the strategic vulnerabilities of the country. In the process of economic mobilization, measures are taken to organize the structure of production, distribution, and consumption of goods which

in turn tends to organize the population, thus providing a shield against the enemy's infiltration of the civilian sectors. The structure of economic activities during peacetime is exceedingly frail and any socioeconomic change can disrupt it. When shortages or bottlenecks in the production or distribution of goods develop, activities such as black market speculation, hoarding, forceful requisition, and illegal traffic in government or military supplies begin. The consequences of economic disruption impact unfavorably upon the political system and the capabilities of the armed forces. Governments, lacking the organization and personnel required by the sudden expansion of tasks resulting from economic mobilization, rely on the military for augmentation and support as well as for enforcement of economic control policies.

(3) Economic intelligence is that component of strategic intelligence which deals with the extent and utilization of natural and human resources and the industrial potential of a nation. Economic intelligence analyzes a country, the state of the economy, identifies enemy economic resources or its supporters, provides information to the economic resources or its supporters, provides information to the economic warfare and economic mobilization programs, and provides to Military Intelligence information on the apparatus of the internal or external aggressor. Economic intelligence by revealing the supply and storage sources of the aggressor deprives him of his most essential asset. It also provides reliable indicators of the aggressor's system of controls.

3. ECONOMIC-MILITARY OPERATIONS. Armies, per se, are not primarily oriented to undertaking economic roles. However, the mere availability of a trained military force has frequently led to the use of military forces by the LDCs in nation-building tasks. The level of technical skills found in the military which is usually well above the level found in the civilian sector facilitates the adoption of these roles by the military. As a result, the IAFs are often called upon to provide services not normally associated with military institutions in the developed nations. Historically, this pattern of economic and economic-related roles played by IAFs emerges from the study of the 40 selected LDCs. These economic roles vary under "normal," "preconflict," and "conflict" conditions.

a. Under normal conditions. Under these conditions countries use a civil rather than a military agency which places IAF involvement at a minimum. However, the military economic-related civic action programs that are initiated make direct contributions to economic development while serving as useful components of counterinsurgency programs. These nonmilitary actions are aimed at reducing economic hardship that may provide the breeding ground for insurgency. The military becomes involved

frequently at the request of civilian agencies when civilian political structures and institutions fail, when factionalism develops, and when the constitutional means for the conduct of political action is lacking. The different phases or stages of insurgency appear to lend themselves to particular kinds of civic action.

b. <u>Phase I</u>. During the latent or incipient phase, emphasis is on long-term social and economic development. Vocational training and major road-building campaigns such as those being carried out by the armies of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia are pertinent examples. When insurgency begins, the military objective is to end or prevent escalation of the conflict. Therefore, the civic action emphasis must shift to shorter-term measures designed to show that the government is interested in the people's welfare and is reform oriented. Examples of projects would include road repair, temporary bridge building, well-drilling, and agricultural extension works.

c. <u>Phase II</u>. When the insurgency escalates to organized guerrilla warfare, the IAFs primary objective is to defeat it. Measures must be more immediate so as not to commit resources that may be required to combat the insurgents. This was exemplified in the Philippines where it was made a command responsibility that anything the soldiers could do for the people without jeopardizing armed action they should do.

(1) Two assumptions about the relationship of civic action and counterinsurgency exist. The first is that insurgency stems at least in part from the dissatisfaction arising out of underdevelopment and unfulfilled expectations from which it follows that counterinsurgency must relate itself to economic development and the fulfillment of expectations. The second is that many of the poorer countries' economic and social development cannot proceed effectively without the productive nonmilitary use of military forces. The counterinsurgency depends, at least in part, on civic action. Thus, there exists a direct relationship between economic and social development, civic action, and successful counterinsurgency.

(2) The earlier an IAF begins civic action, the more time and energy it will have to devote to it and the higher the probability that the IAF will be able to prevent, defeat, or at least de-escalate insurgency. Types and degrees of economic-related civic action projects cover an extremely wide range of activities. It is conceivable that there will be no dramatic breakthroughs in new activities to meet future insurgencies. Therefore, modification and adaptation of current and past activities to fit specific future situations can be expected. Economic-related civic action is much more in the area of science. While it should be used, studied, and analyzed as objectively as possible, it must not be blunted by codification and textbook implementation. Glick asserts that the field of counterinsurgency generally has suffered from a failure of scholars and analysts to communicate clearly with their uniformed practitioners, with

the result that some of the latter "have lost the knack of using these potentially flexible and powerful instruments with real success."[1] Thus, the key factor to future success in economic endeavors by IAFs appear keyed to maintenance of maximum flexibility to react and operate.

d. Under conflict (phase III) conditions. Possible future IAF economic roles under conditions of paramilitary or military violence between two or more parties competing for political control in country are indicated in the accounts of past and existing IAF commitments. In the Philippines the IAF relied heavily on civic action tactics to improve the standard of living of former insurgents. This effort contributed greatly to the success of putting down the Huk insurgency. Because of the successes achieved, the roles of the IAF employed here will be copied. The principal roles involved were the distribution of land to the landless, rehabilitation of masses who need a new start, and initiating agricultural reforms to feed the population. In Vietnam the IAF built schools, roads, and bridges as a means to solicit population support. These assets improved the transportation network to markets and suppliers.

e. Other related economic roles. Some IAFs engage in business activities, land reform and resettlement administration, and projects for employment of civilians which can provide a stimulus to the economy.

(1) Entrepreneurships. The entrepreneurial capability of the IAF in some countries, particularly in Latin America, is very pronounced. In Brazil the IAF built its own factories and produced many items of military and nonmilitary equipment. The factories and shipyards produced arms, vehicles, and ammunition for military use and vessels for commercial shipping. In Mexico the IAF engages in many economic activities outside the military establishment. The Mexican Army cooperates with rural communities in building schools and public works and controlling forests and fisheries. In Guatemala the IAF participates directly in economic activities, both individually and as an organization. Individual members of the IAF are employed in business and industry. As an organization, the IAF participates in the administration of the school lunch program and school construction. In Peru the IAF operates privately owned businesses as a sideline. Several industrial training centers teach a wide variety of vocational skills that are in demand by industry. These training centers produce 10,000 graduates annually. In Venezuela the IAF has carried out several economic-related projects such as soil and water conservation, road construction and repair, and school construction. The Dominican Republic engaged in the so-called "industries of the armed forces" during the 1940's and early 1950's.

(2) Civilian employment. The IAFs in some countries, such as Morocco and Pakistan, provide for employment of civilians in civic action programs. These programs have a threefold goal in that they reduce unemployment, improve the economic climate, and utilize the technical and supervisory skills of the IAF. In a few other countries, employment

opportunities are afforded young men through military conscription and employment in civic action projects. In India 10,000 university graduates are drafted for participation in mixed military and civilian economic roles. In Iran, high school graduates are conscripted into the Education Corps where after three months of military and civic training, they are sent out to conduct literacy and public health programs. Finally, in those countries where the IAF operates in the industrial sector, it makes employment opportunities available to civilians.

(3) Property control. Another economic role being carried out by IAFs includes property control, a function exemplified by programs of resettlement and land reform administration. Special Army detachments determine the areas to be settled, classify and clear the land selected, construct and operate the provisional installation, transport the civilian settlers, issue supplies to colonists, and train the colonists in the necessary skills to promote agricultural progress in resettlement projects.

f. Economic planning by IAF.

(1) National level economic planning has been in the forefront in certain countries. In Peru, at the national administrative level, the Air Force controls civil aviation while the Navy manages the merchant marine, dockyards, ports and fisheries. In Argentina the Army has a special role in the economy through the operation of the General Directorate of Military Factories. The Army sees itself as making significant contributions to the inventory of skilled personnel at managerial as well as lower levels, creating new industries on the basis of domestic resources, and, in general, enhancing economic development. Thus, the Argentinian armed forces have been able to acquire a major and, at times, a controlling voice in the formulation of national policy dealing with those sectors of the economy that relate to their defense missions. Such roles by the armed forces constitute a normal part of Argentinian life. In Brazil the generals running the country encourage the participation of multinational companies in the country's economy as a necessary instrument for achieving and accelerated rate of development and quest for major power status.

(2) Provincial and local levels. Since Indonesia obtained its independence, the Army and Air Force are very active in this nation's administration. Military personnel participate in the economic planning for their country, not only on the national but also regional and local levels. Public plantations are one of Indonesia's largest industries and the IAF is responsible for their management. A large number of subordinate officers have served on boards controlling former Dutch enterprises. To carry out the policy of extensive civic action programs, the Army has also changed the mission of one-third of its infantry battalions from combat to civic action functions.

4. FUTURE ECONOMIC ROLES. The previous section presented historical and empirical evidence that IAFs in the LDCs have performed distinctive economic and economic-related roles in the last one and a half decades. Various economic, political, and social characteristics depict succinctly those relevant factors from which possible future military economic roles can be discerned. These are:

a. Economic.

(1) Per capita Gross National Product (GNP) represents a guide to broad differences in productive capacity and levels of economic welfare.

(2) Natural resources. "Surplus" resources, such as minerals and agricultural land, can through exploitation play a positive role in expansion of trade and income. Historical evidence indicates that greater abundance of mineral resources has consistently tended to attract larger amounts of foreign investment.

(3) Capital formation. The supply and new formation of capital have been a key determinant in economic growth. Efficiency in the allocation and use of capital can also affect development.

(4) Modernization of industry. The greater and more advanced industrialization is, the more likely it is that living standards and incomes are rising. Industralization enlarges opportunities for individual advancement and for the emergence of an environment conducive to change and innovation, which almost invariably facilitate economic development.

(5) Character of agriculture. An important concomitant to successful industrialization, particularly in countries at low-income levels, is the modernization of the agricultural sector. Traditional tenancy systems in many low-income countries result in the proceeds from production increases going to other than the actual tiller of the soil, and this stifles incentives for innovating activity. Another condition which retards economic development is the prevalence of individual holdings too small to be economically viable.

(6) Agricultural productivity. Increases in agricultural productivity are essential to economic growth by releasing a supply of labor to growing urban industry and providing adequate supplies of food and fiber at reasonable prices to meet increased urban and industrial demands.

(7) Adequacy of physical overhead capital. Such capital, particularly in the form of transportation and power networks, is crucial to development in low-income countries.

(8) Effectiveness of tax system. Taxation enables governments to secure control over resources that they can use to finance the basic investments in physical and social overhead capital necessary to successful development. Taxes can also make the distribution of income more equitable or alter it in order to promote private savings, or act as a means for avoiding inflation by absorbing the excess of personal incomes over the supply of consumption goods which is typically created by the development process.

(9) Effectiveness of financial institutions. Banks, etc., can play an important role in increasing the proportion of total domestic resources available for investment (i.e., raises rate of savings) and in effectively channeling available internal savings into productive investment.

(10) Structure of foreign trade. International specialization and trade generally tend to have a significant positive influence on the standard of living of the trading countries, but the beneficial effects may depend on the extent to which the proceeds from export sales are distributed throughout the entire economy. Dependence on one or two major crops or products for export proceeds, however, can be unhealthy from the standpoint that those commodities may be subject to wide price fluctuations.

b. Political.

(1) Degree of national integration and sense of national unity. As countries develop and become more integrated economically and socially, it becomes more likely that their political institutions will reflect the spread of more generalized commitments to a nation-state that are characteristic of the advanced countries of the world. The intensity of the political and economic nationalism of a country's leaders and the pervasiveness among the population of a sense of national unity, by increasing with economic and social development, provide a positive influence on economic growth.

(2) Strength of labor movement. A sociopolitical concomitant of the process of industrialization is the growth of trade-union organizations. The creation of stable labor organizations has typically accompanied the growth of industrial enterprise. Labor unions, as specialized structures of interest which formulate and transmit explicit political demands to other political structure such as political parties, can impact on political decisions relating to economic development.

(3) Degree of administrative efficiency. Rationally organized administrative services from an effective bureaucracy can help establish and strengthen the legal and public service facilities necessary for steady growth; they can help create financial institutions and tax instruments favorable to the expansion of private economic activity, or they can take direct responsibility for initiating development projects and plans.

(4) Extent of leadership commitment to economic development. It is almost a truism that the extent of commitment of the political leadership of a country to economic development is a significant determinant of its success in raising the country's standard of living. Given the weakness of the private sectors of contemporary low-income countries, they are unlikely to move forward economically without effective action on the part of their governmental leadership.

    c.   Sociocultural.

(1) Size of the traditional agricultural sector. It is typical of low-income countries that large proportions of their populations live in relatively self-contained agricultural communities in which production is primarily for local consumption. Land is farmed inefficiently by using traditional techniques of production which are largely determined by inherited social values and organization. Conventional communal technology must undergo significant transformation in order to aid economic growth by expanding agricultural output to provide increased food supplies to growing urban areas, by increasing the market for domestic industrial productivity, and by releasing to industry the labor required for its expansion.

(2) Extent of dualism. A striking characteristic of the socioeconomic structure of many developing countries is that side by side with a concomitant traditional sector in which conventional techniques and command self-sufficiency prevail, there exists a rapidly growing exchange sector. The presence and extent of socioeconomic and technical dualism can have a marked effect on the path of economic growth.

(3) Character of basic social organization. In the long run economic development has almost invariably been accompanied by significant transformations in the pattern of family kinship relationships. A breakdown of the extended family, clan, or tribe and a movement toward smaller family units governing purely social realtionships facilitate the linking of personal effort and rewards for effort, and tend to be more conducive to family limitation practice which in turn facilitate upward social and economic mobility.

(4) Importance of the indigenous middle class. An aspect of social organization commonly associated with economic growth is the availability of a pool of commercial, entrepreneurial, professional, and technical talents. Generally, these talents tend to be drawn from those occupational groups that are often referred to as the middle class. It is clear from many country studies that the growth of a robust middle class is of crucial importance in low-income nations.

(5) Extent of social mobility. The process of industrialization and the increase in opportunities for social mobility interact as countries proceed toward sustained economic development. The expansion of industry normally entrains an increase in employment opportunities and thus an upward mobility. A significant aspect of social mobility is the extent of opportunity in a society to obtain skills and education, and with it the opportunity to advance into middle-class occupations (clerical, administrative, technical, managerial, commercial).

(6) Degree of social tension. One would anticipate a longrun positive relationship between better economic performance and the absence of extreme and widespread social tensions. The breakup of traditional kinship and tribal groups produces tensions, both personal and social. Widespread and violent outbreaks of tension inevitably hamper economic development because of their adverse effect on risk-taking activities and therefore on investment.

5.   ECONOMIC ROLES OF IAF IN THE 40 SELECTED COUNTRIES.

a.   Latin America. The military directly engage in economic activities including industry, agriculture, internal development, research, and education. Significant economic impacts are also obtained through channeling military expenditures into the local economy. Most LDCs maintain defense budgets of 20 percent or more of total governmental outlays which is high for countries with limited military activities. In looking for social and economic improvement, economic-related civic action by Latin American IAFs has been developed as a major mission by most of the governments of those countries. However, in some countries where urban and rural violence is a continuing problem, the primary motivation is to improve internal security. A brief review of the specific IAF economic and economic-related roles in Latin American countries under "normal" conditions follows:

(1) Argentina: Although the government is committed to civic action programs, Argentina is one of those Latin American countries that engages in industrial activities which in other countries are performed either by private enterprise or civilian agencies of government. Production in excess of military requirements has been offered to civilian consumers. Military factories are offered for sale to the civilian sector at public auction when the need for these facilities to meet the demands of the private sector can be justified and the civilian sector has the capability to run these factories.

(2) Venezuela: Civic action programs have been designed to provide internal security and to improve the economic and social posture of the country. In agriculture, IAF teams have assisted by instructing local inhabitants and in soil and water conservation and in collective farming in order to improve production and distribution of products. The Army has assisted in natural disasters by providing

temporary housing, food, clothing, and medical supplies when needed, and medical teams have given lectures on health and sanitation and provided emergency medical and dental treatment.

(3) Brazil: The IAF has for many years played a part in the economic development of the country. The military services responsible for their own logistical support built factories and not only provided employment to many civilian workers but, by producing arms, ammunition, vehicles, light naval craft, and other items that otherwise would have to be purchased abroad, helped to conserve foreign exchange. Naval shipyards and repair facilities have regularly devoted a considerable portion of their output and services to nonmilitary requirements. For example, the navy shipyard at Guanabara Bay has built vessels of 5,000 tons displacement for commercial firms engaged in coastal shipping. The Air Force has contributed to the economy through its control and administration of all airline routes and facilities in the country and through its responsibility for operating the airmail service. One of the difficulties in the country's economic development has been a shortage of qualified executive, management, and technical personnel. Realizing this, the IAF has authorized its members to accept leaves of absence to help out in important commercial enterprises. The Army has regularly provided top mangement executives for these activites. Air Force personnel have been prominent as top management officials in civilian airplane factories, airlines, weather reporting services, and airport facilities, whereas the Navy has contributed leadership to shipping concerns and port authorities.

(4) Uruguay: There is minimum participation by this IAF in civic action. However, the Uruguayan Navy transports fuel regularly, saving freight cost and foreign exchange.

(5) Dominican Republic: The Army particpated in an agricultural civic action project. To assist farmers who had been losing up to 50 percent of their annual rice crops to the rats, the Army organized a rat extermination program.

(6) Mexico: Military civic action has been and continues to be an important component of the IAF's military mission. As early as 1921, labor battalions were employed in road construction irrigation projects and maintenance of railroad and telegraph lines.

(7) Ecuador: The Air Force civic action program competes directly with commercial aviation. There are 57 flights a week, with passenger traffic being carried largely between Quito and Guyaquil. The organization employs civilian clerks, ticket agents, and stewardesses.

(8) Peru: The IAF's economic roles include administering internal development projects, engaging in industrial activities and participating in research projects. Special Army detachments have the mission of

establishing new settlements. The Army is responsible for determining
the areas to be colonized, classifying and clearing the lands selected,
constructing and operating the provisional installation, transporting the
colonists to the settlements, and supporting the colonists except for
extending credit and financing. Industrial activities involve operating
maintenance and repair shops, and salvage and production of new equip-
ment. Excess production is made available for consumer sales. The IAF's
participation in research projects provides support to commerical food
suppliers. For example, the Navy performs research on the characteristics,
locations and fluctuations of the anchovieta population and disseminates
this information to anchovy fishermen.

(9) Guatemala: The IAF directly participates in economic civic
action projects. The Army has constructed schools, potable water facili-
ties, and transportation. It has also performed other miscellaneous sup-
port functions such as conducting adult civilian literacy programs.

(10) Bolivia: A civic action program consisting of school and
road construction and medical programs was undertaken by the IAF as
counterinsurgency and nation-building measures.

(11) Cuba: The military conscripts those who are unemployed or
who are not doing well in school. The government is encouraging the
people to look upon the educational advantages of the military with
slogans such as "Join the Army and Learn a Trade."

(12) Haita and Panama: The IAFs are assigned only to internal
sceurity roles.

b. Moslem states. The historical economic roles of the IAFs in
some Moslem states reflect the assignment, as a matter of policy, of mili-
tary resources to increase skill levels and to develop country resources
to foster economic growth and the distrubution of national resources. The
nation-building contributions by IAFs in the Moslem states have been bene-
ficial to each state and the region. Without the bridges, roads, and com-
munication networks, the flow of raw materials for export and manufacturing
for some of these states would be hindered and so would economic progress.
A brief review of these nations' IAF activities follows. It shows a dis-
tinct variance with Latin America, where activities are more extensive
in the economic sphere.

(1) Afghanistan: For some years this country has had a military
labor corps which provided resources for the construction of arterial roads
and permanent bridges aiding economic development.

(2) Algeria: The mission of the IAF includes participation in
the economic activities of the country. After independence was won, for
example, the effort of the IAF was diverted to civic action projects as
a means to maintain military strengths and to combat unemployment aggra-
vated by personnel leaving the military services.

(3) Iran: This country has one of the largest economic related civic action programs in the Moslem area. These programs operate in seven fields; engineering, sanitation, agriculture, vocational training, communication, and transportation.

(4) Jordan: The Army economic activities are direct to resolving the chronic water shortages in the country. In this connection, pipelines from wells in the nearby countryside were laid to provide over 300,000 gallons of water daily to the Bethlehem-Jerusalem area.

(5) Morocco: The IAF, in addition to a security mission, also has the mission of extending construction assistance in the economic and social development of the country. The Army assisted in reconstructing an irrigation system to combat famine and rebuilt local homes and schools. Other less involved economic operations include the Army's general support to the Ministries of Health, Public Works, National Education and Agriculture.

(6) Pakistan: The IAF is the largest single agency engaged in adult education. Service academies and other military institutions have served as a training ground for technical and administrative personnel who have been made available for public and private concerns. The Army is active in agricultural production and any surplus crops or livestock are sold commercially: Army farms have been used for demonstration and experimental purposes. The Army is active in reclamation of land and distributing these lands to veterans. The IAF also plays a role in the development of national industries, partly because of the crucial importance of supplying logistical needs through internal production facilities.

(7) Tunisia: The Tunisian government has a few civic action projects; the most significant project undertaken was rebuilding a destroyed railway bridge which provided a vital link for delivering mining products to factories and export facilities.

(8) Israel: Israel is one of the world's leading "exporter" of civic action trainees. The military actively provides extensive training programs for conscripts of the armed services. The military schools of Gana and Nahal provide technical training in agricultural and industrial subjects. The graduates are available to enter jobs in the civilian sector; the trained military agriculturalists often settle the frontier lands by actually planting acres of grapes, tomatoes and eggplant and then turning over the control of the fields to the civilian community.

(9) Saudi Arabia: There is no indication of IAF economic roles. The only point of possible mutual interest is providing security to facilities in the economic sector.

(10) Syria: The military runs the major government ministries affecting all areas of industrial sector. The political party in power, composed of military leaders, campaigns for organized labor support in order to supervise the labor unions.

(11) Iraq, Lebanon, Libya: The IAFs are primarily concerned with internal and external security missions and have no apparent civic action missions.

c. Africa. There are minimal military economic rules performed by the African IAFs except for a few low-key civic action projects. The Kenya, Sudanese, and Liberian IAFs have no apparent civic action missions and Zaire has few except for training military personnel. In Nigeria the troops have been employed in constructing roads and bridges and urban sanitation projects.

d. Asia. In those nations facing insurgency, IAFs are very active in civic action programs, attempting to improve the social and economic conditions of their citizens in order to lessen the insurgent threat. In nations that have suffered and survived insurgency, the IAFs are still active in civic action programs, completing short range projects which lay the ground work for resumption of responsibility by civilian agencies. A country review follows:

(1) India: The IAF has a limited role in civic action. Paramilitary groups have direct volunteers working on some agricultural, cultural, education, and defense projects. Boys between the ages of 15 to 17 are recruited for the Army and organized into boys battalions. They serve in a training status longer than regular recruits but receive a general as well as a military education. Thus, they enter regular units better educated than regular recruits and progress faster.

(2) Indonesia: The IAF has been deeply involved in the nation's administration ever since achieving independence and have a military economic role in development planning and operations. The IAF officers were on board controlling Dutch enterprises and were acting as managers of plantations.

(3) North Korea: The role of the military in the economy became pronounced as a result of the ability to divert IAF resources to economic roles with assistance from other communist states.

(4) Republic of Korea: Korea has had a long continuing and very extensive civic action program. Thus far, more than 4500 economic projects including roads, schools, bridges, civic buildings, public health facilities and sewer systems have been completed enabling faster economic growth.

(5) Malyasia: Malaysian civic action played a small part in resettling the so-called Chinese squatters in new villages which were built with assistance from the British.

(6) Philippines: The IAF relied heavily on civil action measures to reduce support for the HUK insurrection. Unfortunately, civic action was viewed primarily as a weapons system against insurgency and was discarded after the insurrection movement was achieved by the central government. Civic action projects were carried out by the Economic Development Corporation of the Philippine Army Engineers and included (a) rehabilitation, (b) relocation to populate large areas of uncultivated land to distribute population from the congested areas, (c) initial agricultural progress geared to the needs of the resettlement projects, (d) land reform, (e) establishment of new home industries, and (f) agricultural training.

(7) South Vietnam: The Vietnamese government accords top priority to civic action as the intensity of the internal conflict is lessened. There is a commitment to the coordination of the civic action effort at all levels of administration.

(8) Thailand: Civic action activities have involved dam and bridge building projects and schools, reservoirs, roads, and playgrounds. The Thais faced by rural insurgency themselves use two principal "instruments" of civic action, the Border Patrol Police and the Mobile Development Units. In particular, the Border Patrol Police have established village schools which also conduct education classes. Each teacher is in effect a one-man civic action team and serves as teacher, doctor, sheriff, farm adviser, and information officer.

6. CONCLUSIONS.

a. The analysis shows that IAFs of LDCs are involved in agricultural activities. However, the commitment of an individual country's resources, military manpower, and finances has varied substantially in the past. Examples of heavier commitments are in Latin America, where countries like Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia have expanded activities.

b. The contribution of IAFs to capital formation is the exception rather than the rule in terms of economic roles performed. Of the eleven countries' IAFs identified as performing such roles, only Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru are considered to be fully committed. One important constraint which surfaces with respect to the heavy commitment to capital formation by the four leading countries in this field of military involvement (Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru) is the extent to which any country can proceed in terms of commitment of resources. What comes to mind also is the matter of competition with what is normally considered a civilian responsibility. It can, at least, be explained in

these four countries because of the historical nature of military involvement and control. It is concluded in this analysis, therefore, that such a military economic role could not be universal but would depend on the factors pertaining to the four countries. Few of the countries studied fall into the category, according to our evidence, and the constraint of commitment of resources and possible competition with the civilian sector would be factors to be weighed in suggesting such a military economic role for any particular IAF.

c. In the corollary function of engaging in industrial activities and modernizing industry, there are 20 countries in which there is some degree of IAF involvement. Of these, one-half are considered as fully committed to some sectors of the industrial economy, while the other half are considered partially committed. The commitment again depends on what military economic resources a country has available for such purposes. The fact that one-half of the countries surveyed show some involvement in industrial activities is indicative of that possible role by additional IAFs, provided the resources, capability, and dicision-making by those in power are available.

d. Again in the provision of physical infrastructure, some 19 countries' IAFs are fully committed to this task. This depends on engineering capabilities which not all country IAFs possess.

e. Evidence shows only very minimal involvement by IAFs in tax systems and customs enforcement roles.

f. Eight country IAFs also make contributions to foreign trade, again related to their commitments to industrial activities and production. Four of the countries are those previously identified--Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. The armed forces of four others--Pakistan, Mexico, Venezuela and Bolivia--perform some active role in industrial production for export.

g. Lastly, there is a relationship between economic roles and political and sociocultural characteristics. For example, most of the Latin American and Asian countries studied have strong centralized governments. The military in most of these countries identify with the centralized government and participate actively in their nation's economy. In these Latin American countries, the military assist the economy by encouraging their personnel with those administrative and technical skills needed in the private sector to take leave of absence from the military in order to participate actively in the private sectors. The military also provide services in the private sector that are feasible commercially. In Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru the military can perform such tasks.

h.   The sociocultural roles of IAF in the Moslem states provide a melting pot to bring about cohesive ethnic group relations, provide educational opportunities for the illiterate, and provide training for skills that could be subsequently used in the private sector of the economy. In the Latin American countries, the IAF efforts are directed to educational pursuits for training military as well as civilians; and in Peru, to skills that both enhance job opportunities and produce necessary materials for consumption. Lesser efforts are directed to sociocultural roles in the African and Asian countries.

CHAPTER 4

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC SERVICE ROLES OF IAF

SECTION I. Public Transportation

1. **GENERAL.**

    a. There can be no question as to the importance and relevancy of transportation in the economic development of lesser developed countries (LDC). Construction, administration, and operations of transportation facilities, systems, and equipment may take place principally under one or another of three basic organizations: the national government (nationalized transportation modes), indigenous privately owned transportation forms, or privately owned foreign firms. A fourth, but less known, less publicized, and less extensive source of transportation services, may be found within an LDC's indigenous military transportation system used as part of the country's overall plan of civic action.

    b. Indigenous Armed Forces' roles in civic action projects related to transportation are more prevalent in the sphere of public transportation (i.e., mass transportation under government sponsorship) and negligible in private and/or individual transportation (except, of course, in the case of emergency medical or disaster relief operations).

    c. At the outset, it would be beneficial to differentiate between transportation considerations as opposed to public works considerations. In this chapter, public transportation functions and activities include the equipment, operation, and management of transportation modes and facilities but exclude the task of physical construction of facilities such as airports, highways, and railroad lines. These latter activities will be discussed in the Public Works and Utilities section. This section will discuss IAF roles in public transportation using historical descriptive data as a guide to the analysis of what LDCs might or could do.

    d. LDCs are generally characterized as agrarian societies with a preponderance of self-sufficient social units (families or tribes for example), with emphasis on extractive types of industry in a climate of "rising expectations" in the area of economic development. Consequently, it is not unusual that the public transportation, and IAF participation therein, serves generally agrarian economies and/or industries extracting natural resources in pursuit of economic development.

    e. Transport activities may be viewed also as having a two dimensional relevancy, first in the development and operation of transport modes in themselves and, secondly, in the support rendered to other socioeconomic development activities (e.g., health care, welfare, education, and resource control).

2. IAF ROLES IN "NORMAL" CONDITIONS.

a. Generally speaking, in "normal" times (no significant threat of internal turbulence or insurgency) indigenous armed forces in LDC are involved in operating airline systems with air force equipment and personnel and in transporting passengers and cargo by naval vessels and trucks, mostly in support of other economic development projects, rather than in mere transportation development for its own sake. Availability of IAF for transportation-civic action projects is not necessarily a panacea, for as John Pustay observes: "...such military-civic action operations, if not properly designed and controlled, can possibly promote the establishment of military oligarchies and may even stifle the creation and growth of civilian business enterprises essential to the development of viable economic and political institutions."[1]

b. Table 1 outlines some specific IAF civic action activities in selected countries.

c. Such public transportation services are confined to remote area operations to necessary projects which are not economically attractive to private or nationalized transportation enterprises, to fields where military expertise is particularly applicable, e.g., air or marine navigation, civil engineering, and in environments suitable to military personnel.

d. It is significant to note that many LDC have nationalized transportation systems and facilities in which the military play no significant role (railways in Nepal, Ceylon, and Pakistan; buses and trucks in Bhutan, Ceylon, and Sikhim; inland water transportation in Burma and Pakistan). This characteristic in many countries is particularly applicable to railroad operations which are mostly nationalized activities employing civilians. Table 2 shows a sample of government owned transport facilities.

e. The small size of LDC armies and emphasis on combat type organizations for security and counterinsurgency preclude extensive involvement in land surface transport modes, particularly in African countries (e.g., Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zaire).

f. Transportation of petroleum products in most LDC is performed by nationalized or foreign-owned firms utilizing indigenous civilian labor, as in Iran and Iraq.

g. In situations of normalcy, IAF'S transportation functions are directed principally toward support of other national socioeconomic development projects, transporting equipment, personnel and supplies, as shown in Table 1.

3. IAF ROLES IN THREAT SITUATIONS.

a. In situations of internal turbulence without insurgency, transportation functions are still related mainly to economic development projects and appropriate security measures of transportation facilities, as in Venezuela and Chile.

b. In situations of insurgency, transportation modes would probably be nationalized, if not already in that category, with perhaps some selected militarization of operating employees, with an ultimate point being the complete militarization of transport modes and operating personnel. Public transportation operations are usually planned and directed at the national government level with the possible exception of local bus service in urbanized metropolitan areas.

c. LDCs most often do not have indigenous resources available for manufacturing public transportation equipment nor for training of transportation management personnel, although they can and do train operating personnel through on-the-job training. Consequently, these aspects of public transportation may largely be a function of aid from foreign countries in the form of money, equipment, or management personnel.

d. Any study of IAF in the transportation field must therefore recognize the importance and applicability of support from foreign sources. Fluctuations in economic aid and military assistance from foreign sources impose a significant constraint on the IAF role in public transportation.

4. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Based on the above, IAF will generally continue to provide public transportation service in situations of normalcy, primarily in such military projects as air and marine transportation to remote, sparsely populated areas. IAF involvement in railway and highway transport of passengers and general cargo may be minimal due to generally adequate capability of nonmilitary resources and assets, objections from civilian labor organizations, and/or private nationalized transportation of arms, limited national budgets, heavy reliance on foreign sources for capital and equipment, and limitations of manpower missions and training of indigenous ground forces (which are usually combat or engineering oriented).

b. IAF might realistically be expected to continue operations of some air and marine transportation through Phase II insurgency. Phase III insurgency would see the militarization of all transport modes with primary emphasis on support of strictly military operations.

Table 1.   IAF Roles in Public Transportation
Civic-Action Projects

CIVIL-MILITARY ROLES

I. Airline Operations

A. Ecuador: Ecuadorian Military Air Trans-
portation Organization (TAME) carries
civilian passengers and cargo on a regular
basis competing with commercial aviation.

B. Colombia: SATENA carries general cargo
and passengers.

C. Peru and Brazil: IAFs transport civilian
passengers and cargo in Amazon region.
Brazil's air force maintains airports and
landing strips.

D. Iran: The air force transports food,
supplies, and equipment in disaster relief.

E. Guatemala: The air force provides crop
dusting service.

II. Ocean and Inland
Waterways

A. Argentina: The Navy operates a meteoro-
logical service broadcasting weather
reports; carries cargo and passengers to
remote coastal areas.

B. Ecuador: Navy transports water to arid
coastal areas.

C. Peru: Navy transports oil and petroleum
products.

D. Brazil: Navy maintains navigable water-
ways and provides oceanographic information.

III. Highways

Most Latin American countries provide highway
transportation services mainly related to
economic development projects.

IV. Rail

Nicaraqua: Guardia Nacional manages internal
railway system. Other countries may operate
railroads in security situations.

Table 2. Government-owned Transportation Facilities
(select sampling)

Bhutan   State Transportation Department operates a fleet
                          of busses and truck.   .

Nepal   State-operated airways, roads, railways, and ropeways.

Sikhim   Sikhim nationalized transport service confirmed to
                          a road haulage company. No airport or railway
                          system.

Burma   Railways, domestic airways and major inland water
                          transport facilities are owned and operated by the
                          government. One third of seaborne freight tonnage
                          is carried by state owned shipping.

Indonesia   State-operated rail, air and shipping systems.

Afghanistan   Substantial foreign aid in building roads and air-
                          ports. (Soviet aid and technical assistance.)
                          Ariana Airline is the national airline. No railroads.

Sri Lanka (Ceylon)   Ceylon Government Railway. State-owned airlines.
                          Nationalized road passenger service.

India   Government-controlled railways and road system.
                          Nationalized airlines. State-supported inland
                          waterway operations.

Pakistan   Directorate General of Civil Aviation has been
                          merged with Headquarters, Pakistan Air Force. No
                          railways. Government-owned airlines.

Iraq   Stated-owned railway.

Ghana   State-owned airlines and railways.   .

Congo   National airlines.

Liberia   National airlines.

Rhodesia   National railways, road transport and airlines.

SECTION II. Public Housing

1. GENERAL.

a. This section deals with the involvement of IAF in their civil-military roles in developing nations with respect to Public Housing.

b. Whether the area is Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, or Asia, increases in population have often been accompanied by housing shortages in developing nations. These housing shortages are often accentuated by rapid shifts in population resulting from natural disasters and internal and external conflict. IAF construction activity for civilian populations has been largely confined to major public works with the authority resting in the civilian government sector. Even in the two Communist nations studied, Cuba and North Korea, public housing activity has been civilian controlled. From time to time, in those two countries, labor has been supplied to civilian housing operations by the military.

c. In non-Communist nations, IAF activity has been largely confined to major public works construction, rarely including housing. For example, IAF in Egypt,[2] Venezuela,[3] Malaysia,[4] Brazil,[5] and Iran[6] have built bridges, roads, schools, and hospitals, particularly in rural areas for purposes of resettlement and development.

2. CIVIL-MILITARY ROLES IN HOUSING.

a. As a rule the civil-military role in housing appears to be a low military priority. IAF housing construction has occurred during situations of normalcy and for the apparent purpose of developing remote areas, as in Bolivia, Peru, and Israel. Such housing construction has also occurred during situations of internal turbulence without insurgency. For example, in Argentina in 1971 army units in Cordoba undertook a program encompassing 141 projects including schools, child-care centers, housing in slum areas (villas miserias), and hospitals. A similar program was carried out in 1969/70 in Cordoba which included construction of 768 housing units. Department of Defense Intelligence reports that the Cordoba projects were a part of a psychological program likely to assist greatly in assuaging the perennially restless Cordoba environment.

b. Argentina appears an exception among LDCs in including housing construction in the program of community assistance. Perhaps because of the low priority accorded housing by the military, direct military involvement in housing appears minimal if not totally disregarded during situations when the military's traditional role is necessarily greater; i.e., situations of constitutional turbulence, revolution, insurgency, and internal war. The low priority accorded civilian housing among countries otherwise active in civil-military operations appears attributable to the more limited public impact that construction of a few hundred dwellings has as compared with construction of schools and hospitals. Similarly, construction of roads and land reclamation has strategic value while civilian dwellings in most cases do not.

3. CONCLUSIONS.

a. There has been extensive criticism of the failure of the military in most less developed nations to maintain sustained civil-military operations. It is possible to speculate that if sustained operations were undertaken, public housing construction would be a significant part of a civil-military action program particularly since skills required for the other public works are easily transferable to housing construction.

b. Civil-military housing construction is potentially a greater danger to the established government than other forms of construction activity. Housing construction appears to have been characteristically a private sector matter, requiring large numbers of skilled carpenters, plumbers, electricians, and ironworkers. Road construction is perhaps a more tractable task for military units and does not require as many skilled workers.

c. There appears to be no significant difference between Communist and non-Communist countries with respect to IAF activity in housing construction. In both situations, it is extremely limited, except insofar as one may say that Cuban construction is all military controlled and directed because Fidel Castro is a military officer.

SECTION III. Public Works and Utilities

1. GENERAL.

a. This section deals with the involvement of IAFs in civil-military roles in public works and utilities.

b. Historically, the IAF in developing nations have always been involved to some extent in the operation or construction of public utilities and public works, both in normal times and under various threat situations. The degree of involvement varied greatly depending on the level of analysis or on geographic location, but there was always some involvement. For example:

(1) In Iran there are at least 50,000 villages where the water is unclean. Each army brigade has a standing order to cover the polluted springs and wells in its geographic region and to install wells and water lines in at least three villages each month.[7]

(2) In hot and humid areas of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, the Iranian Navy provides water to humans and animals.[8]

(3) In Brazil the IAF is very much involved in the design and construction of the Sudene and Amazon Highway projects, projects of national significance. The army is not only furnishing labor, materials, and equipment for these projects but is also actively engaged in the design, award, and administration of civilian contracts, and it is providing a communications system for this countryside effort.

2. ROLES UNDER NORMAL SITUATIONS.

a. Under normal situations when fighting is not its primary concern, the IAF may be involved in projects affecting the civilian populace (Table 3).

Table 3. Public Works and Utilities

TYPE PROJECT	COUNTRIES INVOLVED
(1) Road Building.	Nearly all IAFs.
(2) Bridge Building.	Nearly all IAFs.
(3) Treatment, Purification, and Distribution of Water.	Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Venezuela, Uruguay, Peru, Morocco, Jordan, Iran, Thailand.
(4) Pipeline Construction.	Jordan, Iran, Ecuador.
(5) Construction of Public Buildings.	Jordan, Iran, Ethiopia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Colombia, Argentina, Peru, Brazil, Philippines, Thailand, Venezuela, Morocco.
(6) Construction of Sanitation Facilities.	Iran, Brazil, Colombia, Thailand, Peru, Venezuela.
(7) Railroad Construction.	Iran, Brazil.
(8) Airfield Construction.	Cambodia, Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, Philippines, Venezuela, Uruguay, Peru.
(9) Construction of Power Generating and Distribution Systems.	Brazil, Colombia, Thailand.
(10) Construction of Dams.	Cambodia, Venezuela, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria, Thailand, Iran.

b.   Iran and Brazil provide good examples of IAF involvement in civic-action projects. Iran has civic-action programs operating in seven fields: engineering, sanitation, agriculture, education, vocational training, communication, and transportation. Individual military units and subcommittees carry out specific projects, an Executive Committee of national agency representatives plans and directs the projects, and a Permanent Committee at the ministerial level supervises the overall effort. The members of the Permanent Committee are the Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, the Director of the National Plan Organization, the Director of the Red Lion and Sun Society, the Director of the Imperial Organization Society Services, and several ministers of the National Government.[9] This illustrates the involvement of the IAF at the highest level of planning and programming civic-action projects.

c.   The number, kinds of projects and degree of involvement in which the IAF are to be found in normal situations are limited by funding, geographical location, acceptability of the project, presence of specific opportunity, and technical know-how.

3.   ROLES UNDER SITUATIONS OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS.

a.   The predictable and most obvious impact of any internal or external threat on the roles of the IAF in civil projects will be that less time, less money, and less emphasis can be devoted to them as a result of having to direct their efforts toward strictly military operations.

b.   Additional roles in the public works/utilities area assumed by the IAF during Phases II and III of an insurgency or during conflict with external forces are those of security and/or operation of public works and utilities such as power plants, water treatment and supply plants, and sewage disposal systems. The reconstruction of damaged or destroyed utilities, roads, bridges, and airfields also is assumed by the IAF during periods of conflict.

4.   CONCLUSIONS.

a.   It can be conclusively stated that participation of the IAF in civil projects dealing with public works and utilities is well received by the civilian sectors of the population. These projects are the type which show tangible benefits which the people are receiving from their government, and they therefore tend to hold down the level of discontent with the established authority, or the advocacy of its overthrow.

b.   The desirable order of priority for civic action projects in most developing nations is as follows:

(1) Water supply and distribution.

(2) Sanitation.

(3) Educational facilities.

(4) Roads and bridges.

(5) Power generating facilities.

c.   The IAF and the national government benefit from civic action projects in remote and rural areas by collecting terrain intelligence which can be utilized in future military operations; e.g, location of water supply points, terrain suitable for construction, etc.

SECTION IV. Public Health

1. GENERAL.

a. LDCs usually have a separate organization at the national
level responsible for the formulation and administration of the public
health programs in normal situations. As threats emerge, national con-
trol becomes less effective and with the disruption of medical assist-
ance programs to the civilian population, public health organizations be-
come targets of opportunity for the insurgents.

b. Roles and operations of public health organizations are either
directed or suggested by the highest level of government which, providing
financial assistance, feels the need for optimum control of a new or
developing function. Of the 33 Asian, Latin American, and Middle East
countries, 19 IAFs are involved in activities which include medical aid
during and following disasters,[10] training military personnel to fill
civil public health functions upon release from military service,[11]
drilling of potable water wells,[12] and construction of medical treatment
facilities.

c. When the training requirement is limited, some public health
programs can be initiated with untrained personnel, for example, the
elimination of mosquito breeding sites.[13] Most LDCs have a deficit of
professional medical personnel such as doctors, nurses, and allied
medical help.[14,15.16]

d. External public health resources are available through many
organizations including the World Health Organization, the Pan American
Health Organization, and the International Red Cross.

e. Since public health functions are personal service operations,
the recovery of capital investments is not feasible. Some medical
development might be realized through the introduction of industries which
produce medical supplies and equipment while at the same time providing
a return of capital investments, but this function would be more of an
industrial than public health nature.

2. PUBLIC HEALTH ROLES UNDER SITUATIONS OF NORMALCY.

a. Roles of IAFs in public health are restricted by at least
three considerations: geographic location, acceptability or credibility
of force, and the presence of specific opportunities.

b. Assistance by the IAF may be required at various levels of
national and rural health organizations. The assistance may be represent-
ed by a large military hospital which serves both military and civilian
patients,[17] or it may be limited to a military medical team providing
assistance to remote areas.

c. There are constraints within most LDCs which limit the potential involvement of the IAF. Religious beliefs, "evil eye"[18] and the "purity of running water",[19] have a detrimental impact upon scientific medicine in such areas. Current scientific knowledge is in conflict with ancient cultural and religious beliefs in many LDCs and the roles available to the IAF within the countries are affected by the impact of the relationship existing between science and tradition.

3.   PUBLIC HEALTH ROLES UNDER VARYING DEGREES OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS.

a.   <u>Phase I - latent or incipient subversion</u>. Preventive public health measures which may have been initiated by the IAF during normalcy will continue to be emphasized as effective military civic action programs. Public health and medical assistance programs will expand during this phase because the government will seek to demonstrate its concern for the segments of the population most susceptible to insurgent efforts.

b.   <u>Phase II - organized guerilla warfare</u>. Preventive programs will be abandoned in favor of direct medical assistance by IAF medical personnel to civilian victims. IAF forces will become more involved in military efforts than in public health projects.

c.   <u>Phase III - war of movement</u>. The majority of medical manpower will be involved within the military. As the level of hostility increases, there will be resumption of public health projects, although of an emergency nature, in order to restore sanitary conditions. Control of disease within the civilian and military populations through elimination of filth will become eventually as important as the direct provision of medical services.

d.   <u>External threat situations</u>. The military role in public health during an external threat will be much the same as in phase II depending upon the degree of the threat.

4.   CONCLUSIONS. The provision of direct medical treatment and provision of water supplies have been most widely accepted in programs operated jointly by civilian and military organizations. New roles might include increased releases of information describing military assistance programs and the availability of various types of medical aid, assistance to educational institutions in areas related to medicine and medical training, and improved liaison with medical organizations to identify and supply aid in areas of need.

SECTION V. Public Welfare

1. GENERAL.

a.   Public welfare functions considered in this section will include those actions which are directly and indirectly essential to the protection and enhancement of the standard of living of underprivileged segments of the populations.

b.   The structure of public welfare organizations of LDCs varies but usually falls into one of two groups: a single Ministry of Public or Social Welfare[20,21] or a combination of functions such as the Directorate of Labor and Social Welfare.[22] The national level establishes various suborganizations until at the lowest level welfare becomes the responsibility of one of four organizations: the church, the tribe, the family, or private organizations.[23] Due to tradition in LDCs, responsibility for public welfare in rural areas does not normally fall within a governmental system, but rather becomes a religious function. Almsgiving is a traditional Islamic means of public welfare,[24] and the needy may also be supported by the extended family unit or tribal organizations.[25,26,27,28,29] However, in contemporary society the trend is for national governments to undertake a greater role in public welfare programs.[30,31,32] In order to develop public welfare programs most LDCs will require foreign assistance.

2. PUBLIC WELFARE ROLES UNDER SITUATIONS OF NORMALCY.

a.   At the national level although IAFs participate directly in public welfare and socioeconomic development, most civic action projects are nondirected; aid by the military to underdeveloped and needy areas is most often accomplished through public works such as resettlement and rural development.[33,34,35] These projects seek to foster a greater sense of self-reliance in the population and to reduce public welfare assistance.[36,37,38,39] Other direct services provided by the IAF are aimed at groups within the population in need of special assistance. Examples of these operations include the provision of hot lunches for school children,[40] assistance to the adult literacy program,[41] and the supervision of children in private institutions and foster homes.[42] Finally the IAF have assumed roles in the rehabilitation of war invalids and veterans,[43] and the assistance to veterans in obtaining their own land.[46]

b.   Efforts of LDCs to improve public welfare and related programs have identified potential problems, two of which are (1) the better educated middle class and the migrating peasant tend to create a nucleus for leftists and extreme nationalists,[47] and (2) religious groups provide much of the welfare needs of the populace which would normally be furnished through the established government welfare organizations.

c. Overall evaluations of IAF efforts in the public welfare function have been stated as follows: "Dissident elements have gained no significant foothold within rural areas where there were meaningful civic action projects."[48] Similarly, "Military leaders are being won to the cause of orderly reform."[49] An appraisal of the impact of fear of insurgency upon the military and civilian populace has been thus expressed: "A little bit of insurgency (or the fear of it) may be a blessing in disguise, especially if it forces armies into civic action and soldiers and civilians into mutual understanding and cooperation for the public good."[50]

d. These evaluations of conditions and efforts of IAF appear to be normal in LDCs and describe results which can logically be expected. It is likely that "The living conditions of the military personnel and their families may be as low or lower than those of their needy countrymen"[51] and that "The personnel of the armed forces may be of such low caliber that they possess little or no technical capability to support a civic action program."[52] These two factors can be corrected or improved only through long range planning.

3. PUBLIC WELFARE ROLES UNDER INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS

a. Phase I - latent or incipient subversion. It is doubtful that public welfare roles would be negatively affected during this phase. Activities of the IAF which would be most effective at this stage include many of the public welfare functions which are carried out under normal conditions.

b. Phase II - organized guerrilla warfare. During this more active phase public welfare activities will be in a state of transition. While self-help and development projects will continue to be emphasized, there will be an increasing need to assist in welfare projects for refugees. At the same time the increasing military roles of the IAF will place a strain upon all but essential welfare roles.

c. Phase III - war of movement. During this combat phase, the welfare roles undertaken by the IAF during normalcy will cease and be limited essentially to refugee evacuation and emergency care to displaced persons.

d. External threat situations. The effect of an external threat on public welfare roles parallels that described under Phase III insurgency above.

4. CONCLUSION. New and feasible roles of IAF in public welfare could be limited to the provision of trained personnel and the furnishing of supplies which augment civilian resources identified in public welfare operations. Utilization of IAF personnel and their resources should be controlled so that adverse impact upon civilian operations is avoided and there is no conflict with traditional cultural and/or religious customs of the country.

SECTION VI. Public Education

1. GENERAL.

   a.   This section deals with the involvement of IAFs in their civil-military roles in the field of public education.

   b.   Although the majority of the 40 countries in our study show evidence of involvement in varying degrees in education by IAFs, there is a wide disparity in the scope of their activities, both historically and at the present time. The range extends all the way from Guatemala and Israel, which has "the most highly-developed internal civic action program in the world;[53] to Iraq and Haiti, where unstable governments have precluded any effective action.

2. PUBLIC EDUCATION ROLES UNDER SITUATION OF NORMALCY.

   a.   Involvement of IAFs in assistance to education embraces a wide variety of activities, including school construction, teaching at all levels, training of teachers, school lunch programs, provision of transportation, adult literacy programs, support of primary, secondary, and university level curricula, educational radio programming, and provision of textbooks.

   b.   The educational activity most commonly engaged in by IAFs is the provision of literacy training for their own conscripts, many of whom are illiterate upon entering the armed forces. Among these countries are Iran, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel. In Iran, the army claims that 50,000 to 75,000 illiterate inductees leave the army two years later able to read and write.[54] In Peru, as a nation-building activity, the military has had the assigned function since 1900 of bringing literacy to the troops, particularly the illiterate Indian population. They are given 1 1/2 hours of daily instruction, and the army claims that it teaches 6,000 conscripts a year to read and write.[55] In Chile, conscripts who are illiterate return to civilian life knowing how to read and write through the armed forces literacy campaign.[56] Israel conducts a literacy program for all army conscripts, which also includes trade training.[57] In Saudi Arabia, in addition to compulsory literacy training for military personnel, the government operates a number of basic military schools located in the larger cities offering a free education in elementary and secondary subjects to prepare young men for service in the armed forces.[58]

   c.   Probably the most ambitious and long-lasting educational efforts engaged in by IAFs are the literacy programs aimed at the civilian populations. These are started for a variety of reasons: to quell unrest in the countryside (as in Guatemala), to educate newly-settled immigrants (as in Israel), to provide employment for recent secondary school graduates unable to gain university entrance (as in Iran), and for the general improvement of socioeconomic conditions. In many countries a combination of these circumstances prevail.

d.   One of the best known such program is Iran's Literacy Corps, run by the Army to provide primary and adult education in rural areas. Started in 1962, it recruits secondary school graduates of conscript age who join this paramilitary corps and receive credit for military service. They are given a four-month course, one half devoted to military subjects; receive the rank of sergeant upon completion; and are sent to a rural area to teach for 20 months (assigned by the Ministry of Education). In 1965, the Literacy Corps numbered 17,000 men, and was instructing 70,000 boys, 14,700 girls, 32,000 adult men and 1900 women. An interesting spin-off from this program is that 80 percent of the Corps members become regular teachers upon completion of service.[59]

e.   In Israel, where "education and training constitute the most substantial military contribution in the field of civic action, and the one with the most long-lasting effect,"[60] women soldiers largely staff the army's educational program, both internally and externally. Each year, 100-120 girls graduate from the army's teaching seminary, following a two-year course. They are then sent to teach for one year in border villages or slum areas. The target group is the 10 percent of the Israeli population who are illiterate, comprised largely of the so-called "oriental Jews" who recently emigrated from Arab-speaking countries.[61] In Guatemala, under the Military Civic Action Program, 503 literacy centers have been established in which approximately 10,000 persons have been established in which approximately 10,000 persons have been taught by 5,000 volunteer teachers.[62]   In Thailand, the Border Patrol Police have established 150 village schools, 134 of which have Border Patrol Police teachers who teach both children and adults.[63]

f.   The training of teachers is another important educational activity undertaken by the IAFs in many countries. In addition to the programs currently conducted by Iran and Israel, described above, the Mexican Army has historically aided education by building and rehabilitating schools, training teachers, and teaching. As far back as the early 19th Century, normal schools gave teacher training to commissioned and noncommissioned officers.[64] While there is no evidence of aid to education in Mexico's current civic action program, the military obviously has the capability of providing it should the need arise.

g.   School construction has been a major part of the IAF involvement in education in a number of countries. Among these are Ethiopia,[65] Jordan,[66] Bolivia,[67] Colombia,[68] and Guatemala,[69]--last three with healthy infusions of AID financing.   .

h.   In addition to the major activities outlined above in which numerous IAFs have provided aid to education, there are a few others that deserve mention as examples of what can be done under different circumstances. In Guatemala's major civic action program, established in 1961, three of the five most essential efforts dealt with education. One of these was the hot lunch program, involving over 300,000 children in 3,073 primary schools. The army transported food and built warehouses

for its storage. Educational radio programming was also inaugurated, reaching 104,000 people per year. The Army supplied over 1 1/2 million textbooks and training materials. In Colombia, the military organized workers educational seminars.[70] In the Dominican Republic, which started a modest civic action program in 1962, Army transportation was placed at the disposal of educational institutions.

3. PUBLIC EDUCATION ROLES UNDER VARIOUS DEGREES OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREAT.

    a. Phase I - latent or incipient subversion. During this phase the government attempts to stabilize the population in the face of insurgent-provoked discontent. IAF education roles begun under normalcy will be continued and increased in an effort to combat dissatisfaction. There will be increased emphasis on those programs which are aimed at the civilian populations, and countries which did not previously have such IAF roles may initiate them.

    b. Phase II - organized guerrilla warfare. As groups opposing the government become organized and armed, the IAF must neglect or abandon troop literacy training and possibly civilian education assistance roles. The role of the IAF in public education must be minimized as more urgent manpower demands arise.

    c. Phase III - war of movement. Public education roles are abandoned as full IAF manpower is directed to opposing enemy military forces.

    d. External threat situations. A severe external threat would also have the effect of eliminating IAF public education roles. Smaller threats, such as border clashes, might not necessitate abandonment of these roles.

4. CONCLUSIONS.

    a. IAFs play many and varied roles in the area of public education. Normal training within the Army is in itself a valuable program, preparing soldiers for a productive return to civilian life. Beyond normal training, the most common educational program of the IAF is literacy training.

    b. Literacy training within the armed forces and as an action program aimed at civilian populations is a widespread and productive use of IAF manpower. Beyond teaching roles, a large number of countries also provide materials and labor. Active teaching corps under military auspices are not unusual.

    c. Public education roles of the IAF are limited by the shortage of qualified military personnel to conduct teaching programs. School building programs may also be limited by the number of teachers available to staff newly constructed schools.

d.   The potential of IAF forces in public education is limited by the constraints noted above. In undeveloped areas they provide facilities, materials, and, to a limited extent, basic teaching services. In developed and developing areas the IAF role diminishes as the civilian educational structure becomes established.

SECTION VII. Public Communications

1. GENERAL. The primary objectives of the IAFs in LDCs are twofold, first, to combat insurgency and, second, to develop a close relationship between the civilian population and the military.

a. Although roles and relationships of IAFs in LDCs within the area of public communications and postal systems may not be identical, many do share common characteristics.

b. In most LDCs the military establishments usually possess a high percentage of trained technical and administrative telecommunications personnel. In many of these countries, the IAF has become a modernizing progressive force in planning, constructing, operating, and maintaining public communications and postal systems.

c. The army has developed a local and regional infrastructure linked to the central authority.

d. In many LDCs telecommunications systems have been expanded to rural areas.

2. PUBLIC COMMUNICATION ROLES UNDER NORMALCY. Generally the IAF can construct public communications facilities at less cost than a private contractor, and military communications units with military engineers have proved to be efficient in this task. These factors present strong economic arguments for utilizing the IAF in the development of public communications facilities and the training of operators.[71]

a. Practically all Latin American countries use their armed forces to support and expand civilian telecommunications.[72] A characteristic common to these nations is that all telecommunications and postal systems are centered in the capital and radiate to the major cities and ports, railroads, and industrial complexes.[73]

(1) An example of IAF participation in public communications is Brazil where engineer construction battalions work under contract to the Ministry of Communications and Public Works. The civilians generally supply the overall direction, program specification, and money, while the IAF does the actual work. However, there is constant interchange between the military and civilian components of the project.[74] In the most poverty-stricken northeastern part of Brazil, engineer battalions have been busy for 10 years building plant and commercial telecommunications facilities.[75] The IAF has also been extensively involved in training individuals to operate, install, and repair such facilities. The IAF is also involved in the security of these facilities.

(2) In other countries of Latin America the IAF is also involved in developing public communications facilities. In Bolivia the IAF installs public communications systems and teaches its operators.

In Guatemala interministerial agencies have established special military units to develop public communications facilities. Similarly, in Colombia an interministerial body for Public Communications has been established through the institution of a presidentially established National Committee on Military Civic Action. The secretary of the committee is the War Minister and military and civilian members serve on the committee.[76] The Costa Rican army and its paramilitary army, the Guardia, expand public communications as part of their regular duties.[77] In Peru the IAF forced the electrical and transmission cable industry to turn over 50% of its ownership to the workers. Also in Peru the IAF has developed communications facilities to all outposts.[78]

    b.   In Viet Nam the IAF has become involved in developing public communications facilities in rural areas.[79]

    c.   In the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, the IAF has participated in the development of public communications facilities in previously isolated rural areas.[80] In Iran the Army in conjunction with, but subordinate to, the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones has developed an extensive network of rural telecommunications and postal systems.[81] In Saudi Arabia public communications facilities are included as a priority item in the country's modernization program.[82] As part of the efforts of the government to broaden the country's industrial base and reduce the dependency on the ARMACO oil complex, the IAF has expanded the communications network to link previously isolated marked areas.[83] Among countries whose telecommunications and postal systems are becoming modern, there are numerous military controlled countries which maintain the status quo. Frequent coups d'etat by senior military officers of the elite have failed to respond to the needs of the indigenous populace. In these countries the public communications and postal systems remain confined to military outposts, industrial areas, and government centers.

    d.   India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the lower Egypt-Sudan area still maintain much of the British and French telegraph and telephone systems operating on a part-time basis. These are both inadequate and inefficient. Operation, maintenance, and expansion have not progressed and these areas have been plagued with insurgent movements and unrest.

3.   PUBLIC COMMUNICATION ROLES UNDER VARYING CONDITIONS OF THREAT.

    a.   Phase I - latent or incipient subversion. During this phase the government's efforts would be focused on stabilizing the population in the face of the insurgent-provoked discontent. This stabilizing effort on the part of the government will require direct communication with the people, particularly those in the remote rural areas who seldom experience contact with their governing officials. This increased effort to communicate will result in increased involvement of the IAF in the construction and operation of communications facilities.

b.   Phase II - organized guerrilla warfare. As groups opposing
the government become organized and armed, there will be an increased
requirement for direct and rapid communication with the civilian populace.
This increased requirement will result in an acceleration and expansion
of the IAF's communication construction and operations programs. In
addition, protection of the existing facilities from destruction or take-
over by the guerrilla forces will become a primary responsibility of the
IAF.

c.   Phase III - war of movement. During this all-out war effort
many of the construction and communication expansion projects of a
permanent nature will be abandoned in favor of the operation of strictly
military networks in support of the Army's objectives.

d.   External threat situations. External threat would impact upon
the communications efforts of the IAF much in the same way as Phase I and
II of an insurgency.

4.   CONCLUSIONS.

a.   Countries in which stability and nation-building are proceeding
have utilized the IAF in expanding public communications and postal systems
to scattered groups, tribal societies, and the rural sectors.

b.   Most effective IAF roles in public communications and postal
systems have resulted from a "team concept" approach in which civilian,
IAF, paramilitary, and police agencies have worked together.

c.   Public communications in LDCs progress and expand as the techno-
logical and industrial base expands.

d.   The IAF can fill the gap between the national government and
the local populace in LDCs where the technological capabilities have not
been sufficiently developed to permit civilian agencies to fill the gap.

SECTION VIII. <u>Religious Relations</u>

1. GENERAL.

a.   This section deals with the civil-military roles of IAFs in LDCs in the areas of religious relations.

b.   Historically, the role of the IAF in LDCs in the religious relations area has varied from one extreme of little or no involvement to the other extreme where national policy is identified with a religion. The roles vary depending on whether it is national or local level involvement.

2. ROLES UNDER SITUATIONS OF NORMALCY.

a.   The military contacts of the IAF with civilian religious affairs are often related to the interaction of the state with established religion. The IAF in Islamic nations sometimes function as protectors of the state and the faith, the government not differentiating clearly between secular goals and religious missions. For example, in Libya national policy and religious mission are completely undifferentiated. On September 1, 1967, the ruling RCC announced a five-point declaration; point five proclaimed: "The RCC believes deeply in the sanctity of religions and in the value of spiritual precepts emanating from the heart of our Sacred Book, the Noble Koran. It will continue to support religious precepts and to watch for the destruction of false religious heresy." Point five is not only a guiding principle of government; in Libya it functions as a military principle as well under circumstances where the government is military. National leader Colonel Qaddafi has referred to religion and the Koran as sources for finding political answers. In a recent interview Qaddafi stated that "Our socialism is a socialism emanating from the true religion of Islam and its Noble Book." Shortly thereafter, he closed a number of Christian churches including the Cathedral of the Sacred Heart which for generations had been the center of the Italian Community. Qaddafi renamed the Cathedral the Gamal Abdel Nasser Mosque.[84]

b.   Where the military is inextricably bound up in national religion it is impossible to identify civil-military religious roles as distinguished from strictly military roles. Rather, the religious and military functions are bound together in the national religious mission.

c.   Other Islamic states which have established Islam as a national religion do not completely mix religious and secular goals in a national religious mission. Iran, for example, is predominantly Islamic. The Shah is a Mohammedan, and the state religion is Islam. However, the Shah's personal goals are secular. Correspondingly, the military is officially Islamic while its goals are secular. The Iranian IAF has no organized chaplain's corps. Mullahs (Islamic religious teachers) attached to major commands perform such religious duties as are required by

the military in addition to their work in the civilian community. They administer oaths and lead the morning and evening prayers on the parade grounds, which all soldiers are required to attend. Chaplains are given the equivalent rank of officers but do not wear the uniform; "their badge of office is the turban and a stubble beard."[85] While religion draws the military together with the civilian population at one level, the contact is not deep.

d.   Civil-military roles in religious affairs can function at still another level. In Argentina the state religion is Roman Catholicism. While the military does not direct religious affairs and religious officials do not govern the military, the vast majority of the IAF officers are Roman Catholic. They regard themselves in a sense as protectors of national morality as informed Roman Catholics and have from time to time taken 'ver the government when they have believed that those national principles 'e threatened. They may be expected to do so again.

e.   Constitutional separation of church and state restricts civil-military roles in religious affairs. Brazil is the largest Roman Catholic nation in the world. Ninety-five percent of its vast population is Roman Catholic. Roman Catholicism, historically, has formed national culture and maintained national integrity. Accordingly, religion has been a major factor in its development. However, Brazil has, by constitutional law, separated Roman Catholicism from the State. That does not mean there is absolutely no overlap. The officers and government officials share the same prevailing religion. It does apparently mean that the religious sphere does not govern the military and the government does not dictate to religious functionaries.[86]

f.   Legal interference in religious affairs may exist even under circumstances where no particular religion is established as a state religion. That is, the government may make no law establishing a religion but it may legislate matters affecting religion. The military may be ex-pected to enforce such laws. In Zaire the government adopted one law permitting only three religions. Thereafter, it adopted a law permitting three additional religions but specifying that any other religion must either merge with one of the acceptable religions or face closure of its churches by the state.[87]

g.   While a national religion may have been established, traditional military roles of the IAF may be so important a national priority that religion functions as a service to the military rather than as a mission of the military. Judaism is the established religion in Israel. Religious courts govern all civil domestic relations. However, military personnel are, in all respects, subject to military law. In fact, all civilians working for the military directly (in addition to certain other persons working in strategic areas or occupations) are governed by military law. However, religious officials occupy a position of great political power in that they are a minority without which the governing coalition would not exist. Yet, this power over national religion has not extended beyond

ritualistic observance in the military. Kosher food, for example, must[88] be served in the military as a result of an ordinance adopted in 1948.[88] Traditional military demands appear so great that religious missions do not impinge on military operations. Nor correspondingly do military officers affect religious affairs. The military is completely subordinate to civilian politics. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia the military is completely subordinate to the King and not to the Ulema, a government-religious body charged by the religious community with guarding orthodoxy in all aspects of civilian life. The Ulema protested the use of women's voices on radio programs; the government was able to override its arguments.[89] The King, however, is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and has no separate role as "protector of the faith." The only concession made to religion appears in military justice where religious crimes committed by military personnel are under the jurisdiction of the Islamic sharia law courts.[90]

3. RELIGIOUS RELATIONS ROLES IN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS. The religious roles that members of the IAF may play in LDCs would change little under varying degrees of internal and external threats.

4. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Where there is constitutional separation of church and state, troops are permitted free exercise of religion, and religion may guide their spiritual life; it appears, under such circumstances, to merely form personal action. Moreover, the roles of the military in religious life appear only in the form of service to troops. Civilian religious life is regarded as a private matter over which the military should have no authority. Such a philosophy of church-state separation limits civil-military roles in religious affairs.

b. Where national religion is established, IAF roles in religious affairs vary over a broad spectrum:

(1) The established religion may be indistinguishable from the government and the military, as in the case of Libya.

(2) The established religion may merely minister to the troops, as in Israel and Saudi Arabia.

(3) The established religion may draw the civilian population and the military together through shared religious functions and ministers as in Iran.

c. In general, it appears that perhaps because military goals and religious practice require absolute obedience, or acceptance, the two spheres are either completely mixed, as in Libya where the military is a protector of the faith, or they are not really mixed at all except at superficial levels. Accordingly, civil-military roles of IAFs in religious affairs are either all encompassing as in Libya or essentially nonexistent as in nations where the prerogatives of religious functionaries are zealously protected from the military.

SECTION IX. Recreation

1. GENERAL.

    a. This section deals with the involvement of IAFs of LDCs with respect to their civil-military roles in the area of leisure time activities.

    b. Historically, the IAFs participation in the construction of recreational facilities and the planning and the development of recreational programs has been extremely limited. When this participation has occurred, it has been during periods of relative normalcy. In general, IAFs must devote their limited resources to development activities. The low priority given to recreational programs militates against any substantial participation during periods of internal or external conflict when the IAF would be engaged in its primary mission of maintaining internal security and defense of the nation's borders.

2. ROLES UNDER SITUATIONS OF NORMALCY.

    a. In those LDCs where the IAF is engaged in extensive civic action projects, development of recreational programs and facilities is not an area of primary concern. In Iran, which maintains one of the largest civic action programs, the IAF operates in seven areas (engineering, sanitation, agriculture, education, vocational training, communications, and transportation). However, no emphasis is placed on the development of recreational programs. Similarly, in Republic of Korea and the Philippines, extensive civic action in the form of construction of roads, medical facilities, churches, libraries, and nurseries has been employed to counteract an insurgency, yet their civic action programs have not yet encompassed the development or construction of recreational facilities.

    b. Even in those developing nations where civic action has been employed with respect to recreational facilities, the IAF's participation has been limited. In Israel the paramilitary youth organization, Gadna. which operated in 250 social clubs, has developed a symphony orchestra which regularly performs in other countries. In addition, Gadna broadcasts weekly radio programs and engages in athletics and hikes.[91] In Yemen, the IAF developed sports programs especially oriented toward youth.[92] North Korea, in recent years, has developed an extensive sports program which centers around the use of athletes in the military. These athletes participate in international competition and conduct demonstration clinics for neighboring Asian countries. Since this international activity is at a level which is much higher than that attained in the DPRK, it is interpreted as a civil-military function with the attendant propaganda value.

c.   The IAF in the Dominican Republic has engaged in the construction of children's parks. The IAF has also cooperated with various sports groups in providing transportation to athletic events.[93] However, this program is relatively small and symbolic.

d.   India and Pakistan both provide recreational facilities as a secondary benefit of water resources projects primarily designed for water supply and flood control purposes.[94] The Indian Army also participates in the construction of hydroelectric projects which have resulted in the development of some recreational areas.[95]

3.   ROLES UNDER VARIOUS DEGREES OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREAT.

a.   Since the IAF recreational role is extremely limited during situations of normalcy, as the level of conflict increases the IAF impact on recreation decreases abruptly. In the event of external threat, any recreational roles will be immediately abandoned because of the priority given to self-defense. Internal threats may not trigger complete withdrawal from recreational activities of LDCs. This minimal contribution is caused by the low priority recreation has when traded off against such essential public services as communication, medical assistance, and transportation. The army is prevented from doing more in the recreation field because it has limited personnel, funds, and equipment.

b.   In distinguishing between long-range and short-range programs involving civic action, the development of recreational facilities and activities should be a short-range effort which could effectively prevent counterinsurgency.

SECTION X. Arts, Monuments, and Archives

IAF roles in civic action functions pertaining to arts, monuments, and archives are extremely limited and focus on the protection of cultural properties and on archival responsibilities. Generally, the archival duties are performed by civilian and/or religious and cultural leaders. IAF roles in the security of arts, monuments and archives are generally a normal military activity of IAF when and if the requirement for protection and security arises.

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CHAPTER 5

SECURITY, SAFETY, AND INTELLIGENCE

SECTION I. Introduction

1.   PURPOSE. This section will examine the security, safety, and intelligence aspects of civil-military relations in developing nations in a preconflict and postconflict environment. It will describe the centralized organizations for security and intelligence in such nations, the organization, function and operational techniques of security and intelligence agencies, to include the military, paramilitary, and judiciary. The study will comment on the flexibility and adaptability of these agencies under varying threats and will note their successes and failures. Finally, the study will include comments and recommendations.

2.   APPROACHES. The study encompasses a factor analysis of 40 countries. The factors utilized are reflected in Table 4, with the overall results of the analysis reflected in Table 5. Additionally, the 40 countries are divided into four categories: Central African, Moslem, Central South American and Asiatic. The cross references are found in Tables 6 through 9.

3.   EMPHASIS. The emphasis of the study is on security and intelligence. These measures of internal defense interrelate with and overlap the internal development programs in the political, economic, and social fields. Internal defense and internal development plans and operations must be coordinated and be mutually supporting in order to establish and maintain free, independent, and united countries that are politically and economically stable and viable. The factor analysis revealed that IAF; are playing an active role in public safety. From urban and remote areas, the public safety role of the IAF tends to increase from that of supporting the police to overall responsibility.

TABLE 4.   Factors Considered in Analysis of 40 CRIAF Countries

1.   Military-paramilitary relations:

    a.   paramilitary subordinate to:

        <u>1</u>.   military high command?

        <u>2</u>.   civilian authorities?

    b.   paramilitary commanded by IAF:

        <u>1</u>.   active officers?

        <u>2</u>.   reserve officers?

    c.   paramilitary autonomous?

    d.   paramilitary forces in the country?

2.   Military and other Security Forces:

    a.   security forces subordinate to the military command?

    b.   security forces subordinate to the civilian authorities?

3.   IAFs have a public safety role:

    a.   in urban areas?

    b.   in rural areas?

    c.   in remote provinces/regions?

4.   IAFs have PRC responsibilities/missions?

5.   IAFs have responsibilities for internal security-intelligence operations?

6.   Are IAFs involved in internal defense?

7.   Do IAFs have psyop capability?

8.   Is there a national coordinating agency for national defense mobilization in war and other emergencies?

TABLE 5. CRIAF Countries

	1A1	1A2	1B1	1B2	1C	1D	2A	2B	3A	3B	3C	4	5	6	7	8
KENYA	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	Y
LIBERIA	Y	Y	U	U	N	Y	Y	Y	U	U	U	U	U	Y	U	Y
NIGERIA	N	U	U	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	Y
SUDAN	U	N	U	U	N	Y	Y	N	U	U	U	U	Y	Y	U	Y
ZAIRE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	N
ARGENTINA	Y	U	Y	N	U	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U
BOLIVIA	U	U	U	U	U	N	U	U	Y	Y	Y	U	N	U	U	U
BRAZIL	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	U	U	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
DOM. REP.	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y
ECUADOR	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
CUBA	N	Y	U	U	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
GUATEMALA	Y	N	Y	N	U	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	N	N
HAITI	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
MEXICO	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
PANAMA	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N
PERU	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y
URUGUAY	N	Y	N	N	N	N	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
VENEZUELA	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	U	Y
AFGHANISTAN	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	U	N	N
ALGERIA	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	U	U	N	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	N	Y
IRAN	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
IRAQ	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
JORDAN	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
LEBANON	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	U	U
LIBYA	Y	N	Y	U	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U
MOROCCO	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	U
PAKISTAN	Y	N	Y	U	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	U
SAUDI-ARABIA	N	Y	U	U	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	U
SYRIA	Y	N	U	U	N	Y	Y	N	U	U	Y	U	Y	Y	U	U
TUNISIA	N	Y	U	U	N	Y	N	Y	N	U	U	N	Y	Y	U	U
ISRAEL	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
INDIA	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
INDONESIA	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
MALAYSIA	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	Y
NORTH KOREA	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
REP. OF KOREA	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
PHILIPPINES	Y	Y	Y	U	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
REP OF VIET-NAM	N	Y	U	U	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SINGAPORE	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
THAILAND	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	Y
PERCENT																
Y	38	63	25	8	8	83	53	55	70	80	83	35	93	93	35	63
N	58	30	53	65	83	15	38	38	23	10	10	30	5	3	23	15
U	5	8	23	28	10	3	10	8	8	10	8	35	3	5	43	23

Y = yes, N = no, U = unknown.

TABLE 6.   Central African Countries

	1A1	1A2	1B1	1B2	1C	1D	2A	2B	3A	3B	3C	4	5	6	7	8
KENYA	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	Y
LIBERIA	Y	Y	U	U	N	Y	Y	Y	U	U	U	U	U	Y	U	Y
NIGERIA	N	U	U	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	Y
SUDAN	U	N	U	U	N	Y	Y	N	U	U	U	U	Y	Y	U	Y
ZAIRE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	N
PRESENT																
Y	40	60	40	20	20	100	60	40	60	60	60	0	80	100	0	80
N	40	20	0	40	80	0	40	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20
U	20	20	60	40	0	0	0	0	40	40	40	100	20	0	100	0

Y = yes
N = no
U = unknown

TABLE 7. Moslem Countries

	1A1	1A2	1B1	1B2	1C	1D	2A	2B	3A	3B	3C	4	5	6	7	8
AFGHANISTAN	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	U	N	N
ALGERIA	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	U	U	N	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	N	Y
IRAN	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
IRAQ	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
JORDAN	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
LEBANON	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	U	U
LIBYA	Y	N	Y	U	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U
MOROCCO	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	U
PAKISTAN	Y	N	Y	U	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	U
SAUDI-ARABIA	N	Y	U	U	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	U
SYRIA	Y	N	U	U	N	Y	Y	N	U	U	Y	U	Y	Y	U	U
TUNISIA	N	Y	U	U	N	Y	N	Y	N	U	U	N	Y	Y	U	U
PERCENT Y	50	50	25	8	0	100	42	58	58	75	83	8	100	91	8	33
N	50	50	50	50	92	0	50	33	33	8	8	50	0	0	42	8
U	0	0	25	42	8	0	8	8	8	17	8	42	0	8	50	58

Y = yes
N = no
U = unknown

TABLE 8.   Central and South American Countries

	1A1	1A2	1B1	1B2	1C	1D	2A	2B	3A	3B	3C	4	5	6	7	8
ARGENTINA	Y	U	Y	N	U	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U
BOLIVIA	U	U	U	U	U	N	U	U	Y	Y	Y	U	N	U	U	U
BRAZIL	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	U	U	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
DOM. REP.	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y
ECUADOR	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
CUBA	N	Y	U	U	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
GUATEMALA	Y	N	Y	N	U	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	N	N
HAITI	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
MEXICO	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
PANAMA	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N
PERU	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y
URUGUAY	N	Y	N	N	N	N	U	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
VENEZUELA	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	U	Y
PERCENT																
Y	38	54	13	7	15	53	62	32	93	93	93	47	85	7	46	53
N	55	31	54	78	62	40	15	53	0	0	0	38	15	86	24	32
U	7	15	15	15	23	7	23	15	7	7	7	15	0	7	30	15

Y = yes
N = no
U = unknown

TABLE 9. Asian Countries

	1A1	1A2	1B1	1B2	1C	1D	2A	2B	3A	3B	3C	4	5	6	7	8
INDONESIA	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
MALAYSIA	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	Y
NORTH KOREA	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
REP.OF KOREA	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
PHILIPPINES	Y	Y	Y	U	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
REP.OF VIET NAM	N	Y	U	U	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SINGAPORE	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
THAILAND	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	U	Y	Y	U	Y
PERCENT																
Y	25	88	13	0	0	88	63	88	63	88	88	63	100	100	63	100
N	75	13	75	75	100	13	38	13	38	13	31	31	0	0	13	0
U	0	0	13	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	0	0	25	0

Y = yes
N = no
U = unknown

SECTION II. Centralized Organization

1. PRECONFLICT. Organizational structures to coordinate actions in an emergency are absent in virtually all cases studied. A variety of causes contributes to this condition. For one, the administrative structure of government may be weak or inefficient. This situation holds particularly true in the emerging African nations. In the instances of Malaysia and the Philippines, the preconflict political weakness was attributable to the return of governments weakened by the demands of World War II. In other instances, an autocratic government centralized in a single figure has contributed to the problems of coordination. The government of Vietnam under President Diem was illustrative of such a situation. Whatever the cause, the results were frequently uniform. Civil and military efforts not only were not meshed but at times were even contradictory; the multitude of police organizations operated in a fragmented way reporting to different authorities, duplicating efforts, or neglecting essential tasks. Intelligence agencies tended to proliferate with diminishing returns. In 1966 there were 17 intelligence organizations (American and South Vietnamese) operating against the Vietcong Saigon. Many were not talking to each other.

2. CONFLICT.

   a. When an insurgency breaks out, the question immediately arises of how far the government should alter its normal administrative structure in order to meet the needs of the situation. Unfortunately, reorganization and cooperation are not always attained even under the stress of conflict. For example, initially no significant steps were taken in the Philippines to coordinate police actions between local jurisdictions or with the Constabulary. Efforts to nationalize the police forces in Colombia during the violence of the late 50's failed due to resistance of departmental governors. In Venezuela different forces countering insurgency continued to report to different ministries with no exchange of information.

   b. One means adopted to ensure civil-military coordination was the consolidation of responsibility for both efforts under a single individual. In Malaysia General Templar served as Civil High Commissioner and Military Director during the period 1952-54. Initially, in Algeria the civil and military efforts were maintained separately but from 1958 to 1960 the military commander was solely reponsible for coordinating civil and military programs. Colombia had recourse to military government in two instances-during 1953-1957 under the presidency of General Rojas Pinilla and during 1957-1958 under the provisional junta. In no instance was civil and military authority combined in the person of one man or a single group for the entire period of the conflict.

c.   The British in Kenya and subsequently in Malaysia developed a system of coordination of civil and military efforts through an interlocking hierarchy of committees. The committee system tended to create arenas for debate rather than decision making. Moreover, at the outset means were not provided to put the decisions reached into effect. The deficiencies of the committee system were remedied in Kenya with establishment of a War Council in the spring of 1954 but it took 17 months after the declaration of emergency. Likewise, in Malaysia a Federal War Council was formally established approximately two years after the start of the emergency. Below the national level in both Kenya and Malaysia, a similar structure operated at state or provincial level and at district level. Representatives on these committees include members of the civil administration, the military, and the police as well as appropriate civilians. In Kenya an executive officer was named to see that council decisions were translated into action. The councils did not eliminate all problems. Like all organizations the system varied in effectiveness depending upon the efficiency and ability of its members. In India a National Defense Council was established in the course of the conflict with Pakistan and the earlier Chinese invasion to cope as well with civil violence. Within the council there was a military affairs committee chaired by the Defense Minister with a membership of the various service chiefs of staff. Notwithstanding th's organization, the efforts of the three services were not well integrated.

3.   CONCLUSIONS.

a.   If insurgent war, as it has been described, is a total effort to subvert the military, economic, and political structure of a country, it stands to reason that the government response should be decisive. The threatened government needs an overall plan encompassing not just security measures but all political, economic, and social measures required to eliminate the threat posed by the insurgency. A national plan need not be detailed in a single document, but it has to provide for a coordinated national effort. Each agency of government, be it Defense, Treasury, or Interior, may have its own program and plan for implementing that program. The sum of all these plans constitutes the national plan. Bearing in mind the resource constraints, a national coordinating group is necessary to establish priorities and allocate resources. Its title is unimportant. However, it is important that it define goals to be achieved, define roles and responsibilities to avoid duplication of effort, balance the security and civil efforts, and monitor progress to assure the attainment of objectives. Membership on such a body should consist of representatives of all national agencies having an internal defense and development mission as well as the senior military officers and civilians concerned with the conduct of the war effort. These last should include the heads of the armed services, the police, and intelligence organization. The

Chairman of this group should be the head of government. For day-to-day direction and supervision of the execution of policies approved by the body, a Chief of Staff is desirable. The staff should be small because of the normal chain of command within the armed forces and government departments should continue to operate. These agencies must continue to be responsible for their activities.

b. The council should only become involved in the performance of work that is not the responsibility of an operating agency. If this rule is not observed, the so-called national coordinating group will end up running a separate government.

c. Similarly, at lower administrative levels, such as province and district, coordinating groups should be established to carry out programs approved by the national body. The membership should consist of the senior civilian officer and senior military officer as well as the senior police officer in the political subdivision with such other individuals represented as may be concerned with any particular problem. These lower level administrative groups not only afford further coordination of effort but the opportunity to review and adapt the national policies and programs to local needs.

d. While the optimum situation would appear to dictate a governmental political organization of relative strength functioning with moderate efficiency and accepted by the bulk of the people at national and lower levels in order to avert or combat insurgency, this assumption does not always hold true. A government may appear to be functioning efficiently and appear to be strong but may still invite strife because it favors a minority group. Examples would be Algeria and Kenya. Moreover, initial governmental weaknesses may not necessarily appear to preclude ultimate victory over the insurgent effort. Examples would be Malaysia and the Philippines.

SECTION III. <u>IAF Security and Intelligence</u>
                    <u>Organizations</u>

This section will discuss type units or organizations for security
and intelligence, their size and interrelationships, their suit-
ability in an emergency, and modifications required to adapt to
crisis situations.

1. PRECONFLICT.

        a. <u>Military forces</u>. In the preconflict period, the military
forces of the developing nations studied spanned the spectrum as to
size and competence. They ranged from the small-scale force of Kenya
through the armed forces of Vietnam more than 500,000 strong. One or
more of the following adjectives could be applied to these forces:
poorly led, ill equipped, inadequately trained, badly organized. Some
were found graftridden, incompetent. This was true of the reduced
forces of the Philippines following World War II. In Malaysia,
Kenya and Vietnam, British and American forces furnished varying de-
grees of support to the IAF. In almost all instances the military
force found itself unprepared to fight the type of warfare it faced
and required additional training and adaptation. In hindsight, it
would appear that wrong history books were studied in the buildup of
the huge conventional Vietnamese force. Ignored were the lessons of
Malaysia and the Philippines and in their stead Korea became the model.
The threat appears to have been incorrectly assessed. Force planners
envisioned direct conventional aggression across a frontier by the
forces of North Vietnam along the lines of the North Korean invasion.
In anticipation of such a day, a force consisting of divisions and
corps was constituted with all of its attendant problems. The huge
military force vied with the civil authority for political control of
the country, for manpower and for resources. Support for such a force
caused greater economic dependence upon the United States. Qualified
personnel required in the civil service, the professions, and services
were drafted into the military. A large conventional army required a
substantial logistical train--engineer, ordnance, transportation, medical
communications--causing diversion from civilian services. Moreover, the
kind of force employed dictated tactics and strategy as a country with
divisions and corps tended to engage in division and corps operations.

        b. <u>Police and paramilitary forces</u>.

        (1) Police. A set of common characteristics applied to the
police force studied in a preconflict period. They were usually un-
prepared for the emergency, lacking experienced and professionally
trained personnel as well as equipment. They suffered from political
influence and corruption, lacked coordination, and were subject to
jurisdictional conflicts. Moreover, they were often understaffed. The
police systems of Colombia, the Philippines, and Venezuela were parti-
cularly afflicted by these problems. In most instances police strength

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tended to be concentrated in urban areas. These defects encouraged the growth of insurgency. Insurgent threats below the level of overt violence were rarely perceived. Absent was the realization of the magnitude of the threat and there was a reluctance to commit energy and resources to modify these conditions.

(2) Other paramilitary forces. In addition to different units, an assembly of paramilitary forces operated in the countries studied. Some of these existed prior to the emergency. Thus, in India a volunteer service called the Territorial Army was set up in 1949 for internal security use in times of emergency. A People's Assistance Corps was established in 1953 to give basic training to inhabitants of border areas. In most instances, special units were created to meet special requirements created by the insurgency. In Thailand there was the Volunteer Defense Corps, a part time militia that operated as a reserve force for the police at village level. Malaysia created special constables, auxiliary police, home guards, and a Special Operational Volunteer Force. In addition to the existing paramilitary forces, government-sponsored organizations arose in the Philippines, Colombia, and Venezuela to cope with domestic insurgencies.

c.   Intelligence organizations. Most of the countries studied have some organizational arrangement, usually within the police system, to manage intelligence collection. Like the police of which it was a part, this effort was generally understaffed and lacked top-level recognition. In India, a joint intelligence unit was created after independence for handling military intelligence under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in addition to the police network. Coordination of these two efforts proved a problem and underscored the defects of the system.

d.   The judiciary.

(1) A legal system that is corrupt in its personnel, discriminatory in its laws, or one-sided in dispensing justice will furnish fuel for the cause of insurgency. In Algeria the shortcomings of the legal system motivated the insurgents. While the Organic Statute of 1947 guaranteed full citizenship rights to Algerian Moslems, implementation of the law maintained minority European control. The National Liberation Front (FLN) won converts by attacking the discriminatory application of the law.

(2) Insurgents will often utilize civil rights safeguards to protect their operations in the preconflict period. The insurgents are quick to recognize the natural reluctance of governments to abrogate these safeguards or to invoke extraordinary legal measures. In Kenya

the insurgents began a campaign of personal violence against Europeans and then intimidated witnessses so that the government could not secure convictions at criminal trials. Additionally, the trials held were skillfully used for political propaganda. As a consequence, the government began to look inept and to lose credibility.

(3) The existing laws of a country may furnish the means to combat insurgency and special powers may be available upon declaration of a state of emergency. If emergency legislation does not already exist, it may be necessary to enact such measures. By such legislation the state may temporarily withdraw certain rights of its citizens such as the right to assemble or to travel. However, there must be the will to enforce available laws or to enact necessary legislation. In Algeria emergency measures were not invoked until 5 months after the start of open conflict. In the Philippines legal powers were available but the government chose not to use them. In Kenya appropriate laws were not on the books and there was disagreement within government as to the need for greater legal powers. The Mau Mau were proscribed in 1950 and it was legally possible to prosecute anyone who gave or took an oath of allegiance to that society. However, the government lacked the means of protecting witnesses from public identification. It became impossible to find persons willing to risk retaliation. In India the constitution permitted the President to declare a state of emergency in the face of external aggression or serious internal disturbance, and it made provision for him to assume the powers of any governor whose state authorities showed an inability to handle the emergency. The President was empowered to suspend all constitutional rights, and he was granted almost unlimited power over communications, transportations, finance and the mass media. Additionally, he was authorized to order the detention of persons suspected of endangering national security; to control movements, arms and explosives; to order searches without warrants; and to ban the assembly of five or more persons.

2. CONFLICT.

   a. Military.

   (1) Force size. In most instances troop strength was increased in the course of the emergency. In Malaysia a force of 9,000 men was increased to 40,000, 25,000 of whom were supplied by Great Britain. In Algeria, French Army strength approximated 55,000 at the beginning of the rebellion and was ultimately increased to 400,000. The buildup of U. S. forces in Vietnam went from a few thousand advisors to a combined force in excess of half a million men and the South Vietnamese forces eventually numbered nearly one million men.

   (2) Command and control. As conflicts developed into a serious threat to the government concerned, the security effort generally came under military control.

In Algeria all security operations were under military command from the start of the emergency. In Kenya the military command was made responsible for security as soon as it became evident the problem was beyond police capability. In Malaysia, while the police theoretically were responsible to the civil government alone, in practice the army exercised a dominant influence over the police. In the Philippine the Constabulary was brought under the armed forces. While coordination of the security effort was regarded as a major problem and the military tended to be predominant in this area, no optimum organizational framework to cope with the crisis was discerned from the case studies.

     b.   Police and paramilitary forces.

     (1) Police. Once insurgent operations commenced, the lack of government control over rural areas was generally recognized and steps were taken to increase the government's presence in such areas. Police control over rural areas was expanded in Algeria, Kenya, Malaysia, and the Philippines. This expansion of responsibility required added strength. Thus, in Kenya a regular police force of 8,000 at the end of 1952 was expanded to almost 22,000 (including regulars, reserves, and special police) by the end of 1953. A force of 10,000 in Malaysia at the outbreak of the revolt was increased to 75,000 regular police and Special Constabulary. Not only were regular police units increased but new police units were formed. Thus, in Algeria 184 mobile groups with a total of 8,700 personnel were organized. Kenya formed a General Service Unit and Malaysia a Police Field Force for special operations. Limitations of facilities and trained cadres, however, often impede recruitment. This problem plagued Colombia, Kenya, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Obviously, poorly led and ill-trained forces create problems.

     (2) Other paramilitary forces. Like the military and police forces, paramilitary organizations existing at the outset of an emergency were augmented and other organizations were formed. Thus, a home guard of 5,000 in Kenya formed shortly after the emergency commenced eventually grew to 25,000. If such forces are to be utilized effectively, government inputs are required in the form of training, organization, leadership, and control. Where such training is ignored or delayed, the results can be fatal. The paramilitary force as a supporter of the government can prove a worthwhile target for the insurgent. The untrained paramilitary are easy victims for insurgent attacks. Severe losses can damage morale. The need for administrative and organizational support to paramilitary forces has to be an early planning requirement.

c. Intelligence.

(1) The major changes during the conflict period were to increase personnel engaged in intelligence activities and expand the area of coverage. There was no tendency to form a single, unified intelligence agency. In Colombia a separate intelligence service was created and made responsible directly to the President. In Kenya the Special Branch was enlarged and additional subordinate units were formed at provincial and district levels to increase area coverage. The Kenya police organization remained responsible for intelligence for both military and administrative needs throughout the emergency. This arrangement was also tried in Malaysia. The Special Branch for intelligence was originally under the Criminal Investigation Division of the police force and was later given separate departmental status. In Venezuela intelligence responsibility remained divided between the police, the armed forces and a civilian agency. Two of the most useful techniques in collecting intelligence were interrogation of captured insurgents and the use of informers. In the case of the former technique incidents of torture reported from Algeria, while it no doubt yielded some information for the authorities, caused a backlash of antimilitarist sentiment in mainland France. Civilian informers used in Kenya, Malaysia the Philippines, and Venezuela produced useful data.

(2) For the developing nations, a single organization responsible for security and intelligence within the country has much to recommend it. Where intelligence responsibilities are fragmented, it is virtually impossible to define the respective responsibilities of each organization or to devise means of coordinating their activities. The different organizations tend to compete and withhold information from one another. Agents of dubious reliability might get on the payrolls of several intelligence organizations and supply them with the same unreliable information which will thus seem to obtain multiple confirmations.

(3) A special branch of the police force has many advantages as the organization for internal security intelligence. It has the benefit of long experience of close contact with the populations whereas the military will have had very limited experience with such contacts. Moreover, military units are subject to deployment throughout the country at any time.

d. Insurgent impacts.

(1) In considering the government's force requirements in an emergency, it is necessary to take into account the insurgents' organization and the type area in which operations are to be conducted. At the outset there are three main areas of activity. There are the populated areas under government control where the threat is subversion, terrorist acts, sabotage, and propaganda. Eliminating the threat is

the responsibility of police aided by intelligence organizations.
Next there is the rural populated area where control is disputed
between the government and insurgents. Such an area is mainly
a police responsibility with military support. The third area is
the remote lightly populated area, including jungles and swamps, which
is under insurgent control. Such an area is a military responsibility.

(2) Fixed ratios for the size of the government force in re-
lation to the insurgent and the balance between regular armed forces and
paramilitary forces are illusory. There are many factors other than
operational consideration that have to be taken into consideration such
as the costs of training, equipping and maintaining a soldier, which are
at least one and a half times as great as those for a policeman. Terms
of service and demobilization problems are significant. For example,
the police can offer a lifetime career to its regulars. The army, by
contrast, can offer only temporary service and presents the government
with the problem of absorbing servicemen into civilian occupations.
Viewed in this light, expansion of the police force and intelligence
organization has much to recommend it. The additional police will be
required to provide security in the towns. An armed constabulary, not
fully trained as regular police, will be required to furnish defense
of essential installations and vital points. A police field force
made up of units up to company strength may be utilized in disputed areas.

(3) If there is a conventionally trained and organized army,
its immediate requirement will be training and reorganization for
counterinsurgency roles. If there is an air force, its role will be
dual: to provide transport, and hence mobility for the ground forces,
and tactical air support. This latter role will have to be performed
with discretion so as not to alienate the population.

SECTION IV. Security and Intelligence
Operations in Conflict

1. MILITARY.

a. Urban operations.

(1) Initially, the role of the army in urban areas was minor.
This was true in Algeria, Kenya, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Major
urban violence occurred at the outset of the insurgency in Columbia
and Venezuela, and only in Colombia was the army brought into operation.
In Algeria, Kenya, and Venezuela the army eventually played a major role
in curbing violence.

(2) In Algeria the French had recourse to a program called
quadrillage in which they garrisoned all cities, towns, villages, and
hamlets. Quadrillage tactics were supposed to isolate the guerrillas
by physically denying them popular support. Eight months were required
by the French to restore control and suppress the underground network
in Algiers. In Kenya disorders became so severe--950 major crimes per
month in Nairobi alone--that a special operations was mounted whereby
25,000 British troops and police were used in a massive cordon and
search of the 65,000 Africans in the capital. Suspicious persons
were detained in camps. At the close of the operation Nairobi was firm-
ly in British hands, the crime rate diminished, and the Mau Mau militant
wing was denied an important logistics base.

(3) Army successes in urban areas were purchased at times at
substantial cost. Methods were used that are not normally condoned.
Suspicion of guilt was frequently resolved in favor of the government.
Innocent persons were killed and detained. Urban operations being car-
ried out in front of a mass audience, even small abuses, had major rami-
fications. Citizen reaction to such abuses tended to create doubt in
the security forces and play into the hands of the insurgents.

b. Rural operations. In all instances studied the army had a
major role in providing rural security, often from the beginning of
the emergency period. Initial responses were similar. They consisted
of a static defense network using patrols, and routine reactions to
insurgent operations. These were followed by large scale operations
such as encirclements and area sweeps. The French sealed off the
frontiers between Tunisia and Morocco. Additionally, they resettled
persons from areas having large rebel forces and constituted these
areas into security zones. The British found "flogging the jungle"
with large numbers of troops useless. Of greater success was the use
of small unit patrols backed by extensive planning, intelligence, and
coordination. Tactical air operations against guerrilla personnel
in Malaysia proved generally disappointing because of jungle conditions.
Similarly, in Kenya great sweeps through the forests by army troops
proved a failure. Bombing of these forests also proved to be con-
troversial. The same applied to an even greater extent in Vietnam.

c. <u>Results of military operations.</u>

(1) In most instances, the military were not effective in stemming the rebellion, protecting the population or in managing resources at the outset of the emergency. This held true in Algeria, the Philippines, and Kenya as well as in Vietnam. Little imagination was exercised in population protection and in resources management. In time, some means were identified for managing the problem, but these too did not produce a positive military solution. Thus, in Algeria we have noted the tactics of quadrillage; in Kenya, the cordon; in Nairobia, the search; and in Malaysia, the joint military-police tactical effort with concentration on small unit tactics. Military operations generally do not seem able to end a strong insurgent threat in a limited time. Recourse to military operations is an extreme expedient and by the time the military are called upon to enter the picture, the insurgency already has a substantial grip upon the body politic.

(2) As one principle of counterinsurgency, Sir Robert Thompson cites the need for the government to defeat the political subversion rather than the guerrillas. The intelligence organization, by identifying the individuals in the underground organization, is the main element in the accomplishment of this breakthrough. As another principle Sir Robert cites a government need to secure its base areas first. Base areas are the main towns, ports, airfields, and military installations as well as heavily populated rural areas. These are the sources of supply and manpower and to secure them is to deny these assets to the enemy.

(3) The tactics aimed at isolating the insurgents from the people also have the virtue of protecting the population and ultimately of winning support. The process requires population control measures that at times appear repressive and involve some discomfort. These harsh facts of life point up the need for psychological campaigns and civic action programs to run concurrently with the control measures.

(4) In securing base areas, paramilitary forces can provide the static security and the military can be used in a mobile role to fend off attacks upon these areas by enemy units. As a further tactic in the counterstrategy, the military can be used to disrupt the enemy's organization. His weakest link is the constant movement of men and supplies on the ground within the population, on the fringes of the populated areas, and in the deep jungle. The intelligence organization and paramilitary forces can concentrate on the populated area and its fringe. The military will operate on the outer fringe and in the jungle.

(5) Guerrilla forces are just as vulnerable to ambush as are the government's. The night and the jungle are as useful to government forces as to the enemy. This points up the need for training in the jungle, at night, and in small units. Many of the most successful ambushes in Malaysia

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were carried out by parties of two to five men at night on trails the enemy were known to be using. With modern weapons the firepower of a small party is such that it can take on a larger insurgent unit, inflict heavy casualties, and fade away. The result is to disrupt the enemy's supply organization and deny him freedom of movement.

(6) This does not mean that there is not a need for other kinds of operations, but it must be recognized that the inflicting of casualties upon insurgents does not destroy the enemy's organizational infrastructure.

2. POLICE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES.

a. In Algeria paramilitary force operations covered a wide range of activities. Some forces were used as auxiliaries in regular army units with an identical role. Some were used as auxiliary police. Large numbers of Moslems served in village self-defense units. A European home guard defended farms villages. The most usual role for paramilitary forces was defensive. Home guard units functioned not only in Algeria but in Kenya, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. At times these forces were used in offensive operations, usually as blocking forces.

b. If they are to be useful to the overall plan of operation, the efforts of these forces must be coordinated. Their coordination usually devolved upon the organization designated to give them the greatest degree of support. In Algeria it was an army function. In Kenya and Malaysia it was a police duty. When the operation was defensive, coordination was effected through cooperative defense schemes and the use of mixed patrol. This was the mode of operation in Kenya. When the operation was offensive, the coordinating measures varied according to the nature of the operation. If the paramilitary force was operating as a guerrilla band, coordination was effected by withdrawal of other forces from the area while the paramilitary operation was in progress. At times coordination was achieved by combining paramilitary forces with the police or army for small scale operations. These efforts proved successful in Kenya and suggest that integration of paramilitary units into regular units may be the best solution to the coordination problem as well as the best use of these forces. The effectiveness of the paramilitary forces was dependent upon the degree of organizational support and coordination they were provided. In Venezuela and Colombia there was no coordination and, therefore, no results were to be expected. Their effectiveness in Algeria was mixed. Although they freed French forces for other activity, their effectiveness in defensive roles was modest.

c. In Malaysia these forces assisted the military forces by providing guards for installations while the military engaged in offensive operations against guerrilla bands. In Vietnam these forces were probably too prolific in number of organizations. At one point there were: the Civil Guard, the Self-Defense Corps, the Gendarmarie, the National Police, the Republican Youth, the Hamlet Militia. Such a proliferation of forces led to confusion over roles, and coordination of their efforts became an insuperable problem. Paramilitary effectiveness appears to be greatest

where the paramilitary forces receive organizational guidance, training, leadership, and coordination by a regular security force and where their operations are small unit type conducted jointly with regular forces.

3. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION.

a. In Sir Robert Thompson's view, no government can hope to defeat an insurgent movement unless it gives top priority to its intelligence organization. Intelligence can provide warning of insurgent activity, and knowledge of the insurgent organization, its personnel, plans, and tactics. It can also pinpoint the causes of popular discontent and can determine popular reaction to insurgent and government activities.

b. Information can be provided by agents, loyal citizens, captured enemy personnel, and documents. The French had recourse to torture in efforts to extract information from prisoners. Forms of brutality were used in Kenya and have been reported in Vietnam in connection with the interrogation of captured prisoners. The most consistently used technique for obtaining good intelligence was the traditional one involving the civilian informer. This technique proved useful in Kenya, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Venezuela. Money and other forms of payment provided an inducement to provide information. When it becomes apparent to the population that the government is likely to prevail at the end of the insurgency, members of the population become ready sources of information.

4. JUDICIARY.
In most cases studied the governments declared a state of emergency for a portion if not all of the emergency. Under such circumstances the government is able to invoke emergency legislation already on the books or to enact the necessary legal measures. It is important that the government operate within the law. By virtue of emergency laws, certain rights can be temporarily withdrawn from the citizenry. Some of the measures adopted included:

a. Suspension of habeas corpus. This principle of law, usually associated with Anglo-American jurisdictions, limits the powers of the State in matters of arrest, detention, and treatment of suspected persons. It protects persons against arbitrary imprisonment by requiring authorities to institute formal charges in court. In most instances habeas corpus procedures were suspended at least for a time during conflict periods. Governments could arrest and hold suspects without going through normal legal and judicial procedures. Known supporters of the insurgency against whom the evidence was insufficient could be held indefinitely. This technique ended the detainee's effective support of the insurgency. The danger, however, in indiscriminate arrests is the possibility of radicalizing previous neutrals and creating a source for insurgent recruits.

b. Control of communications, press, and public assembly.

c. Restrictions on possession, movement of food, weapons, and commodities.

d. Civilian registration and identification.

e.   Control of civilian residence and movement. In Algeria, Kenya, and Malaysia large-scale relocations of civilians took place on a compulsory basis with the objective of isolating vulnerable and susceptible elements of the civil population from the insurgents. The populace would thereby be protected from demands of money, food, recruits, labor, and intelligence. Tactical operations were also facilitated. In Algeria, one million to two million persons were "regrouped"; in Kenya, one million; and in Malaysia, 400,000. This control measure while harsh had a few positive aspects. In Kenya it afforded an opportunity for land consolidation and the issurance of land titles. In Malaysia the new homes were better than former habitations.

f.   Penalties for aiding insurgents. Illustrative of the measures adopted under emergency powers are:

(1) Algeria. The French were empowered to search, arrest, detain, deport, relocate, impose curfews and travel restrictions, prohibit demonstrations and public gatherings, restrict possession of arms, and institute an identification card system. However, these measures were not invoked until 5 months after the initial outbreak of violence and the civil administration was too thin and politically unreliable. Enforcement suffered.

(2) Kenya. A state of emergency, declared in 1953, enabled the British to detain suspects, impose prohibited and restricted zones, ban political activity, and register weapons and people. The Africans feared the identity card system and the insurgents played on the fear.

(3) Malaysia. Extremely detailed emergency regulations were invoked affecting virtually every aspect of daily life. In affected areas the place of residence, freedom of movement, and possession of goods, particularly foodstuffs, were closely prescribed. Employers had to register workers. Local authorities had to register local residents. Householders and landlords had to register persons on their premises. Suspects could be held without bail. Chinese and Indian detainees without citizenship status could be deported. Severe penalties were invoked for supporting the insurgency--death for unauthorized possession of weapons, life imprisonment for harboring insurgents, 7 years for giving false information. Collective punishment of an entire village by fine and curfew was useful. These restrictions could be remitted or lifted as a reward for evidence of community cooperation.

5. IMPACT OF EMERGENCY MEASURES. The psychological impact of emergency measures was generally good in Malaysia and the Philippines. In Algeria, Kenya, and Colombia the reaction was mixed depending upon the part of the population affected. The value of emergency power lies in the grant to a government of a legal basis for its actions. While a government might not immediately recapture support of many neutrals or insurgent supporters by adherence to legal forms, by nonadherence the government risks loss of its natural and loyal supporters.

6. CONCLUSIONS. A codified and detailed system of emergency regulations and instrumentalities for their enforcement are important factors in population protection and resources control. The measures are merely tools and their effectiveness is dependent upon the efficiency of the administrative apparatus employing them. In their employment care must be exercised to distinguish between the insurgent and the noninsurgent political opposition. The application of laws and their effectiveness require review frequently. The tough laws in Malaysia during the emergency, whereby all Chinese found in a declared trouble spot were deported and the other act whereby the government could impose a collective fine on all the inhabitants of an area where the people were uncooperative, were dropped after being used only two or three times.

in CRIAF Countries

Civil-Military
Functions/
Activities

	CIVIL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONS				CIVIL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES		
	GOVERNMENTAL	ECONOMIC	FOR FAC	SPECIAL	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC	INTERN DEF OPNS

Column headers (vertical):

GOVERNMENTAL: Civil Defense, Labor, Legal, Pub. Admin., Pub. Ed., Pub. Finance, Pub. Health, Pub. Safety, Pub. Welfare

ECONOMIC: Civ. Supply, Econ. & Comm., Food & Agricul., Property Control

FOR FAC: Commun., Trans., Pub. Wks & Util.

SPECIAL: Arts, Mon. & Arch., Civil Info., Dis., Refu., & Evac., Relig. Relations

POLITICAL: Nat. Level Gov., Prov. Level Gov., Local Level Gov., Gov. Reps., Legis. Reums., Polit. Making, Polit. Mobil., Indoctrination, Propaganda, Political Succes., Ideolog. Def., Intervention, Back-up Common., Institution Bldg.

ECONOMIC: Planning, Entrepreneurship, Pt. Time Civ. Emp., Property Controls, Labor Relations, Civic Action, Housing, Resettlement, Customs Control, Agrarian Ref., Devl. Remote Areas

INTERN DEF OPNS: Pop. & Res. Ctrl., Retroguer. Opns., Pub. Saf. Opns., Intel. Opns., Psych. Opns., Postal Opns., Villagization, Parami. Forces

Countries
AFRICA
Kenya
Liberia
Nigeria
Sudan
Zaire
LATIN AMERICA
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Cuba
Domin. Repub.
Ecuador
Guatemala
Haiti
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
ASIA
India
Indonesia
Korea, North
Korea, South
Malaysia
Philippines
Vietnam, South
Singapore
Thailand
MOSLEM STATES
Afghanistan
Algeria
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
Israel

N = No
Y = Yes
U = Unknown

Table 11. Recap of Civil-Military Functions and Activities in CRIAF countries

CHAPTER 6

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY

1. INTRODUCTION. Military theory of insurgency is basically concerned
with the principles governing the use of force between two or more
parties to reduce the enemy to a point of losing the will or the ability
to fight and eventual submission. The reasons, causes, or determinants
of the contest of force are not relevant to military science. For
example, this eliminates from a military theory of insurgency the end-
less discussion on "what causes insurgency?" What are relevant to mili-
tary science are the resources which allow the enemy to fight. Accord-
ing to tested military definitions, these resources may be political,
economic, sociological, psychological, physical, and military. They
constitute the sum total of national power.¹ Increase of these resources
as well as their protection is a grand strategic problem of each nation,
and their transformation into offensive and defensive instruments of
force becomes the grand logistic problem. Controlled use of all the
resources against the enemy is the resolution phase of the conflict in-
volving field strategy, logistics and tactics. The application of
force, where it is more effective in reducing the enemy and where it
is less costly to apply, is of equal importance to the military science.
This principle is of particular importance to insurgent warfare, which
by definition "acts violently from within, against the political, social,
economic, military and civil vulnerabilities": it indicates a distinct
military characteristic of this type of warfare, since it hits at the
resources of national power, concentrating on strategic vulnerabilities
in contrast to the tactical emphasis of conventional warfare.

    a. The military interpretation of conflict. The military approach
to conflict based on factual observation is reflected in the FM 100-5
definition. The addition of some general terms extends it to all con-
flicts within a given nation.

> Conflicts between nations (or parties) will vary
> from mild disagreements and conflicts of interests
> to basic and irreconcilable differences in nation-
> al (or sectional) ideologies and objectives. The
> former are often resolved by arbitration or con-
> cessions and do not necessarily result in hostili-
> ties between the nations (or parties) concerned.
> The latter type of conflict may be considered a
> form of war, whether characterized by the employ-
> ment of military force or by the application of
> national (or sectoral) power short of military
> force.

Current army definitions use the terms "country" and "nation" inter-
changeably, leading to a confusion of terms appearing in stability
operations doctrine. The question can be presented, "What do the in-
surgents attack: the nation, the country, or the government?" In the
definition of "subversion" insurgents are referred to as the enemy.
Actually, the insurgents are attacking their own state--an organized
entity. Military doctrine could be clarified considerably by consist-
ent use of precise terms.

> The state is a legal entity with sovereign power
> over population and territory. It is represent-
> ed by a paramount organization, called Govern-
> ment, in which the sovereignty is delegated,
> sustained and generally recognized, de jure or
> de facto, by other states forming the world's
> international community.

"Country" refers to a geographical area in which a state exercises
sovereign power. Often states are sovereign over various geographically
separated countries, as was the case with Pakistan. Conversely, a state
may be deprived of some territory, without losing its legal status or
its international identity. The concept "nation" refers to an ethnic or
cultural group; in this sense Croatians and Slovenese are "nations" with-
in the state Federated Republic of Yugoslavia. Sovereign states some-
times claim that the whole of their population is part of "a nation."
Not infrequently an ethnic group disclaims to be a part of a "nation,"
meaning that it does not recognize the sovereignty of the state: the
Ibos leadership rejected Nigerian nationhood and created a sovereign
entity of their own, which they called Biafra. States of old standing,
with centuries of uncontested sovereignty, have become identified with
the concept of nation. These are the so-called "homogeneous states."
Other states have not yet assimilated the population over which they
exercise sovereignty into a self-identified nationality aggregate.
Ethiopia's population consists of eight ethnic groups, none represent-
ing a majority; 53 percent of Laos' population is composed of some 200
tribal entities with distinct ethnic traits; in both countries the
majority of the population is composed of multiple minorities. Any one
of the major ethnic groups may at any given time seek and claim the
right of self government or, conversely, to use force to assume control
of the existing government. When the force available to a state
diminishes drastically, secessionist or subversive movements are likely
to occur. In most cases these movements pose no threat except when the
force available to the state continues deteriorating. The military is
the dominant force element of the state even to the point of being "the
monopoly of force," but there are other, smaller reservoirs of force at
the disposal of the government, such as the police, paramilitary organi-
zations, or tribal and political labor groups. However, armed forces are
likely to oppose the buildup of any paramilitary organization which could
challenge their position. From a military point of view, the causes of
conflict are "basic and irreconcilable differences" between parties in

opposition. There is empirical evidence that basic differences become irreconcilable when one party believes that conciliation is undesirable, i.e., when basic objectives can be reached by other means such as war. To reach this state, after analysis of the balance of forces, both contenders believe that such a balance is in their favor.

b. <u>The role of force in societies</u>. It can be argued that force is self defeating, that it prevents consensus and agreement, and that compromise and negotiation are the only way to solve basic differences among parties. This line of reasoning would lead to the conclusion that the military, as the institutionalized element of the force of the state, is obsolescent in modern society. On the other hand it can also be argued that

> Force constitutes one of the major foundations
> of social structure. The processes by which
> the force is expended, exchanged and accumu-
> lated or lost are universal in social inter-
> action, because force is one of the funda-
> mental resources people and groups need to
> elicit cooperation, help, and conformity
> from one another.[2]

The principal function of force is deterrence--the ability to formulate credible threats to those engaging in unlawful activities. Deterrence is the basis of law enforcement. Force is defined as follows:

> The capability to reduce the will and to
> obtain compliance of others through threat
> or use of organized and controlled
> violence.

c. <u>Insurgent war in light of the general concepts of war</u>. It has been suggested that insurgent war is an unconventional aspect of war, and even that it is not a war at all, but a political, economic, and social problem.[3] On the other hand, General Earle G. Wheeler made the following statement:

> It is fashionable in some quarters to say
> that the problem in Southeast Asia is
> primarily political and economic rather
> than military. I do not agree. The
> essence of the problem in Vietnam is
> military.

It is the thesis of this presentation that insurgent war is simply one category of the general concept of war.

2. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MEANS OF WAR IN INSURGENT WARFARE. The
"means of war" is the totality of resources allocated to the military for
war; it is the sum total of combat power available to a state. The
intellectual elements of combat power are imaginative and effective
planning, leadership and discipline: the emotional elements are moral
strength and esprit de corps. Organizational elements include coordi-
nation and control, training and preparedness, and unity of effort.
Physical elements are composed of manpower, firepower, communications,
equipment, supply, transportation and mobility. While it is difficult
to measure objectively the intellectual and organizational elements,
the physical elements can be measured in terms of the costs of acquisi-
tion and maintenance.

    a.   <u>The art of warfare and the means of war</u>.

       (1) The art of warfare has developed in close relationship
to the "means of war." Irreconcilable differences between parties have
always existed, and force has been one of the major forms of conflict re-
solution, but the means by which force could be efficiently applied have
often determined the art of applying it. Soldiers have had to manage
the best they could with what they had available. The physical elements
available have been expanded by the introduction of organizational im-
provements and by intellectual accomplishments. The emergence of mili-
tary formations from fighting hordes coincides with the emergence of
military science. Military history has been divided into "the age of
muscle" in which the Macedonian sarissa, the Roman short sword, and the
English long bow played an overwhelming role; into the "age of gunpowder,"
which began with the first cannon in 1326, developed into the arquesbus,
the flintlock and the smoothbore cannon; and into the "age of technology,"
which began in 1849 with the introduction of the high velocity rifle
bullet, the machine gun and the high explosive shell, up to the atomic
weaponry of 1945. Each new technological development in weaponry re-
quired new organizational improvements and new intellectual dispositions
manifested in strategic and tactical innovations. The increase in man-
power and costly weapons was achieved at the cost of internal changes,
in which the state had to become stronger to obtain the means to wage
war.

       (2) In order to use force, for both offensive and defensive
purposes, states faced the very expensive problems of raising men,
weapons, and supplies. The development of the modern state coincides
with the development of large armies. On the eve of the French Revolu-
tion, France maintained an army of 180,000 soldiers, but immediately
after the revolution, 1,169,000 conscripts were called. Napoleon raised
2,100,000 men from September 1805 to November 1813. As the cost of
weapons increased, it became more and more difficult to maintain and
service soldiers in the field. The Imperial Russian Army during World
War 1 sent some unarmed contingents to the front line in the expectations
that they would receive the weapons of the casualties. After that war

TABLE 12. Manpower, artillery, magnitude of battles, and
frequency of engagements

	AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ARMY IN BATTLE*	NUMBER OF CANNONS PER 1000 COMBATANTS	NUMBER OF BATTLES IN WHICH OPPOSING ARMIES TOGETHER NUMBERED OVER 100,000	AVERAGE NUMBER OF BATTLES PER MONTH
Thirty Years War	19,000	1.5	1	.24
Wars of Louis XIV	40,000	1.75	7	
Spanish Succession				.77
Wars of Frederick II	47,000	3.33	12	
Austrian Succession				.82
Seven Years War				1.40
Wars of French Revolution	45,000		12	
First Coalition				3.0
Second Coalition				4.4
Wars of Napoleon	84,000	3.5	37	
Third Coalition				7.0
Wars of 1809				11.0
Wars of 1812				5.2
American Civil War	54,000	3.0	18	1.0
War of 1870	70,000	3.3	12	9.0
Russian-Japanese War	110,000	3.75	3	1.0

*Computed on the average from 30 battles each year.

it became clear that the possibility of waging warfare on a grand scale required a large economic base, which only the major powers could afford. With World War II the cost of weapons reached excessive levels with few nations being able to afford nuclear weapons.

       (3) It is important to emphasize that each technological development imposed new strategies and tactics. The Macedonian sarissa imposed the "phalanx"-- a division of 4,096 professionals used as a shock force. The Roman short sword generated the "centuria," a company-size unit of 120 men, capable of deploying in flexible formation of considerable mobility and maneuverability. The English long bow introduced mixed formations of bowmen, light and heavy infantry. The arguebus and the musket led Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden to adopt thin infantry formations, which with their superior firepower and decreased vulnerability defeated the massive Spanish "tercio" squares. The introduction of the machinegun and the high explosive shell changed the close formations to the platoon base tactics of World War I. Ultimately, present weapon and delivery systems have changed the tactics of World War II. It can be concluded that the means of war have imposed changes in the organizational structure and in the planning of war.

      b.   Strategy--the science of the utilization of the means of war. The enormous influence of Clausewitz on military thinking led modern professional soldiers to concentrate almost exclusively on the problems of application of the means of war made available to them by the state. Clausewitz identified strategy as "the art of making use of given means in combat." Further he stated that

> The theory of war itself is occupied not with
> perfecting these means but with their use for
> the object of war.[4]

General Moltke reiterated the "classical" Clausewitz position, defining strategy as

> The practical adaptation of the means placed
> at the general's disposal to the attainment
> of the object in view.[5]

Captain B. H. Liddell Hart stressed that

> Strategy depends for success, first and most,
> on a sound calculation and coordination of
> the end and the means.

In the definition of Clausewitz, strategy forms the plans of war, maps out the proposed courses of the different campaigns which compose war and regulates the battles to be fought in each.[6] Captain Liddell Hart objects to this concept on the grounds that in one sense it is too large,

since it impinges upon "grand strategy"--or "national strategy"; further, it narrows the meaning of strategy to the pure utilization of battle, thus conveying the idea that battle is the only means to the strategic end.[7] This compares with the U.S. JCS and Army definition of military strategy:

> The art and science of employing the armed
> forces of a nation to secure the objectives
> of national policy by the application of
> force or the threat of force.

Liddell Hart states that strategy is not concerned with the overcoming of enemy's resistance, which is the province of tactics, but that its purpose is "to diminish the possibilities of resistance by exploiting the elements of movement and surprise."[8] Movement represents the physical element while surprise lies in the psychological sphere. Movement generates surprise, and surprise gives impetus to movement by hindering the enemy's countermeasures and countermovements. All these elements belong to strategy: strategy creates the conditions of fighting and tactics begins with the actual fighting. In Liddell Hart's words, the aim of strategy

> ...is not so much to seek battle as to seek a
> strategic situation so advantageous that if it
> does not of itself produce the decision its
> continuation by battle is sure to achieve this.[9]

He redefines the difference between the strategist and the tactician. The tactician is concerned with overcoming the resistance, on the offensive of the enemy by the direct application of force, by fighting. The strategist is concerned with obtaining a situation of superior combat power which may deter the enemy from fighting or secure his defeat in case of confrontation. In short, good strategy is not only combat-determining but combat-deterrent. Strategy aims at presenting two alternatives to the enemy: to fight under unfavorable conditions or avoid fighting by withdrawal or submission.

    c.   <u>Guerrilla warfare--extension of the concepts of strategy and tactics</u>. In World War II guerrilla warfare became very widespread with a major psychological impact upon the enemy affecting their morale.

> Guerrilla warfare reverses the normal practice
> of warfare, strategically by seeking to avoid
> battle, and tactically by evading any engage-
> ment where it is likely to suffer losses.

A different point of view is presented by Mao-Tse-tung in his maxims on guerrilla warfare.

> To gain territory is no cause for joy, and to
> lose territory is no cause for sorrow.[11]

> The peculiar quality of guerrilla operations lies
> entirely in taking the enemy by surprise..A
> guerrilla unit...should think frequently about the
> ways in which it can appear..where the enemy does
> not expect it...Then, following the principle that
> "the thunderclap leaves no time to cover one's
> ears" the unit can strike...and vanish without a
> trace.[12]

> If we do not have a one hundred per cent guarantee
> of victory we should not fight a battle...when the
> enemy is well armed and his troops numerous and
> courageous..we have to evade clashes.[13]

Liddell Hart believes that "guerrilla warfare" alone cannot achieve
favorable resolution except through psychological means, by causing the
weakening or the collapse of the will to fight or resist the enemy. The
guerrilla movement which in World War II became "an almost universal
feature" did not achieve ultimate resolution anywhere, except in those
areas where the defeated armies had left a vacuum of force.[14] Mao-tse-
tung himself does not claim that guerrilla fighting alone can bring
military victory. The guerrilla is a means to harass the enemy and,
more important, to divide the population, to split it away from the
government by pointing out government failures in guaranteeing law and
order, and the security of persons and property. George K. Tanham[15]
spoke of the need of the insurgent to establish absolute control over
the population by illegal means--by means a government could not afford
to use--generally resulting in the "encadrization," i.e., semi-mili-
tarization of the insurgent-controlled population into cells or cadres.
The mix of psychological, political, and military methods and aims of
guerrilla warfare confused the analysts. Thus, tacticians became in-
terested in guerrilla tactics, and politicians in guerrilla politics:
the action of guerrillas became the deep concern of political leaders
and of military tacticians. The end result was the belief that there
are two kinds of war: "conventional war," and "unconventional war,"
somewhat outside the established tactics politics and ideology. The
writers and politicians wondered how could a citizen become a guerrilla
fighter, and why should the civilian population support him. The issue
of "population support" became so magnified that the tactician was
denied competence on the subject of guerrillas as a "fighting problem."
The tactician in turn devised tactical means to reclaim his competence
by instituting the concept of military civic action. But as Charles
Wolf, Jr., and others have observed, "military civic action" as a
tactical answer to an erroneously formulated problem was no satisfactory
solution.[16] Another problem was the assumption that guerrilla tactics
could only be implemented by the guerrilla fighters. This error has
been definitely rejected by current Army doctrine, as it became clear
to professional soldiers that such tactics could be implemented by any

trained combatant. Still another fallacy was to treat "guerrilla warfare" as an "independent phenomenon of political origins,"[17] leading to the development of a concept of unconventional war, outside the body of military strategy, as an unorthodox military concept of its own. "Guerrilla warfare" is only a set of tactics, and it is tactical in the sense that it is concerned with fighting. That type of strategic concept is "unconventional" only in the semantic sense that it does not include many conventions of warfare, generally upheld by Western military thinking. But it is militarily orthodox because it respects and abides by the principles of war and the universal doctrines of military science.

     d.   Internal war--the application of the means available to non-industrial states. Under this heading three major issues will be discussed: (1) the concept of insurgency being political rather than military, (2) the processes of insurgency as it refers to internal war, and (3) the development of the strategy and tactics of internal war as a military application of the means available to nonindustrial nations.

     (1)   Insurgency--the political identification of the problem. Three basic definitions cover the concept of insurgency (formerly called "subversive insurgency") in current Army doctrine:[18]

> Subversion: Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, moral, or political strength of a nation.[19]

> Insurgency: A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context subversive insurgency is primarily Communist inspired.

> Insurgent War: A struggle between a constituted government and organized insurgents frequently supported from without, but acting violently from within, against the political, social, economic, military and civic vulnerabilities of a regime to bring about its internal destruction or overthrow. Such wars are distinguished from lesser insurgencies by the gravity of the threat to government and the insurgent object of eventual regional or national control.

These three definitions are concordant with the three phases of insurgency, as defined by FM 31-23:

> Phase I: This phase includes the latent and incipient periods and extends through periods during which organized subversive incidents are frequent, but there are no major outbreaks of violence against the established authority.

> Phase II: This phase is reached when the subversive movement has gained sufficient local or external support to initiate organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.

> Phase III: The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established government.

It will be noted that the stress of those definitions is on the insurgent, represented as a "civilian" who gradually changes from a law abiding citizen to a subversive, from a subversive to an insurgent, and from an insurgent to a guerrilla fighter.

(a) The "scenario" implied in the current concepts. It is of the utmost importance to emphasize that current concepts assume that this individual progression into violence occurs in a situation of underlying peace, calm, and tranquility. For example, FM 100-20 (3-1) states that:

> Conditions that favor insurgency usually exist in nations which are breaking a traditional order but have not yet developed a stable social and economic structure or a popularly accepted governmental apparatus.

Current scenarios mention the failure of governments to provide the people with immediate and tangible benefits; call the traditional government unwilling or unable to meet popular expectations, by failing to recognize the magnitude of the grievances of the people or failing to provide solutions because of strong factions seeking to maintain the status quo; and note that grievances and lack of faith in the programs or capabilities of government may promote smoldering resentments. In

short, unmoved by the dynamics of social change, a status quo-minded government ignores the grievances of the people and thus fosters smoldering resentments, which an insurgent leadership exploits to persuade peaceable and orderly law-abiding citizens to enter the process of becoming insurgents and guerrilla fighters. To support these statements, the manual lists China, Greece, Malaysia, the Philippines, Laos, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Iran, and Indonesia as examples, but fails to mention that the "traditional order" which had existed in those countries until 1939 had broken down during and after World War II when, with the exception of Cuba, all those countries had been theaters of war and of allied-sponsored movements of national liberation. The mysterious forces of dialectical necessity expounded in Marxist sociology were not responsible for breaking traditional orders, but rather the very real upheavals of World War II and its aftermath. The fact that traditional orders had already passed and that the societies involved were in a state of upheaval prior to the development of insurgency had been somewhat ignored. The grievance of the people against a traditional government was emphasized when, in most cases cited, no traditional government existed but only transient, provisional, or improvised administrations.

The scenario of current concepts is, therefore, unrealistic.

       (b) Cultural, constitutional, and political concepts. A distinction was made between military, cultural, constitutional/ legal and political/policy concepts. The same distinction can be applied to the insurgent in current doctrine when presented as a legal concept. The insurgent is represented as the person who attempts to overthrow an incumbent government by force and violence, an action which is both a constitutional and legal crime. While armed forces the world over do not ignore legal definitions, they are not the best basis upon which to build military doctrine, for legal science and military do not have the same purposes and objectives. The Principles of War, for example, are not based on legal definitions but on the accumulated experience of military science. Constitutional and legal definitions vary from country to country, and what is appropriate in the United States may be totally irrelevant to a third country with different constitutional and legal systems. This is particularly pertinent because FM 100-20, FM 31-23, FM 41-10, and FM 33-1 are written for scenarios which take place in other countries, and for the purpose of conducting operations to support sovereign and allied states. While it is certain that U.S. constitutional/legal constraints are valid whenever U.S. forces operate, a military doctrine based on U.S. characteristics may not be acceptable to other sovereign countries, especially when the scenario upon which it is built is incompatible with the actual situation existing in a particular country.

(c) Consequences of the current definition of the insurgent in terms of the standard scenario of insurgency.

1. It is an historical fact that all countries in which insurgency movements took place immediately after World War II did not enjoy the situation of calm, peace, and tranquility in which the law abiding citizen was somehow driven to become a subversive and an insurgent. In Greece insurgent action took place in the aftermath of a German occupation, and the insurgents were the EAM/ELAS guerrillas which had been initially supported and assisted by Great Britain in order to harass the lines of communications and supply of the German armies operating in North Africa. The Huk movement in the Philippines grew out of the manpower, material, and the experience of the anti-Japanese resistance movement, superimposed on a situation of latent ethnic resistance which existed even prior to the Spanish American War of 1898. The Indochinese insurgents received some weapons and training from General Donovan's OSS, and the Chinese Communist "insurgents" had been operational ever since the Communist takeover in Russia. The Malayan Insurgency was largely ethnic and erupted upon the upheavals of the Japanese invasion, and as a natural consequence of the movement which led to the independence of India. The Mau-Mau rebellion of Kenya was ethnic and tribal and reflected the worldwide commotions which marked the end of the British colonial system. The Iranian troubles followed the occupation of parts of the national territory by the Soviet Union, tribal unrest over dynastic problems, and the violent episodes of the aftermath of World War II. The Algerian insurgency was not only financed by external elements and physically supported by newly independent Tunisia, but occurred after Algeria had been the theater of operations of the North African campaign, and when the French overseas empire had been militarily defeated in Indochina and internally weakened by the political struggles. The Ibo rebellion was equally tribal; it took place after the turbulences accompanying the birth of Nigeria, and developed in the context of the larger confrontation between the Black African Nations and South Africa and the Portuguese territories.

2. In no case can one observe that the assumptions of current doctrine are satisfied by reality. Phase I, the phase of latent conspiracy and subversion, does not take place in a state of peace and tranquility. It takes place in a scenario of political disarray owing to preceding upheavals and emotions of international and national scope. It has not been recognized by U.S. Army doctrine that the insurgent operations of Phase I refer to the particular problem of the Communist Party to establish its political and paramilitary undergrounds in a scene of general upheaval and multilateral confrontation. Such was the situation in China, where the

Communist Party had to get organized and rooted amid the turbulence of the Japanese invasion, the warring factions of the Kuomitang, the roving bands of Chinese, Mongol and Turkoman warlords, and the multi-party agitation in the cities. Phase I represents the problems of a generally small Communist Party to gain the organizational buildup to which it owes its successes, to impose itself not only upon the government--which may be the last on the list--but upon all other rebellious groups against which it must compete for mobilization base. Phase I, as viewed by Communist strategists, refers to that particu-lar stage in which the party begins preparing for war using the methods and procedures that characterize military organizations the world over: recruitment, training, force structuring. Phase I then is a requirement which applies to Communists and to everyone else who tries to contest organized and controlled force. It does not take place in a vacuum and certainly not necessarily in a time of peace, order, and tranquility. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Lenin, and most Communist strategists have emphasized over and over again that the "revolution" must wait for the "appropriate moment." In Lenin's words:

> Marxism asks that the various types of struggle
> be analyzed within their historical framework.
> To discuss conflict outside its historical and
> concrete setting is to misunderstand elementary
> dialectic materialism. At various junctures of
> economic evolution, and depending upon changing
> political, national, cultural, social and other
> conditions, differing types of struggle may be-
> come important and even predominant.[20]

It will be apparent to the military professionals that Lenin is mention-ing strategic conditions almost in the same words used by most military manuals. Phase I has been taken out of context and represented as a whole scenario, while the real scenario--the situation of turbulence, political upheaval, aftermath of war and defeat and weakness of govern-ments in which Phase I insurgent operations adjust to Lenin's "concrete historical setting"--has been forgotten. The misconception of the real meaning of Phase I has led to the thesis that "as the grievances of the people grow," Phase I is succeeded by Phase II, which is in turn followed by Phase III. This grievance-propelled automatic escalation is not convincing. The insurgent staff cannot escalate to Phase II operations until some preconditions have been achieved. In turn, the access to Phase III requires military means, manpower, weapons, supplies, organization, all the elements essential to a military staff to conduct a war of movement.

3. It has been shown that insurgencies appear in times of political turmoil and upheaval. But there is nothing of turmoil in an insurgency. On the contrary, a successful insurgency is as orderly, as disciplined, as any other military action. As Edward Meade Earle observed in his analysis of the Russian revolution, revolutionary strategy must be related to military efficiency and even to orthodox military methods. In the chaos, upheaval, and turmoil which mark revolutionary situations, the insurgency is the antirevolutionary element, because it is the organizational movement amidst a sea of disorganization. This has been repeatedly perceived, but not satisfactorily integrated into current doctrine, because it is still under the influence of the political concepts of "insurgent" and "insurgency."

4. The fact that an individual breaks the political order and engages in violent action is a politically-relevant phenomenon. It is not a military relevant phenomenon because military science must assume that some people are organized to perform violent actions. It is military-irrelevant why human beings engage in violence; what concerns the military is how are they going to be used and for what purposes. The military view is that people engage in violence because they have been recruited into organizations specializing in violence. Only these organizations are the concern of military because the outcome of the confrontation of forces depends on their potential to maneuver, their posture, and combat effectiveness.

5. In short, it has not been sufficiently stressed that insurgent means insurgent against the political order of a society. The insurgent with whom military doctrine is concerned is a person dedicated to a political order which tries to supplant the existing one. That is, he is a combatant for another social order.

6. International and national legal conventions as presented in Section IV, Chapter III, of FM 31-23 (Legal Status of Insurgencies and Insurgents) refer to the legal status, rights and responsibilities of insurgents. One must deal with the delicate concept of "sovereignty" in relation to human rights, to explain why an individual who places himself outside the constitutional legal system of a sovereign state has still some rights. The judicial construction of the status of "insurgent" and "insurgency," and the political significance of both, cannot be the basis for the military doctrine of what is known as the insurgent war. As indicated above, from a military point of view there should be no difference between a civilian who has been inducted into an enemy army, and an "insurgent" who has been inducted into the paramilitary insurgent organization, not even when they may be of the same "nation," because "nation" is recognized by others, with sovereignty over a population and a territory.

(2) The means of war available to nonindustrial nations. The purpose of this section is to show that the development of the strategy of internal war is the logical consequence of applying the means of war available to states with small industrial resources.

(a) National potential for war and national resources. Expenditures on national defense increase proportionally to the growth of the GNP, and on the will of governments to use a larger share of the gross national product for these purposes.

(b) The statistical outline of the problem. Table 13 demonstrates that the world's total income, as measured by the gross national product (GNP), is unevenly distributed. Eighty-two and seven-tenths percent is attributed to the developed countries, and 17.3 to the underdeveloped countries. In contrast, 27 percent of the world's population lives in the developed countries, as against 73 percent in the underdeveloped. This has important military consequences. If we divide the means of war into manpower, materiel and supplies, the wealth of the developed countries allows them to spend much more in materiel and supplies. The underdeveloped countries can put more men in the field. A "man in the field" is a drain on resources, since he has to be fed, clad and equipped.

TABLE 13. Indicators of Military Expenditures and Military Power

	Military Expendit. (in thousands)	% of GNP for Mlt. Exp.	Mil. Exp. per man	1000 in Armed Forces	Soldiers per 1000 pop.
World Total	208,496	6.5	8,817	23,370	6
Developed	180,445	6.7	17,095	10,451	10
Developing	28,051	5.0	2,168	12,919	5
North America	79,733	7.5	25,240	3,159	14
Europe	100,799	7.0	11,689	8,483	11
Latin America	2,931	2.1	3,063	957	3
Far East	15,526	4.2	2,079	7,467	6
Developed	1,522	.8	6,088	250	2
Developing	14,004	8.0	1,940	7,217	6
South Asia	2,446	3.2	1,580	1,635	2
Near East	4,330	12.1	4,597	942	10
Africa	1,277	2.2	2,033	629	2
Developed	360	2.2	9,000	40	2
Developing	917	2.2	1,560	589	2
Pacific	1,434	3.7	1,434	98	6

Therefore, LDCs cannot minimize their manpower resources because of GNP limitations. Nevertheless, LDCs account for 55.3 percent of the 23 million soldiers in the world today and the developed countries, for 44.7 percent. This has been achieved by lowering the cost per "soldier in the field." Statistical calculations indicate that the LDCs spend annually an average of $2,168 per soldier while the developed countries spend almost nine times more, $17,095. The developed countries spend $180 billion per year for military budgets, or 86.5 percent of the world's total. As measured by the percentage of GNP dedicated to military expenditures, the developed countries devote 6.7 percent and the underdeveloped 5.0 percent. Since the fiscal resources of governments increase as development increases, this means that undeveloped country governments devote a much larger share of their revenue to military expenses, although they can afford it less. Were it not for their fiscal constraints, the underdeveloped countries would be able to put more soldiers in the field. The world's percentage of soldiers per one thousand population is 6. The developed countries have 10 soldiers per thousand, while the underdeveloped countries only 5. This has another internal defense implication: if the number of soldiers per thousand population is taken as a measure of the potential of governments to apply force within the boundaries of the state, obviously underdeveloped countries have a much lesser potential. Since most of the world's uninhabitable areas (52.6 percent) are located in underdeveloped countries, their armed forces have the problem of "saturation" compounded by the problem of "inaccessibility."

     (c) Expenditure for armed forces. Expenditure per soldier includes pay and allowances, equipment, weapons systems, maintenance, transportation and communication, repairs, training, research and development, services, installations, etc. Some armed forces are more "luxurious" than others, as measured by the amount of funds expended in making the service attractive. In general, western industrial states must maintain more "luxurious" military organizations since they must approximate the standards of living of the military and their families to the prevailing civilian standards. There is always some correspondence between the social and purely military expenses. The average expenditure per soldier of NATO forces is 20,115 U. S. dollars, ranging from that of the U. S. Army which is $25,385 to that of the European armies, which is $17,187. In the Warsaw Pact the average expenditure is $15,240, but here again the USSR spends $18,388 while all the other partners spend only $6,191. The People's Republic of China maintains a military of 3,100,000 men. It is about the same size as the United States total force level, but the expenditure per soldier of the PRC is $3,226. Israel spends $16,259 per soldier, but the combined forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq spend $3,263 per soldier. As shown in Table 13, the armed forces of Latin America and Sub-Saharan underdeveloped Africa have one of the lowest percentages of GNP dedicated to military expenditures, their expenditure per soldier being also among the lowest, $957 and $629, respectively. In addition to their active internal political roles those armed forces are mainly oriented toward internal security missions.

TABLE 14. Expenditure Per Soldier
(in U.S. Dollars)

NATO

U.S.A.	25,384
OTHERS	17,187
AVERAGE	20,115

WARSAW PACT

USSR	18,388
OTHER	6,191
AVERAGE	15,240

ARAB NATIONS

EGYPT	8,000
SYRIA	3,143
JORDAN	1,967
IRAQ	3,031
AVERAGE	3,263

ISRAEL

16,259

PRC

3,226

(d) The Military Options of LDCs. If a government is faced with the need to prepare for, or engage in war, it has the following options:

1. Increase national power. In statistical terms this means increase in GNP. The factors accruing to the GNP are the primary sector (agriculture and mining), the secondary sector (industry), and the tertiary sector (services). If national power is wanted for military purposes in the conventional, classical sense, the industrial sector must be developed at the expense of the others. This is achieved by investing manpower and capital resources in war-related industries, but it is done at the cost of reducing the levels of living of the population. The latter policy is likely to produce discontent and political opposition of such caliber that a strong totalitarian system of government is needed to control it. The heavy industrial development of the USSR after 1926 is a case in point. Increases in national power are a long run proposition and nonindustrial states are not likely to gain substantial increases in the expenditure per soldier except after a considerable period of time. Moreover, if national resources are devoted to industrial growth they cannot initially be expended on the military.

2. Increase the transformation of national power into military power. The predictable response of governments to perceived national security threats is to take up arms. The occurrence of threats has been frequent. Ted Gurr and Charles Ruttenberg,[21] using a sample of 119 governments, concluded that 83 experienced some form of strife in the three years from 1961-63. Turmoil--spontaneous unstructured mass violence-- occurred in 76; conspiracy--intensively organized, relatively small-scaled violence--occurred in 22; and internal war--mass violence accompanied by intensively organized violence--in 38. It is not surprising that the world's military expenditures grew continuously. The developing countries' military expenditures increase at an annual rate of 8 percent and their force levels 3.3 percent, which is much faster than their GNP growth. The military expenditures of the developed nations grew at a rate of 2.6 percent while their force levels increased at a rate of only 0.8 percent. This points out that no matter what level of effort a developing country may attempt in national defense, ultimately it must resort to a manpower-based armed force because it cannot afford a capital-based one. A capital-based armed force is one whose high levels of capital investment allow it to have modern technological weapons, transportation and communication means, while a manpower-based armed force is one which has to base its effectiveness on a skillful use of manpower.

AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES, 1961-70
(Values in constant prices)

	World	Developed	Developing
Military expenditure	3.2	2.6	8.0
GNP	4.8	4.8	4.7
GNP per capita	2.7	3.7	2.2
Public education	7.9	8.0	7.5
Public health	5.9	6.2	2.0
Armed forces	2.2	0.8	3.3
Population	2.0	1.1	2.4

<u>3.</u>   Develop a new concept of warfare not dependent on military expenditures. It has been shown that those developing countries with a will to wage war were in a situation of inferiority with respect to the more advanced countries. No matter what their efforts might have been, the only way they could have increased their armed forces was by using their only abundant resource: manpower. Under prevailing strategies, a manpower based army would be so inferior in fire power, movement, and communication that it could never achieve the tactical capability to defeat its enemy in a set battle. At this time some strategists realized that they had a third option: to develop a concept of warfare not dependent on tactical weapon systems. They succeeded in masking their doctrine with a wrapping of political and ideological verbiage that Western observers did not penetrate. Like all sound military innovations, it was based on a set of principles and provided an answer to the key question:

> How to obtain a strategic situation so
> advantageous that if it did not produce
> the decision by itself, its continua-
> tion by battle would be sure to achieve
> it?

The answer was obtained by adaptation of the means of war available to them, manpower, to serve strategic requirements. It is only in this sense that one can interpret Mao-Tse-tung's maxim:

> Weapons are an important factor in war but
> not the decisive factor; it is man and
> material that counts.

Most Western analysts misinterpreted Mao, as he probably would have hoped. To Westerners, "Man" has all sorts of humanistic, philosophical, and ideological implications including the axiom of "Man's Free Will." They thus concluded that Mao's dictum meant to say that they would gain men to fight for shared ideals with utmost dedication. There is nothing of the sort. What Mao had in mind was:

Let us make a strategy of war based on optimal
manpower utilization, rather than on material,
which is an important factor, but which we can-
not afford given our natural resources.

(3) Internal war.

(a) The military identification of the problem. Under
this heading an alternate approach to the concept of "insurgency" will
be presented. The object of the inquiry is to obtain a pure military
concept of the phenomenon known as "insurgent war." This conceptualiza-
tion aims at providing the military common denominator for the phenomena
involved, which in any specific case must be supplemented with the
cultural, constitutional, legal, and political circumstances existing in
an operational environment. The analysis must apply equally to "insur-
gent" and "incumbent," and must conform to the principles of military
science; it must provide criteria for military operations. However,
feasible operational criteria always involve nonmilitary considerations;
the constraints set up by nonmilitary factors refer to modes of opera-
tions rather than to operational objectives.

(b) The concept of internal war. Internal war is a war
fought within the territory of a sovereign state, in which most of the
participants are subjects of that state.

1.   As soon as two or more parties engage in overt
or covert hostilities upon the sovereign territory of a state, the
sovereignty of the state is challenged. Five thousand years of recorded
history show that in many cases the sovereign state did not consider the
challenge to be significant, and let the parties in opposition solve
their conflicts by force. Present examples of intertribal warfare in
sovereign states, in which the government as the holder of the sovereign-
ty is unwilling or unable to interfere, are frequent. Should the conflict
challenge the sovereignty, however, the state organs would have to
intervene.

2.   The armed forces are the states' institutional-
ized means of force. They are the element to which the ultimate means of
force are entrusted. Although armed forces tend to identify themselves
with principles such as "nation," "country," "fatherland," they serve the
power holders of the state. In many instances their members are re-
cruited from minority groups within the population over which the state
claims sovereignty. The occasional conflict between the "government"
and the "military" stems from diverging views on the most effective way
to serve the state.

3.   The armed forces, as servants and instruments
of the force in the state, claim the right of supremacy of force in the
same manner as the government, the instrument of power in the state,
claims the right of supremacy of power. An alternative to the use of

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force is the threat of force. If deterrence fails, governments have to employ the armed forces or lose the attributes of sovereignty.

4. Any group within a state can challenge the sovereignty of the government by force as long as it is willing to risk violent confrontation with the armed forces. That confrontation not only challenges the "supremacy of power" of the government but, simultaneously, the "supremacy of force" of the armed forces. It is not only to defend the government, but to defend their own institutional role, that the armed forces react against the challengers.

5. The challengers may invoke many causes as a justification of their action and they may be valid or invalid, just or unjust, moral or immoral, according to the code of values used to evaluate them. However, the very existence of the challenge to the sovereign power of the government and to the supremacy of force to the armed forces is enough to lead to "basic and irreconcilable difference" which may be considered a form of war, whether characterized by employment of military force or by the application of national power short of military force in internal war. An identity of views between government and armed forces cannot be taken for granted for each has distinct although not necessarily opposed objectives. The fact that in well-developed Western industrial nations the objectives of their legitimate governments and those of the armed forces overlap extensively, and that in the United States the armed forces are the instruments of national strategy, national policy, and ultimately of the people, does not warrant the assumptions that less developed countries share the same set of relationships.

6. For purposes of analysis these elements are important: "government," "armed forces" and "population." In an internal war both the "insurgents" and "incumbents" must have some "government," some "armed forces," and a degree of control over some sector of the population.

7. Like all wars, internal war has three phases: precombat, combat and post-combat. The precombat phase of internal war has the overall purpose of preventing a potential enemy to achieve a level of "government," "armed forces," and "population control" which will allow it to enter the combat phase.

8. The overall objective of the combat phase in internal war is the same as for all war: "to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this."[22] Or, in the very similar CRIAF definition, "to achieve the application of force where it is more effective in reducing the force levels of the enemy, and where it is less costly to apply." It will be noted that the latter definition coincides with what CRIAF investigators observe as the predominant behavior of indigenous armed forces in internal war. Either by training or instinctively, all commanders generally recognize this maxim which is,

in effect, a combination of the principles of offensive, mass, economy of force, and maneuver. The question is where and how to implement that maxim.

9. The overall objective of the post-combat phase is the restoration of normal processes and the elimination of any possibility of the resumption of hostilities.

10. The U. S. National Strategy of Realistic Deterrence recognizes that the primary responsibility for the internal defense of allied and friendly nations will be their own. The National Strategy introduces the concept of sub-theater/localized warfare which covers all contingencies involving third nations, wherever the major world powers are not in direct conflict.

11. The CRIAF concept of internal war devises a conceptual model for the purpose of isolating pure military aspect of sub-theater/localized warfare. But as indicated above, no conflict is purely military, and any real conflict includes situations recognized as constraints of a cultural, constitutional/legal and political/policy nature. For the purpose of producing valid doctrinal guidance for elements of the U. S. Army in their relations with IAFs, the pure-military concept of internal conflict can only serve as a common denominator to which specific characteristics must be added. The major criticism raised by this project of the existing current doctrine on "stability operations" was the impossibility to distinguish in it the military aspects from the nonmilitary ones.

FOOTNOTES

1. In an internal conflict the "sum-total of national power" furnishes the means of war to both insurgent and incumbent. The characteristic of insurgent war and insurgency is that both parties in conflict have the same "mobilization base." The "logistic" effort of each party to monopolize national resources and transform them into their means of war is done in mutual competition.

2. William J. Goode, "Presidential Address: The Place of Force in Human Society," American Sociological Review. 37, 5, 1972.

3. See Robert McNamara's address to the American Society of Newspapers Editors in Montreal on May 18, 1966, Department of Defense Release No. 422-66; William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power, New York: Random House, 1966, pp. 69-81; Roger Hillsman, To Move a Nation, Garden City; Doubleday, 1967, pp. 424-431; David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire, New York: Random House 1964, Chapter 1; as quoted by Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority, Chicago, Markham 1970, p. 16.

4. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. by O. J. Matthijs, Jolles, New York: Random House, 1943, p. 62.

5. B. H. Liddell Hart, op. cit., p. 334.

6. K. von Clausewitz, op. cit.

7. Liddell Hart, op. cit., p. 333.

8. Liddell Hart, op. cit., p. 334.

9. Liddell Hart, op. cit., p. 339.

10. Ibid., p. 377.

11. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith, Trans, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, New York: Praeger, 1961.

12. Stuart R. Schram, Trans. Mao Tse-tung Basic Tactics, New York: Praeger, 1966, p. 67.

13. Ibid., pp. 85-86.

14. Liddell Hart, op. cit., Chapter XXIII.

15. George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961, pp. 23-27.

16. Charles Wolf, Jr., and Nathan Leites, Rebellion and Authority, Chicago: Markham 1970, pp. 32-34, and passim.

17. As indicated above, guerrilla warfare has political origins, but so have all wars; the quote of Clausewitz is pertinent: "The war of a society always starts from the political conditions, and is called for a political motive. It is therefore a political act." (k. von Clausewitz, <u>On War</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, Vol. 1, Paragraph 24.)

18. The following definitions are quoted from AR 310-25.

19. This definition ought to be read in the context of the definition of "subversive activity": "Anyone lending aid, comfort and moral support to individuals, groups, or organizations which advocate the overthrow of incumbent governments by force and violence is subversive and is engaged in subversive activity. All willfull acts which are intended to be detrimental to the best interests of the government and which do not fall into the categories of treason, sedition, sabotage or espionage will be placed in the category of subversive activity."

20. V. I. Lenin, "Partisan Warfare" in <u>Modern Guerrilla Warfare</u>, F. M. Osanks, ed., New York: The Free Press, 1962, p. 68.

21. Mao-Tse-tung, <u>Selected Works</u>, Vol. II New York: International Publishers, 1954, 13-18.

22. <u>Op. cit.</u>, p. 339.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060

CDCCD-B1   22 June 1971

SUBJECT: Combat Developments Study Directive: Civil-Military Roles
of Indigenous Armed Forces (CRIAF)

Commanding Officer
HHC, 354th Civil Affairs Area (B)
Prince George County Memorial USAR Center
6601 Baltimore Avenue
Riverdale, Maryland 20840

1. References: See Inclosure 1.

2. Purpose. The purpose of this study is to examine the civil-
military roles of indigenous armed forces in developing nations. This
study will contribute to the development of Army doctrine for advice
and assistance and for stability operations and will make possible a
significant increase in the Army's ability to implement the nation-
building policy recently promulgated by Department of the Army.

3. Study Sponsor. HQ USACDC, Doctrine Directorate, point of contact:
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5. Terms of Reference.

    a. Problem. Army policy for nation-building directs priority
attention toward the indigenous military as the primary stabilizing and

SUBJECT: Combat Developments Study Directive: Civil-Military Roles
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modernizing influence. A coherent concept regarding civil-military
roles appropriate to indigenous armed forces in underdeveloped countries
has not been developed. The lack of such a concept impedes the
development of valid, comprehensive Army doctrine for stability operations
and hinders the commanders of MAAG's, MILGROUPS's, and Military Assistance
Commands from developing optimal policies as to desired civil-military
roles for host country armed forces. The lack of this concept also
impedes the compiling of information and experiences in a systematic
fashion to improve future operations. A concept is required which relates
possible civil-military roles of the indigenous forces to promotion of
stability, avoidance of conflict, and increase of legitimacy of the host
country government. Doctrine is required to enable advisors and MAAG
chiefs to implement the concept in accordance with country team policy.

b. Objectives.

(1) Analyze the effect on stability, conflict avoidance, and host
country government legitimacy of the possible civil-military roles
which may be required of, or adopted by, the armed forces, including
paramilitary forces, of developing nations to include at least the
following:

(a) Provision of social mobility through recruitment from lower
classes and advancement in the officer and enlisted ranks.

(b) Training of military personnel in technical and administrative
skills and literacy.

(c) Participation of the armed forces, or factions of these forces,
in the political life of the country as contenders for power.

(d) Indoctrination of military personnel, as in the Chinese
Nationalist and Vietnamese political warfare programs.

(e) Strengthening of civilian governments by:

1 Provision of local security, as backup force or as primary agent.

2 Provision of, or support of, civilian government services in
fields such as education, public health, agriculture, and industry.

3 Acting as a guarantor of a specific constitutional arrangement.

(f) Assumption of sovereign state power.

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(g) Acting as an agent for social and cultural change, through the medium of individual communicators and change agents,

(h) Acting as the agent of a faction or tribe in competition for state power.

(2) Develop a general concept of the civil-military roles appropriate to indigenous forces under various economic, social, and security circumstances.

(3) Test the concept by application to specific developing nations, with priority accorded to those designated "high vulnerability - high Communist interest" by reference B 61.

(4) Derive from the concept and its specific applications recommended changes in Army doctrine for stability operations, with emphasis on the fields of civil-military operations and advice and assistance.

c. Limits.

(1) This study will not consider NATO allies, Australia, New Zealand, or Japan among the cases studied.

(2) The study will not make recommendations which bear upon U. S. foreign policy toward specific countries. Study recommendations will be limited to doctrine.

d. Scope. The study will consider the armed forces, including paramilitary forces, in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, China, South Asia, and Southeast Asia and will address all possible civil-military roles, including those listed in para 5b(1) above and those identified through literature search. The study will emphasize the development of leadership in officers and NCO's of indigenous armed forces and the contribution such leadership makes in the implementation of the civil-military roles undertaken by these forces.

e. Time Frame. 1976-1982.

f. Assumptions.

(1) Army policy for nation building, promulgated through reference B 12, will remain unchanged during the time frame under study.

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(2) Low intensity conflicts will occur during the time frame of the
study. However, national policy will be one of non-involvement of US
combat forces unless vital US interests are threatened.

(3) The US Army, operating within the framework of the US country
team, will continue to have a major responsibility in low intensity
conflict, Type II.

(4) The projection of geographical areas of Communist interest,
overall Communist objectives, and Communist operational behavior made
by reference B 61 is valid.

g. Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA).

(1) See Inclosure 2.

(2) Additional EEA will be developed by the proponent if determined
essential to the study effort and submitted with the study plan for
approval.

h. Environment. The study will address the low intensity conflict
environment. Reference B 26b will be used as a general typology of low
intensity conflict.

i. Constraints. Not applicable.

j. Methodology. Develop a study methodology which will permit
valid and incisive comparison between cases, the drawing of inferences
and similarities from cases, and the testing of concepts developed by
comparison with real situations. The methodology selected should employ
quantitative techniques to the extent possible.

k. Alternatives. Not applicable.

l. Measures of Effectiveness. Measures of effectiveness for
indigenous military civil affairs efforts will be developed, where
appropriate, during the course of the study.

m. Related Studies.

(1) Conceptual Design of the Army in the Field, 1976-1982 (CONAF)
Action Control Number (ACN) 16870.

(2) The Army's Role in Security Assistance Programs in the 70's
(ARSAP 70), ACN 17031.

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(3) Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict
(ARMLIC), ACN 13525.

(4) Stability Operations Systems (SOS), ACN 16930.

(5) Military Assistance Study (MASS), ACN 16965.

(6) Army Advisory Assistance in Stability Operations (ADVASO),
ACN 15916.

(7) Civil-Military Operations (CIMO), ACN 17635.

(8) Human Sciences Research Study, "The Operational and Training
Requirements for the Military Assistance Officer", conducted under
ODCSOPS, DA, sponsorship.

(9) Center for Research in Social Systems Study, "Strategic and
Tactical Factors Underlying Internal Defense and Internal Development
Operations, Subtask 3: Population Protection and Resources Management",
conducted under sponsorship of the USACDC Institute of Strategic &
Stability Operations.

6. Support and Resource Requirement.

a. Civil Affairs Reserve Units.

(1) Proponent. The 354th Civil Affairs Area (B) is designated
proponent for the study. Estimated total manpower requirement: 48 full
time man-months (equivalent to approximately 8,000 man-hours). The
study team should include specialists in economics, sociology, public
administration, psychology, and education. Participation in the study
team by officers with advisory experience overseas is desirable.

(2) Other units.

(a) The proponent will furnish HQ, CONARC with the identity of,
and estimated man-hours requirements for, the units whose participation
in the study is desired in sufficient time for CONARC, CONUSA, and
unit approval to be obtained prior to submission of the draft study plan.

(b) Draft tasking directives for other civil affairs units will be
forwarded to HQ USACDC with the draft study plan.

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b. US Army Combat Developments Command.

(1) Requests for references otherwise unobtainable by the unit,
liaison visits, and briefings on related studies should be referred to
the USACDC point of contact.

(2) Proponent will determine input requirements from USACDC
elements and will include draft tasking letters, supported by resource
data, with the study plan.

c. Non-USACDC Active Army Elements. Proponent will determine
input requirements from non-USACDC elements and will include draft
tasking letters with the study plan.

7. Administration.

a. Study Title. Civil-Military Roles of Indigenous Armed Forces
(CRIAF).

b. Study Schedule. The proponent will develop and forward to
this headquarters a proposed time phased study plan not later than
30 September 1971. The completed coordination draft will be submitted
to this headquarters not later than 31 October 1972.

c. Control Procedures. Study sponsor will establish a Study
Advisory Group (SAG). Meetings of the SAG will be held as required,
but at least quarterly. Proponent will provide recommended progress
points suitable for SAG meetings with the draft study plan.

d. Study Format. A proposed format will be submitted with the
draft study plan. USACDC Pamphlet 71-16 will be utilized as a guide
for format preparation.

e. Action Documents.

(1) A formal study presenting in detail the concept developed and
relating it to suggested doctrinal changes.

(2) Draft change to FM 31-23, Stability Operations, U. S. Army
Doctrine.

(3) Draft change to FM 33-1, Psychological Operations, U. S. Army
Doctrine.

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(4) Draft change to FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.

(5) Draft change to (C) FM 100-20, Field Service Regulations,
Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) (U).

f. Coordination and Communication. To be accomplished in accordance
with HQ USACDC Regulation 71-1. The study sponsor will be responsible
for coordination with other USACDC elements and staffing the completed
study within USACDC.

g. Distribution. Distribution will be in accordance with HQ USACDC
Regulation 71-3. A distribution list for organizations not under USACDC
command will be recommended by the proponent.

h. Security Classification Guidance. Materiels classified up to
TOP SECRET may be examined for the study. The study will not be classified
higher then SECRET.

8. Combat Developments Objectives Guide. Chapter 1, paragraphs 114g
and 115d.

9. This study is identified as USACDC Action Control Number 18484 and
supports the following:

a. Army Combat Developments Program.

b. Studies.

(1) Stability Operations System (SOS) ACN 17630.

(2) Army Advice and Assistance in Stability Operations (ADVASO),
ACN 15916.

(3) Civil-Military Operations (CIMO), ACN 17635.

c. Army Tasks.

(3) Low Intensity Conflict I.

(4) Low Intensity Conflict II.

(7) Complementing of Allied Land Power.

d. Phase. Doctrine.

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of Indigenous Armed Forces (CRIAF)

    e. Functions.

    (1) Intelligence.

    (4) Command, Control, Communications.

    (5) Service Support.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
as

                       C. A. BARTOSAVAGE
                       Major, AGC
                       Asst AG

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  2 CO, 365th CA Area (B)

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2. Letter, CDCCD-Bl, this command, 3 March 1971, subject: Combat Developments Study Directive: Civil Military Roles of Indigenous Armed Forces, w/1st Ind, ATOPS-SO, HQ USCONARC, 16 March 1971, w/2nd Ind, AHARF-TP, HQ First US Army, 30 March 1971, w/3rd Ind, AHRO-T, 352d Civil Affairs Area (A), 7 April 1971, w/4th Ind, HQ, 354th Civil Affairs Area (B), 12 May 1971.

3. Letter, ATOPS-SO, USCONARC, 26 May 1971, subject: Combat Developments Study Directive: Civil Military Roles of Indigenous Armed Forces.

B. SUBSTANTIVE:

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   Joint Strategic Operations Plan.

   Army Strategic Operations Plan.

   Basic Army Strategic Estimate.

2. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance Manual (U), 30 June 1967 (SECRET), with changes.

3. JCS Military Counterinsurgency Conference Report, 1966 (U) (SECRET).

4. HQ, U. S. Forces Dominican Republic, Stability Operation Report (U) Part IV, 7 May 1965 (SECRET).

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INCL 1

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b. Chief of Staff Memorandum 68-185, 28 May 1968, subject: Refining the Army's Role in Stability Operations (U) (CONFIDENTIAL).

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21. Joint Thai - U. S. Military Research and Development Center Counterinsurgency Organization, and Programs in Northeast Thailand (U), Seven Volumes, December 1969 (CONFIDENTIAL).

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24. USACDC Study Planning and Programming Forces for Stability Operations (U), August 1965, and associated documents (SECRET).

25. USACDCILC Conflict Situations and Army Tasks, 1985-1995 (U) (CSAT 90's) March 1970 (SECRET).

26. U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies (IAS)-Institute of Land Combat (ILC) Materiels on the Army Roles and Missions on Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC) Study, (FOUO) to include:

a. Seven preconflict case studies.

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28. SAF - Asia Staff Study, Strategic Army Brigade, December 1965.

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31. Letter, AVHGC-DST, U. S. Army, Vietnam, 12 May 1970, subject: Senior Officer Debriefing Report, LTG Julian J. Ewell, (CONFIDENTIAL).

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    b. <u>The United States Soldier in a Non-Violent Role</u> (U): <u>An Historical Overview</u>, CORG-M-310, June 1967.

    c. <u>Communism in Review</u>, CORG-M-311, (U), June 1967.

    d. <u>Political Education in the Army of the Soviet Union</u> (U) CORG-M-312, June 1967 (FOUO).

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ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS

1. What conditions affect the civil-military roles that are likely to be adopted by the armed forces of a particular country?

2. What civi-military roles are likely to be adopted by the armed forces of a country to which a specific set of conditions applies?

3. What roles are precluded by specific sets of circumstances?

4. Which civil-military roles, among those which may be adopted in a particular set of circumstances, are most likely to promote stability?

INCL 2

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 354th CIVIL AFFAIRS AREA (B)
Prince George's County Memorial USAR Center
6601 Baltimore Avenue, Riverdale, Maryland 20840

CRIAF-PO   30 October 1971

SUBJECT: Combat Developments Study Plan: Civil Military Roles of Indigenous
          Armed Forces (CRIAF) ACN 18484

Commanding General
United States Army Combat Developments Command
ATTN: CDCCD-B1
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060

1. References: a. USACDC Study Directive, CRIAF, Inclosure #1.

    b. Others, Inclosure #2.

2. Purpose: To update and synthesize current U.S. Army knowledge on
civil military roles of indigenous armed forces in developing nations under
different internal situations and in the presense of internal/external
emergencies and threats.

    a. The study will give systematic information on situations and pro-
cesses which will increase U.S. Army doctrine, and it's ability to develop
and implement ID/ID, Stability Operations, Nation Building and related con-
cepts, strategies and operational principles.

3. Terms of Reference: a. Problem:

    (1) U.S. Army doctrine on Stability Operations, Nation Building and
Low Intensity Warfare directs priority attention to the capabilities of indi-
genous armies, armed forces and paramilitary forces of developing nations.
Current U.S. Army studies, such as "The U.S. Army Roles in Security Assistanc
Programs in the 1970's" (ARSAP 70); "Army Advisory Assistance in Stability
Operations" (ADVASO), and "Civil Military Operations" (CIMO), which CRIAF mus
support, analyze different options which may be undertaken by the U.S. Army
in line with U.S. national policy and military strategy requirements.

    (2) While there is information on what the U.S. Army could or should
do, and on what indigenous armed forces ought to do in the area of civil
military relations under different internal or external conditions, there is
systematic interpretation as to what indigenous armed forces can be realistic
expected to do, and can perform, under the system of constraints upon which t
operate.

(3) The possible and desirable range of civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces and paramilitary forces depends upon a constellation of governmental, political, economic and social factors. The extreme complexity of those factors has created some ambiguity in U.S. Army doctrine. It has been found that those factors are difficult to control with the means available to commanders in the field. This difficulty has been recognized by the ODCSOPS DA study (S) "The United States Army's Roles in Support of Nation Building" (U), and more recently by the coordination draft of the USACDC study (S) (ARSAP 70), (U).

(4) Military science has long recognized the effect of political, economic and social factors in armed forces, in their defense posture and in their combat effectiveness. Recently, since the emergence of new strategic and tactical concepts of warfare, it has been also recognized that those political, economic and social factors can determine situations upon which military forces are directed to react. The precise military significance of those factors remains unclear, despite the amount of intelligence and information available. This creates to indigenous armed forces, and to their external allies and advisors, a question of doubt as to when an emergency is primarily military (in the sense that it must be primarily solved by military means) and when it is not primarily military (in the sense that it can be solved by non-military means, with or without the support of indigenous military forces. The implications of this problem are critical, for according to military science, a military situation requires a unified military command, a strategic conception and a general operations plan. Thus the problem of civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces becomes the critical axis from which to evaluate the impact of political, economic and social factors in overall defense problems. The relevance and difficulty of the question is exemplified by the fact that the U.S. Army has directed and supported studies on the title subject of "Civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces" since 1964, and generated an impressive amount of information and analysis on the matter.

b. Impact of the Problem.

(1) The impact of the problem on the operational capabilities of U.S. Army forces acting in support of indigenous armed forces is self evident. If it is not assertained what the indigenous armed forces are capable of doing under different political, economic, social and threat factors, it is not feasible to estimate correctly the level and scope of assistance which will allow them to achieve these objectives which are set forth by U.S. national policy.   •

(2) Similarly, if the role of political, economic and social factors in determining situations of military relevance is not explained, it is almost impossible to conceive operations directed to controlling the unwanted effects of those factors.

c. Objectives.

(1) Analyze the effect of possible and desirable civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces, including paramilitary forces, in circumstances of standard normality, political turbulence, insurgency and internal war, and the impact of those roles in internal defense, internal development, stability operations, nation building, deterrence of insurgency and favorable resolution of internal war.

(a) Roles (internal) of indigenous armed forces related to military personnel development and training for threat or fact of internal war:

1 Training in literacy; administrative and technical skills relevant to IDID, Stability Operations and Nation Building.

2 Indoctrination of military personnel according to national values and traditions, and evaluation of such training in terms of the models of the Chinese Nationalist and Viet Nam political warfare programs.

3 Recruitment and promotion policies designed to foster social mobility in officer and enlisted ranks.

4 Analysis of organizational and force structure changes in indigenous armed forces - from a conceptual level - in terms of the requirements of IDID, Stability Operations and Nation Building, with special attention on functional units such as special forces, civil affairs units, politico-military intelligence units, police and security forces, PsyOPs teams, having in mind the inherent limitations of developing nations to support of maintain expensive and highly technical formations.

(b) Civil-Military Roles of Indigenous Armed Forces under various conditions.

1 Roles which have been historically undertaken by indigenous armed forces under various conditions of governmental instability, high levels of political strife and violence, rebellions both violent and non-violent, subversive insurgency, and internal war situations.

2 Benefits and disadvantages of those roles. Political, economic, social and cultural reasons why such roles, and not others, were undertaken.

3 Description of historical roles undertaken by indigenous armed forces at the various levels of "liaison", "advice", "intelligence and planning back-up", "indirect support", "direct support", "augmentation" and ultimately "substitution" which entail some measure of control over critical nuclei of the society, including governmental affairs, political, economic and social affairs, and the problem of operational command of stability operations at regional and territorial levels. This part also covers civil-military roles related to paramilitary and security forces, and civil-military roles related to the elaboration and implementation of "defense mobilization plans".

<u>4</u> Identification of "limits" past which civil-military roles may jeopardize IDID standards, governmental legitimacy, power or efficacy, or the operational effectiveness of the indigenous armed forces (under the various conditions identified above).

<u>5</u> Identification of "jurisdictional conflicts" and "power conflicts" which may result when the indigenous armed forces compete for civil roles with sectors of the government or of other - political, economic and social - institutions.

<u>6</u> Identification of "modal" or "Standard" consequences of those conflicts.

<u>7</u> Identification and systematization of most prevalent structural weaknesses in developing societies, and of the extent to which different civil-military roles of the armed forces are able or not able to correct them, under various conditions, as identified above.

<u>8</u> Revision and verification of current motivational assumptions regarding attitudes of the population with respect to Nation Building, Military Civic Action and stability operations, with special emphasis on the issue of "development-security mix", prior to the arrival of external assistance teams.

<u>9</u> Revision and verification of the validity of the concept "populace" as currently used to describe population aggregates, and possible consequences to doctrine of using non-aggregative concepts which would reflect stratificational, attitudinal, political, ideological and organizational differences which always obtain in the civilian population. Implications of the revision to IDID doctrine.

(2) Develop a general conceptualization of civil military roles appropriate to indigenous forces under various political, economic, social and security conditions.

(a) Identify and conceptualize which types of developing nations are more vulnerable to security threats because of the inherent internal weaknesses of their institutional settings, independently of externally oriented or supported intervention.

(b) In terms of the above, conceptualize which types of internal defense and development operations are more or less likely to succeed in different "types" of countries, independently of external aid and assistance.

(c) Conceptualize which kind of civil-military roles are more or less likely to succeed in different "types" of countries, independently of external or U.S. aid or assistance.

(d) Conceptualize which kind of indigenous force structure and composition are more or less likely to be effective in different "types" of countries under different "levels" of threat, independently of U.S. military assistance.

(3) Test the concepts by application to specific developing nations with priority accorded to those designated as high vulnerability countries by U.S. Army studies.

(4) Derive from the concepts and their specific applications recommended changes in U.S. Army doctrine for Stability Operations, with emphasis on civil-military operations, advice and assistance.

(a) Provide criteria to transform, adapt and systematize existing non-military concepts relating to the role of political, economic, social and psychological factors in internal defense into military concepts, doctrine, operational and strategic principles and organizational and tactical rules, which satisfy the requirements of clarity, simplicity, specificity and measureability as demanded by military planning.

(b) Provide criteria to evaluate and measure when the emergency situation affecting the developing country is basically military, in the sense that it can only be solved by military means; and when an emergency situation is not basically military, in the sense that it can be solved by non-military means, with the support of whatever military resources indigenous armed forces made available to civilian agencies.

(c) Provide criteria to evaluate, measure and counteract the different types of oppositions and conflicts which may exist in a developing country between national governments, political forces and indigenous military forces.

(d) Provide criteria to evaluate the qualities and effectiveness of "mix" between the different types of U.S. military assistance programs (as defined in current U.S. Army doctrine, strategy and in concurrent studies such as ARSAP 70 and ADVASO) and the capabilities of indigenous armed forces, from the point of view of their potential to undertake advantageous civil-military roles.

(e) Verify the empirical validity of Chapter 1 "Characteristics of Developing Countries", and Chapter 2 "Subversive Insurgency" of FM 31-23 Stability Operation, in terms of the findings of this study, and in concurrence with parallel investigations being now conducted within USACDC (ADVASO).

(f) Verify the relationship between Civil Affairs Operations as presented in FM 41-10, and Civil-Military Operations, as identified and conceptualized in this study, and in parallel ones.

(g) Include in the findings tentative answers covering the subjects included in the Study Directive, and not specifically mentioned here.

(h) Provide clear and unambiguous answer to the Essential Elements of Analysis.

(5) Provide doctrinal guidance on the roles of indigenous paramilitary forces, as an intermediate organization standing between indigenous civilian agencies and indigenous military services.

(6) Examine the implications of indigenous National Internal Defense Coordination Centers (FM 31-23) to the range of possible and desirable civil military roles of indigenous armed forces.

(7) Examine the relation of civil military roles of indigenous armed forces to the funtional implications of the U.S. Army concepts: Advisory Operations, Civil Affairs, PSYOPS, Intelligence, Populace and Resources Control, and Tactical Operations.

(8) Provide simplified doctrinal guidance to operation planners in terms of different "standard models" covering internal characteristics of countries, governments and indigenous armed forces.

d. Limits.

(1) The study will not consider NATO Allies, Australia, New Zealand or Japan, except in past historical contexts unrelated to present situations.

(2) The study will not make recommendations which bear upon U.S. foreign policy toward specific countries. Study recommendations will be limited to doctrine.

e. Scope.

(1) The study will not gather new information. It will use parts of the large amount of information available, some of which is yet unanalyzed, to arrive at generalizations and syntheses on the subjects of the study.

(2) The study will consider as sources of information:

(a) Data available in the Department of the Army and in the Department of Defense, with special emphasis on the information about civil military roles of IAF's generally compiled by U.S. Military Attaches.

(b) Data available in other U.S. Government agencies.

(c) Data available and readily obtainable originating from civilian sources.

(3) The study will receive and exchange inputs and outputs from other facilities with USACDC and within DA now currently engaged in related studies.

(4) The study will include the following countries:

(a) Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

(b) Africa: Algeria, Congo R. of Ethiopia, Libia, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunis, United Arab Republic, Angola.

(c) Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria.

(d) Asia: Republic of Viet Nam, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Republic of Korea, North Korea, Phillipines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, India, Pakistan (West and East), Afghanistan.

(5) Although countries are listed in terms of world regions, other criteria will be used to group them. Basic to this study is the concept of cultural areas (see Methodology).

(6) Information relevant to force structure and disposition of indigenous armed forces, and their involvement in civil-military roles, requires access to information which is limited to specific facilities within DA. CRIAF will establish liaison with those facilities through the intermediary of USACDC.

(7) CRIAF will not attempt to develop specific guidelines on a country by country basis. It is recognized that a particular country-study requires more space and detail than any summarizing study could devote to it.

(8) Operations planning for any concrete country involve the participation of several U.S. Government agencies, and it is done at many jurisdictional levels. Moreover, it is outside the limits of this study to formulate policy recommendations about specific countries. Thus, the country studies undertaken by CRIAF do not attempt to serve as a U.S. Army planning document.

(9) It is also recognized that the concrete situation which obtains in any given country at any given time does not warrant predictions about which will be the situations following. The most that can be attempted is a subjective estimate. CRIAF will use country studies as the empirical basis to validate hypotheses concerning modal processes. The knowledge of modal processes will give cues as to the factors involved, and their relative effect through time. It will also offer new perspectives on how to influence those processes. CRIAF's country studies, therefore, are the means upon which concepts and doctrine can be formulated.

f. Time Frame: 1976-1982.

g. Assumptions External to the Study.

(1) Army policy for nation building will remain effective during time-frame.

(2) Low intensity conflicts will occur during the time frame of the study. However, national policy will be one of non-involvement of U.S. combat forces unless vital U.S. interests are threatened.

(3) The U.S. Army, operating within the framework of the U.S. country team, or under related arrangements as directed by the President, will continue to hold a major responsibility in low-intensity conflict, Type II, and in stability operations.

(4) The projection of geographical areas of Communist interest, over-all Communist objectives, and Communist operational behavior, made by refer-ence 61 of Inclosure 1 is accepted, subject to new information as may be available through DA or DOD intelligence estimates.

h. Assumptions Internal to the Study.

(1) The Principle of War, as stated in Section I of Field Service Regulations Operations (FM 100-5) are valid as the fundamental truths govern-ing the prosecution of war. New warfare strategy forms, such as the so-called "People's Liberation Wars" and unconventional warfare operations, ultimately results from the application of the Principles of War, and can be explained and interpreted in terms of those principles.

(2) Tactical operations, of the kind any army may undertake, can only be evaluated in terms of a general strategic plan, from which operations and tactics develop, and which determines the overall principle of the objective.

(3) The concepts, principles, laws and postulations of any scientific field can be incorporated into military science and transformed into military concepts, principles, operational rules and field techniques. However, the transformation must meet the test of relevance to concrete military planning.

i. Essential Elements of Analysis. In Inclosure 2.

j. Constraints. Not Applicable.

k. Methodology. In Inclosure 2.

l. Alternatives. Not Applicable.

m. Measures of Effectiveness. Measures of effectiveness for indigenous military civil roles and functions will be developed where appropriate.

n. Related studies.

(1) Conceptual Design of the Army in the Field, 1976-1982 (CONAF) Action Control Number 16870.

(2) The Army's Role in Security Assistance Programs in the 1970's (ARSAP 70), ACN 17031.

(3) Army Roles, Missions and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC) ACN 13525.

(4) Stability Operations Systems (SOS) ACN 16965.

(5) Army Advisory Assistance in Stability Operations (ADVASO) AGN 15916.

(6) Civil Military Operations (CIMO) ACN 17635.

(7) Human Science Research Study "Strategies and Training Requirements for the Military Assistance Officer", conducted under ODCSOPS DA sponsorship.

(8) American Institutes for Research Study, "Strategic and Tactical Factors Underlying Internal Defense and Internal Development", Operations, Subtask 3: Population Protection and Resources Management, conducted under sponsorship of the USACDC.

4. Support and Resource Requirements.

a. Support Requirements.

(1) Participating CA USAR units: Headquarters 356th CA Area (B), Bronx, New York; Headquarters 360th CA Area (B), Columbia, South Carolina; Headquarters 364th CA Area (B), Portland, Oregon; Headquarters 365th CA Area (B), Seattle, Washington.

(2) An auxiliary full time staff, located at the headquarters of the proponent unit, composed of MAJ Steve Olinyk, CA, USAR, a C & GS qualified officer, with a PhD in Political Science awarded by Georgetown University, and a member of the proponent unit, on extended active duty for the duration and under the conditions determined by DA, or a similarly qualified reserve or active duty officer. The duties of this auxiliary staff is to secure continuity of effort and liaison while reserve components are inactive, to prepare, reproduce and distribute documentation, to generate instructions on those tasks which must be concurrently performed during drills, and to take care of those research and analysis duties which require continuous work, or work during normal weekly working hours.

(3) Consultants. Three: Dr. Jiri Nehnevajsa, Professor of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh, Pa., formerly a consultant for Rand Corporation, Systems Development Corporation, DOD Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization, and other defense related organizations; Dr. Charles Wolf, Jr., a PhD in Economics, in the staff of Rand Corporation, a consultant for USACDC; and a third consultant, not yet identified, with similar scientific background.

b. Resource Requirements.

(1) Personnel.

(a) The personnel force of the proponent unit distributed as:

<u>1</u> The Unit Advisory Board, composed of five officers, with overall responsibility on operations and product control. It includes the DCO, the S-3 Officer and three senior field grade officers.

<u>2</u> The Project Officer, who is research director and principal investigator of the project.

<u>3</u> The Central Project Staff, to which it is confided the general staff planning and guidance function of the project, and which is composed of six officers, including the Project Administrative Officer and the Project Secretary, a company grade officer.

<u>4</u> The Proponent Unit Staff, composed of thirty officers, of which eighty percent are field grade officers C & GS qualified, and with higher civilian degrees. This staff is organized into seven functional teams for the development of specific missions integral to the study.

<u>5</u> The contributing units staffs, which are divided into four Unit Staffs. In total, these staffs are composed of thirty officers, of which seventy percent are C & GS qualified.

<u>6</u> The Auxiliary Staff, composed of no more than two specialists, augmented by members of the Central Project Staff or other staffs on temporary ACDUTRA assignments, as required by project and authorized by Project Officer, Proponent Unit CO, and higher U.S. Army units in the chain of command.

(b) Distribution of the personnel force in terms of man-months.

<u>1</u> The distribution is graphically presented in Inclosure 2.

<u>2</u> The total requirement for man-months amounts to 60.5.

<u>3</u> The study directive calculated the full time involvement of four officers for a total of 48 man-months. The study plan calculated the involvement of seventy-two officers, and an increment of 12.5 man-months. The increment is due to the fact that staff duties increase as the work force increases.

(c) 265 man-day-spaces to be requested from First Army and CONARC from allocations available, to be used by project personnel during FY 72. 260 man-day-spaces will be similarly requested for use in FY 73. A request for active duty of one reserve officer during periods not exceeding 90 days to be transmitted to DCOSOPS DA. (See Inclosure 2).

(d) Housing, space and materiel requirements.

<u>1</u> Project CRIAF will be fully housed at the HHQ of the proponent unit. Materiel requirements are listed in Inclosure 2.

in Inclosure 2. <u>2</u> Budget covering materiel and external costs included

(e) Name, rank and qualifications of study team members.

<u>1</u> Identification of sixty-eight team study members will be given in special biographical appendix, to be submitted.

<u>2</u> Project Officer: Albert S. Frances, LTC, CA, USAR, since 1954 associated with U.S. defense related research. PhD is Sociology, LLD in Jurisprudence, currently Professor of Sociology at Virginia Commonwealth University, formerly lecturer Inter-American Defense College with "Certificate of Outstanding Contribution" extended by CG of College, formerly with U.S. Department of State and Organization of American States, tour of duty at OSD.

(f) Data requirements and security classification.

<u>1</u> As stated under "References", Study Directive, Inclosure 1

<u>2</u> Current information on civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces, as available in DA, and obtainable through USACDC.

<u>3</u> Information originating from non-USG sources, as specified in Methodology and cost-estimated in Budget (inclosure 2).

<u>4</u> Materials up to TOP SECRET may be examined.

5. Administration.

a. Study Schedule (Further information in Inclosure 2).

16 December 71	- Submission of Study Plan to CG USACDC.
16 January 72	- Briefing to contributing CA units (tentative).
16 February 72	- Completion of training by contributing CA units.
16 March 72	- Interim status report to RAC USACDC.
1 June 72	- Interim status report to RAC USACDC.
16 July 72	- Completion of sub-tasks by participating CA units.
16 August 72	- Completion of first phase study by proponent unit.
16 September 72	- Interim status report to RAC USACDC.
17 September 72	- Assembly of final draft, first phase.
16 October 72	- Completion of second phase study by proponent unit.
16 November 72	- Assembly of final draft, second phase, by proponent.
12 December 72	- Coordination draft to RAC USACDC. Begins period for comments and coordination.
16 March 73	- Deadline for comments and reviews of coordination draf
16 May 73	- Assembly of final draft.
16 June 73	- Final report to USACDC.

b. Coordinating Headquarters.

(1) Headquarters, USCONARC, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces. Point of contact: LTC Frank Brunosky, Fort Monroe, Virginia 23351, Autovon: 680-3955/3957.

(2) Headquarters, First United States Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces. Point of contact: MAJ Elizabeth T. Kennedy, Fort Meade, Maryland 20755, Autovon: 923-3821/7509.

(3) Headquarters, 352nd CA Area (A), G-2 Section. Point of contact: COL Roger E. Wheeler, (Area Code 703) 962-0131.

c. Coordination Points of Contact.

(1) ODCSPS DA, point of contact: LTC Thomas Miller.

(2) Others to be specified.

d. Communication between C7 and PO proponent unit and points of contact for liaison purposes is authorized.

e. Study Security Classification. The study will not be classified higher than SECRET.

f. Study Outline. Inclosure 2.

g. Action documents.

(1) A formal study presenting in detail the concepts developed and relating it to doctrinal changes.

(2) Draft change to FM 31-23, Stability Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine.

(3) Draft change to FM 33-10, Psychological Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine.

(4) Draft change to FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.

(5) Draft change to FM 100-20, Field Service Regulations, Internal Defense and Development (IDAD).

h. Coordination. As per Study Directive 7f., Inclosure 1.

i. Distribution. Distribution will be in accordance with HQ USACDC Regulation 71-3. A distribution list for organizations not under USACDC command will be recommended by the proponent.

j. Study Project Point of Contact: CPT Edwin W. Martin, CA, USAR, telephone (Area Code 301) 277-8155/56/57.

6. Support Function. This study supports the following:

    a. Army Combat Development Program.

    b. Studies.

        (1) Stability Operations System (SOS) ACN 17630.

        (2) Army Advice and Assistance in Stability Operations (ADVASO) ACN 15916.

        (3) Civil Military Operations (CIMO) ACN 17635.

    c. Army Tasks.

        (1) Low Intensity Conflict I.

        (2) Low Intensity Conflict II.

        (3) Complementing of Allied Land Power.

    d. Phase: Doctrine.

    e. Functions:

        (1) Intelligence.

        (2) Command, Control, Communications.

        (3) Service Support.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

                                                Odum W Martin, CPT, CA, USAR
                                              H.W. HODGKINS
                                              LTC., CA, USAR
                                              Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

"A"
PLUS
CG, USA CDC
CG, 352d CA
CG, First U.S. Army
CG, USCONARC
CO, 355th CA
CO, 360th CA
CO, 364th CA
CO, 365th CA

REFERANCE ONE

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS

1. What conditions affect the civil-military roles that are likely to be adopted by the armed forces of a particular country?

2. What civi-military roles are likely to be adopted by the armed forces of a country to which a specific set of conditions applies?

3. What roles are precluded by specific sets of circumstances?

4. Which civil-military roles, among those which may be adopted in a particular set of circumstances, are most likely to promote stability?

INCL 2

CRIAF-PO

REFERENCE TWO

METHODOLOGY

1. Methodological Orientation.

   a. Basic Approach.

   (1) The basic methodological approach of this study consists of formulating explanatory and predictive hypotheses, which different research teams will confront with available information. If these hypotheses are regarded as tenable, in the sense that they allow comprehensive, internally consistent, and parsimonious interpretation of the phenomena under scrutiny, they will be tentatively accepted. This study does not provide the basis for quantitative hypothesis testing. Given the state of the art, we do not have the flow of coded information which might allow a proper use of quantitative techniques. We are limited to secondary, descriptive data, generally casted in the historical method. The methodological validity of this study must rest on the quality of its hypotheses. CRIAF uses as hypotheses existing and creditable research findings. That is, its hypotheses are not invented ad hoc. They are obtained by means of a thorough search of the literature on the matter.

   (2) Quantitatively tested and inductively formulated hypotheses are not scarce in the subject under consideration. Ted Gurr and Charles Ruttenberg's "Cross National Studies on Civil Violence", Washington, D.C. Center for Research in Social Systems, May 1969, is an example. It is recognized that the Gurr and Ruttenberg study is much too technical and non-operations oriented to serve as a basis for operational planning. However, this and similar studies offer a choice of tested hypotheses.

   (3) The logical integration of several tested hypotheses into a system of interpretation forms of theoretical model. The relations postulated by a model guide the verificational phase of the quest, and allow explanations of other empirical generalizations. The complexity of the subject matter, and the synthetic nature of CRIAF, indicates the need to use theoretical-interpretative models, rather than an intuitive empirical approach.

           Model 1

           Model 2   Events .   Model A

           Model j   Deviation of
                                               model A due to
                                               X, Y, Z

The use of models as interpretative tools allows, in its most simplified manner, a verification of systems of hypotheses, which ultimately yield a refined Model A, upon which empirical deviations can be assessed.

   (4) In order to define and understand the set of civil military roles of indigenous armed forces it is necessary to evaluate the mix between the

military institution (through its component parts and paramilitary forces)
and the other institutions of any particular host country. This "mix" is
determined by a variety of political, social and economic conditions, as well
as by the nature of existing or anticipated emergencies and threats. Although
the differences between countries are obvious and apparently insurmountable
to the lay observer, sociological analysis shows that: (a) these differences
may be traced to specific ranges of values in a given set of descriptive
variables, (b) that countries can be classified into typologies resulting from
the combination of value-ranges in the variables, and (c) that the problem
of "mix" between civilian and military institutions within particular "types"
of countries can be identified in terms of modal "standard processes".

(5) Although many attempts have been made to clarify the issue of
"civil-military mix", inasmuch as it determines the range of "possible" and
"desirable" civil-military roles of the indigenous military, the whole field
is still obscured by contradictory or unsubstantiated propositions, which
results in dilemmas or paradoxes. These dilemmas and paradoxes are exceed-
ingly detrimental to policy, strategy, operations and tactics. For example,
the coordination draft of the USACDC study (S) "The Army's Role in Security
Assistance Program in the 1970's" (ARSAP 70), in its evaluation of "develop-
ment" versus "security" assistance, clearly identifies a dilemma which has
caused considerable difficulties to planners:

(U) U.S. foreign policy faces a basic dilemma that overshadows
all relationships of a public and private nature. U.S. foreign policy
is committed to development and revolutionary (radical) change and
at the same time fundamentally committed to maintaining stability.

It can be shown that the dilemma is not in the real nature of things; it is
artificially produced by the definitions of "development", "revolutionary
change", and "stability" which have been used by many commentators.

(6) Many definitions have been borrowed from the social sciences,
but quite often they have not been used in the way social scientists would use
them. To the social scientist a definition or a concept is an analytical
"tool", which serves the purposes of the analysis. To the layman, the defini-
tion or the concept is a reality in itself. Military science has freely
borrowed definitions, concepts and theories from the academic world, but many
of those "tools" were not originally developed for the purpose of military
planning. Their hasty introduction into military science has generated no
little confusion. This is particularly true in the areas of "social change",
"dynamics of change", "human motivation", "ingredients of revolution", "causes
of insurgency" and "determinants of stability". In all those matters, more
clear and simple explanations can be found, which satisfy the requirement
of being conducive to military planning, and which do not present insurmount-
able dilemmas to commanders in the field and their staffs.

(7) Current U.S. Army doctrine (ODCSOPS) DA study (S) "The United
States Army's Roles in Support of Nation Building" (U) directs the U.S. Army
to participate in the nation building effort of developing nations through
the intermediary of their indigenous armed forces. "(U) The U.S. Army should
focus its nation building attention to that element of the less developed
countries which it can properly influence. Realistically this is the indige-
nous military". Army doctrine in the broad spectrum of stability operations

and low intensity warfare makes the same provision. It follows that the size, extent, duration and quality of U.S. Army assistance is basically determined by:

(a) the "military posture" of the indigenous army, and

(b) the mission confronting that indigenous army, oriented to meet the challenge of some internal or external threats or emergencies.

The military posture of an indigenous army is dependent on:

(c) its good relation to its government, which must provide appropriations, manpower and policy directives,

(d) the "viability" of that government,

(e) the "legitimacy" and "esteem" the indigenous army may command from various population sectors and institutional domains,

(f) the internal cohesion, discipline and morals of the indigenous army,

(g) the appropriateness of its force structure and material to the missions in view.

In turn, the "viability" of the indigenous government, upon which the "military posture" of the indigenous army partially depends, is determined by:

(h) a government's power to exercise the amount of social and political control needed in any given situation,

(i) the legitimacy of the government, as felt by various population sectors,

(j) the government's efficacy to manage its resources in such way as to provide the minimal services required to keep the society ongoing.

All the above "determinants" are variables, which, in practice, may range from zero to very high. In "ideal circumstances", an indigenous army would maintain "optimal" relations with an "optimally viable" government. Even in such "ideal" state the nature of a threat or emergency might be such as to exceed the government's ability to resolve it. In that case, external assistance and eventual external augmentation would be needed. Military assistance would then cover the "deficit" between what this "ideal" indigenous military "can do", and what it "should" do to meet the threat successfully. It is a matter of record that in several instances, U.S. military assistance has been calculated under such "ideal assumptions". In almost all cases, however, the "ideal assumptions" are untenable. Thus, U.S. military assistance tends to be confronted with the dual task of paragraph (b), to assist and eventually to augment the capacity of an indigenous army to cope successfully with a given threat, and of paragraphs (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g); that is, to compensate for the "dysfunctions" resulting from very low values in those five variables. Our historical record shows that we have been forced to increase

substantially our military assistance levels in order to compensate for those "dysfunctions" and to keep a favorable "military posture" in the indigenous army. We have also found that a favorable "military posture" of the indigenous army is strongly affected by variable (d), "viability of government". This has required various diplomatic actions, usually accompanied by higher levels of military and non-military assistance. It follows from the above that in order to evaluate in a technical non-political way the level of assistance an indigenous army will require to cope successfully with a specific threat or emergency we must differentiate between "pure" military assistance, which is the kind of military assistance deemed as necessary to compensate for the deficit defined by what the indigenous military "should do" versus what it "can do", and "supporting assistance" (technically outside the military assistance program, under Section 401 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), the purpose of which is to compensate for the "dysfunctions" that downgrade the minimal acceptable level of effectiveness of the indigenous army. It is necessary, therefore, a thorough understanding of civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces and armies aside from and/or prior to any amount of external military assistance in order to evaluate the defense and stability potential of any given developing country.

(8) When the relations between an indigenous army with its government and the various population sectors are less than satisfactory, indigenous armies tend to compensate by undertaking a great variety of civil-military roles. Those roles are not to be confused with the civil-military roles indigenous armies take in support of general government programs, such as civil action. They respond to the need to compensate for "dysfunctions" which ultimately downgrade their "military posture" or "combat effectiveness". Not infrequently indigenous armies have pressured governments to maintain law and order, to follow sound economic policies, to legislate reforms, or curb violent political unrest. In other instances they have refused to comply with governmental directive to back up with military force some controversial government policies. Quite frequently those attempts to undertake civil-military roles to compensate for "dysfunctions" or deficiencies have created problems of their own. To date, there is no body or doctrine which allows a clear interpretation and evaluation of those phenomena in terms of the indigenous national defense potential.

(a) Current U.S. Army doctrine recognizes the preponderant political roles of many indigenous armed forces in developing countries. It is not yet clear, however, why do those armed forces undertake such roles. Underdeveloped countries generally have underdeveloped governments, which means governments rating low in "power" and "efficacy". It is common to label these governments as "politically weak", and to explain the political roles of indigenous armies as an attempt to fill the vacuum. To fill a political vacuum, however, does not necessarily mean to gain political strength: it means, in most cases, to enter an open competition with other groups and organizations which also attempt to fill that vacuum. This tends to reduce the legitimacy of both government and indigenous military. In some historical instances, indigenous armies have taken over the government to avoid the detrimental effects of that competition. To take over a government, however,

does not necessarily imply to gain higher levels of (h) power, (i) legiti-
macy, or (j) efficacy. A considerable body of historical evidence indicates
that the increased burden of administering a country and of taking a direct
responsibility for its policies tends to weaken the combat effectiveness of
the military, and to divide its leadership. This aspect of civil-military
roles of indigenous armed forces has not been satisfactorily explained; or
at least, not from the point of view of U.S. Army concerns. There is a very
large bibliographical production on military coups, take-overs, dictator-
ships and the like, but the writers who studied those matters were not pri-
marily and directly concerned with the defense needs of the societies under
examination, or the dilemmas confronting the indigenous military, or the
decision-making problems which such events pose to the military aspects of
U.S. forcing assistance. They were concerned with the civilian aspects of
those occurrences, thus leaving unexplored a whole range of matters which are
of immediate relevance to the U.S. Army.

(9) Another critical aspect of civil-military roles of indigenous
armed forces is the "development-security assistance mix" issue.

(a) The problem is extremely difficult, and as ARSAP 70 indi-
cates "(U) there is no specific way to determine absolutely the precise mix
of development and security assistance for any particular country. The con-
flicting aspects of the two kinds of assistance are extremely difficult to
measure, when viewed in terms of all other variables involved. The con-
straints imposed by U.S. resources and legislative restrictions, the extent
of the development of social institutions within a given country or region,
the threat of internal insurgency and uprising, and international pressures
and threats, creates a situation in which the best objective assessments and
non-quantitative judgments must be used to arrive at a specific foreign aid
program (p. 28)". However, ARSAP 70 also states: "(U) To many, U.S. foreign
assistance programs should serve only moral and humanitarian purposes; how-
ever, the body politic of the U.S. does not support this philosophy. Instead,
allocation of foreign assistance has been based primarily on U.S. national
interest within each recipient country (p. 12)".

(b) Several Army studies now in progress, including ARSAP 70
and ADVASO, are directly concerned with the study of the problem of "develop-
ment-security mix". The CRIAF study is only concerned with the analysis
and interpretation of civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces; but
since indigenous armed forces take a major part in the planning and imple-
mentation of development and security military programs, CRIAF is, to that
extent, involved in the issue. In other words, CRIAF is not directed to
evaluate U.S. military assistance: it is directed to evaluate the ability
and willingness of indigenous armed forces to engage in development and
security civil-military roles, and the possible consequences of such engage-
ments.

(c) The scope of CRIAF does not authorize it to formulate policy
recommendations with regard to specific countries. As ARSAP 70 states, (U)
the role of U.S. Army staffs is to provide doctrine and observational inputs

in ultimate support of the Chief of Staff, Army, in his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have a statutory responsibility to be principal military advisers to the President, to the National Security Council and to the Secretary of Defense.

(d) From CRIAF's limited vantage point, it is apparent that the issue of "development-security mix" cannot be solved unless some basic assumptions are taken. Since some of these assumptions refer to real social, economic and motivational phenomena, the study is bound to substantiate them to the limit where it is possible on the basis of historical and experimental evidence available.

(e) Some assumptions are based on current U.S. Army doctrine and on the key definitions of ID/ID, Stability Operations and Nation Building. Ultimately, the role of armies in development operations is seen as determined by their primary responsibility toward national defense, and by the requirement to improve their combat effectiveness.

(f) Prior to any external assistance, the indigenous military problem of "development-security mix" is one of allocation of scarce national resources. There is the vulgar belief that the more resources are allocated to security, the less resources will be left to development: the old fashion dilemma of "guns versus butter". Sound economic doctrine clearly shows that the "more butter and less guns" solution is not tenable. The military potential of a country ultimately depends on the country's economic capability to support its army in the field; and this economic capability is partly dependent on social and economic factors. In normal circumstances, an enlightened national defense policy recommends long range capital and human investment. In the U.S. National Defense Acts have contributed to build roads, aid schools and support a broad range of development programs.

(g) In emergency circumstances, in the anticipation or eventuation of an internal/external threat, it is the nature of the threat which determines the values of the "development-security" equation. It could not be reasonable to expect a government or a population to devote most of their efforts to development, just to surrender the fruits of this development to an external or internal aggressor.

(h) The nature of the problem, however, rests on the assumption that populations who lack material goods and opportunities are likely to support external or internal aggressors; and that development programs do provide the material goods and opportunities which will win the hearts and minds of the population to support the national defense effort. This critical assumption needs verification and qualification. It is central to the concerns of CRIAF because it is one of the bases upon which civil military roles of indigenous armed forces can be evaluated.

(i) Karl Marx's doctrine of dialectical materialism states that deprivation of material goods leads to dissatisfaction, and dissatisfaction to revolution. No matter how good sense this doctrine may make at the individual level, because of its simplicity and clarity, it does not find

confirmation at the collective level. Its basic tenet that material goods are the prime movers of people is very questionable. At all times, people have willingly undertaken great deprivations, and accepted considerable sacrifices, for the sake of their religion, their nation or some other non-materialistic and non-consumer goods oriented value. Leon Trotsky, who had to his credit the successful management of the Russian Revolution and its Red Army, categorically asserted that deprived and dissatisfied people do not revolt in revolutionary ways, unless it is mobilized, organized and directed by the cadres and staff of the Communist Party, or any such para-military organization, (Crane Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution, 1958). Recent psychological experimentation indicates that dissatisfaction can only turn to aggression if favorable aggressive opportunities are perceived (B.G. Rule and L.S. Hewitt, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 19, 2, August 1971, 181-187). The OACSFOR DA study Institutional Development agrees with RVN ARVAN study Report of the Study on Living Standards, 1968-1969, tha it was not poverty or deprivation but the RVN failure to guarantee law and order and personal security which moved Vietnamese rurals to cooperate with the VC. There is clear evidence that in this area of human motivation and response to rewards a great deal of effort must be done to adjust current doctrine to recent empirical evidence, with reference to civil-military roles of indigenous armies.

(j) There are indications that those issues have been obscured by studies on "causes of revolution", which, according to Prof. Harry Eckstein, "have absolutely inundated (us) with print", (On the Etiology of Internal Wars, History and Theory, 1965, page 136). On the other hand, there is a considerable lack of studies on "processes of revolution". These processes could be documented in ways similar to a PERT chart, so as to give us the succession of revolutionary "phases" and the "paths" which lead to them. There is little doubt that the "causes" of a revolution, whatever those may be, have little in common with the "causes" determining the subsequent "phases" of that revolution. There is a great deal of evidence that there has been some confusion between "pre-condition" and "direct causes" of revolution. While the former are many, diffuse and unmanageable, the latter tend to be few, concrete and manageable. The position is taken here that a "revolution", from the U.S. military point of view, is neither desirable nor undesirable; its desirability or undesirability together with the decision to oppose it, promote it, or ignore it, lies in the domain of U.S. national policy.

(k) National case studies show that the outcomes of a revolution, the events that follow the end of a revolutionary process, are surprisingly unlike the aims which inspired the original revolutionaries. This matter was recognized by the ODCSOPS DA study (S) "The United States Army's Role in Support of Nation Building". It was identified as a problem which needs further research and explanation to meet urgent U.S. Army doctrinal and planning requirements.

(10) The study of civil military roles of indigenous armed forces poses the critical question of when a country is in war, since war will change many civil military roles.

(a) There is the legal definition which states that war exists when it has been constitutionally declared. This legal definition is not quite satisfactory, for a real war can be taking place without any formal declaration. Until World War II it was customary that countries would make formal declarations of war with the same protocol as when treaties were signed. This seems to be a vanishing custom. Another vanishing custom is that wars should be fought only by uniformed military personnel. Today they are fought by both uniformed and non-uniformed personnel. This complicates even further the identification of war, together with the fact that some nations tend to wage war "by proxy". Tradition demanded that real war could only be fought between sovereign nations. All other warlike phenomena were termed "civil Wars". However, the term "civil war" is obviously misleading: historically wars within a country have been fought by both military and civilian personnel, and, as in the case of the American Civil War, they were not civil but thoroughly military confrontations.

(b) Current conceptualizations tend to favor the term "subversive insurgency", and divide it into three operational phases. The concept of insurgency, clear as it may be, conceals the fact that a state of war, including formal military operations, may take place simultaneously and even superimposed to a civilian insurgency. Moreover, at the strategic level, there may be no difference between civilian insurgents and regular combatants, as the Viet Nam experience points out.

(c) The American academic community, finding that the terms revolution, rebellion, revolt, civil violence, liberations wars, and the like, were imprecise, confusing and full of emotional connotations, settled for the concept of Internal War (Harry Eckstein, editor, Internal War, 1964). The concept of Internal War has been defined as: "operations of controlled violence, conducted by an organization structured along military lines, directed by paramilitary chiefs, and staffs, and using tactical formations to achieve an ultimate strategic goal, which is generally 'the conquest of the state'".

(d) The key factor of internal war is the existence of the paramilitary organization, with the ability to recruit, conscript, train and direct manpower toward tactical objectives in support of the strategic goal. A country has an internal war potential when there is such a paramilitary organization, which cannot be rapidly reduced by the government and its armed forces.

(e) It is characteristic of an internal war that the paramilitary organization becomes a competitor of the government and of its armed forces, competing for manpower, supplies, materiel, terrain and population control.

(f) The basic difference between civil violence, revolt, rebellion and similar activities, and an internal war, rests, therefore, on the operational existence of the rival paramilitary organization. During its early period of operation it tends to have tactical superiority over the indigenous army because it forces the latter to engagements in the location of its choice. It also competes with the indigenous armed forces in

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"gaining" civil-military roles. Not infrequently, this competition impels indigenous armed forces to capture civil-military roles, just to deny them to the opponent. These roles cover the broad spectrum of socio-economic and political relations. They can be adequately described in terms of the Civil Affairs functions as described in FM 41-10. This brings an interesting development in military doctrine. The indigenous armed forces, rather than being entrusted with the Civil Affairs functions by legitimate superior authority, must struggle to recover them from the opponent. The Civil Affairs functions, because they are mechanisms of social control, become the prime targets of the insurgent paramilitary organization. They become, in fact, military targets.

(g) One of the most difficult problems of doctrine, operations, strategy and tactics confronting us today is how to protect the Civil Affairs functions, which in normal circumstances are the standard mechanism of governmental control, from being captured by the opponent, while preserving their basic civilian character.

(h) A second problem of doctrine, of equal importance, rest on the difficulty of identifying when internal turbulence and violence is simply that, and when it is determined by the tactics of the insurgent paramilitary organization. In the former case, the situation is basically political, and can be solved by political, social and economic measures. In the latter case, the situation is basically military, and can only be solved by military means; it is a state of war, even if it is an internal war; and if a state of war is confused with a state of no-war, the advantage of the opponent is overwhelming. If an internal war is misclassified as a political revolt, or social strife, the ensuing conflict will be termed political, social and economic. The indigenous armed forces will be denied competence and jurisdiction, and will be used as police-auxiliaries in sporadic, piecemeal and uncoordinated operations. The rate of attribution of the indigenous armed forces will be so high that their combat efficiency and morale will deteriorate.

(i) The civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces take a paramount importance. They are war time roles, forced by the need to take wartime actions. In order to solve this problem to the measure to which it can be solved, the effects of wartime civilian mobilization measures must be identified and evaluated. It is safe to assume that until the set of wartime civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces have been described, classified and evaluated, U.S. Army military assistance doctrine will be faced with a doctrinal void.

(ll) One of the consequences of the distinction between civil violence and internal war is that each state calls for diametrically opposed sets of policies, doctrine, strategy and tactics. For the host country government and indigenous army, it could be equally dangerous to treat political violence as if it were an internal war, or, vice-versa, to treat an internal war as if it were a case of political violence. To illustrate the dramatic difference between the cases, the following may suffice. It is

recognized as good political wisdom that governments should yield to all
or some of the demands of the dissatisfied or of the aggrieved in order to
reduce the causes of their grievances and dissatisfactions, and bring them
back to the fold of normal civil society. Governmental violence may not
produce the expected results. It can increase the violence of the opposi-
tion and can also alienate some hitherto uncommitted sectors of the popula-
tion. In case of internal war, however, the insurgent paramilitary organi-
zation cannot be placated because its objective is the conquest of the
state. The identity with conventional war between nations holds: no amount
of kindness and tolerance on the part of one army can reasonable induce the
opponent army to pack up and go home. In states of internal war, any con-
cession on the part of the government will be used by the rival insurgent
government to further its strategic position, and to increase its control
of the human and materiel resources it needs to bring its war to a favorable
resolution.

(a) One of the disadvantages of the Chinese-inspired theory
of Insurgent Three Phases is that it represents them as a sequence of esca-
lation in politico-military activity. It does not allow a clear differentia-
tion between civil violence and internal war, nor of the ways to deal with
the one and with the other. It is, in this respect, an utterly confusing
theory, at least for the West, but then, realistically speaking, one could
hardly expect Chairman Mao to offer the West a military doctrine with which
to defeat him.

(b) The distinction between civil violence and internal war
was definitely proven by the work of Dr. Michael Conley in his analysis of
Communist Undergrounds, a U.S. Army supported study which has found its way,
charts and graphs of paramilitary insurgent organizations included, in
several U.S. Army Field Manuals (e.g., FM 31-23 Stability Operations, U.S.
Army Doctrine, page 17). The implications of that work have not yet been
developed, and they have not been incorporated in the study of civil-military
roles of indigenous armed forces, thus creating a considerable gap in U.S.
Army doctrine.

(c) The resolution of political violence requires to bring
the country "back to normalcy" by means political, social and economic, by
reforms, changes, concessions, developmental programs, and in general, any
means leading to return the nation to political stability. In contrast, the
resolution of internal war call for taking the country "out of normalcy",
because normal institutional channels are not usually set to resist organized
attempts to control them by force, nor to produce the type of outputs as
required by a national war effort. For example, a small municipal police
force is good enough to maintain law and order in a small market town, but
it is totally incapable of facing or even opposing organized insurgent con-
tingent. More likely than not it will surrender to it - overtly or covertly.

(d) To take a country "out of normalcy" is to create a new
kind of stability, and artificial stability, which can only be sustained by
a more powerful and efficient system of government controls. In other words,
in order to take a country "out of normalcy" and into a war footing, the

government must rate high in power and efficacy. Since underdeveloped countries tend to have underdeveloped governments, and underdeveloped governments tend to rate low in both power and efficacy, it is very difficult . for an underdeveloped country to achieve a satisfactory level of national mobilization for defense. This is one of the reasons why insurgent paramilitary organizations prosper and proliferate in underdeveloped countries, but fail to succeed, and do seldom emerge, in developed countries, the governments of which tend to rate high in power and efficacy. Otherwise stated, internal war is far more likely in underdeveloped countries because of the underdeveloped conditions of their governments, rather than because of the poverty of their populations.

(e) When an underdeveloped country faces the threat of an internal war, its underdevelopment government, for self preservation needs, tends to rely on the military organization as a more powerful and effective organization than the government itself. This reliance, the historical record shows, is highly conditional. There are several cases in record which indicate that indigenous governments are willing to confide civil-military organizational responsibilities to their armed forces, but considerably less willing to relinquish the political roles. It thus happens that a higher organized force is under the control of a much lesser organized force. At the same time, if the government in power represents one political alignment it will tend to give to the internal war effort the sign of its political alignment, rather than a national sign. This may be resented by the indigenous military. At this level, the roles of indigenous armed forces tend to become conflict roles. Whichever these conflicts are, and how to solve them, is still a matter unknown. As such, it is a serious problem for U.S. Army doctrine, with important implications to U.S. military assistance programs, and to the U.S. global military posture.

(f) The taking of a country "out of normalcy" to meet the requirements of an internal war is known as "defense mobilization", or "national defense mobilization". During World War II, both the U.S. and Great Britain adopted defense mobilization measures affecting the political, economic and social institutions of the country, as well as the lives of their citizens. At the present time, the Office of Emergency Planning of the President is the responsible headquarters for emergency defense mobilization in the U.S. Underdeveloped and developing countries usually confide their defense mobilization plans to their indigenous armed forces. There seems to be some evidence that some of those plans fall short of the mark, while others are so ambitious that they cannot be implemented. The realistic approach to this problem calls for plans which can be realistically implemented by the government and the armed forces, with or without external aid and assistance. The optimal level of national defense mobilization in case of internal war is that level which would allow a reasonable prospect of success in the event of maximal escalation on the part of the insurgence organization. The limit of the level of national defense mobilization is the mobilization point past which neither the indigenous government not its armed forces can effectively control. If the threat posed by the insurgent organization at its maximal

capacity falls below that point, external assistance is needed. These rules, however, can only be implemented and translated into operational directives if there is enough knowledge of the civil-military roles a given indigenous armed force can achieve, without jeopardizing its combat effectiveness or combat readiness. In the last analysis, the question reverts to the role of indigenous armed forces, to their ability to undertake a set of civil military roles, of their training to play these roles effectively, and of the willingness of other institutional sectors --majorly the political sectors -- to allow them to have such civil-military roles.

(12) The length given to the discussion of the problems which require a study of the civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces in developing countries responds to the basic need of identifying these problems. It is generally recognized that before a problem can be solved it must be identified first. Problem identification, in this case, has been facilitated by the extensive literature available on the subject. Despite its shortcomings, which have been signalled above, it gives a rather comprehensive picture of the situation.

(a) For the last seven years the U.S. Army has been supporting studies on the role of indigenous armed forces. The majority of these studies were descriptive, not synthetic, and that can be the reasons why that information has not yet been translated into approved U.S. Army doctrine. Descriptions do not explain, but they are essential to arrive at empirically sound generalizations and explanations.

(b) This problem-identification work serves also the purpose of defining the boundaries between CRIAF and other USACDC studies now in progress. CRIAF is not concerned with U.S. military assistance operations, nor with U.S. Army operations: it is concerned with the conditions and situations which U.S. military assistance and U.S. Army operations are likely to find in developing countries, and in their relations with indigenous armed forces. In this sense, CRIAF partially support those other concurrent studies, as instructed by the Research Directive (Inclosure 1).

b. Major Research Phases

(1) The following graph indicates the basic phases involved in the proposed research, according to what has been stated above.

Major Research Phases

Search for Tested Hypotheses		Search for Interpretative models

	Alternative Models and Hypotheses	— — — →	New working hypotheses and questions related to subject

Models of Internal Conflict in Developing Countries (M_c)

Models of Revolution Processes in Developing Countries. (M_r)

Models of Insurgency in Developing Countries (M_i)

M_c

M_r

M_i

CIVIL MILITARY ROLES MODELS

REFORMULATION

Determinant Systems

Application of Models to Countries

Identification of Phenomena, Phases Variables

Deterrent Systems

DOCTRINE

OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES

Methodology - Graph 2

PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CIVIL MILITARY ROLES OF INDIGENOUS ARMED FORCES FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES

ROLES			
No-Insurgency		**Insurgency**	**Post-Insurgency**
DEVELOPMENTAL	STABILIZATION	DEFENSE MOBILIZATION	DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
Augment capabilities of indigenous goverment toward development.	Guarantee law and order, and facilitate institutional performance in cases of political turbulence or civil violence.	Mobilize civilian resources for national defense purposes, and in order to deny them to insurgent organization.	Demobilize civilian resources, in order to allow return to normal conditions under constitutional goverment ("Military Goverment")
No-military situation	Pre-military situation	Military situation	Post-military situation

REFERENCE THREE

SUB STUDY DIRECTIVES

Sub Study Directive One. To HHQ 356th CA Area (B) Bronx, New York.
Scope: African New Nations
        Rep. of the Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, plus Ethiopia.

Sub Study Directive Two. To HHQ 360th CA Area (B) Columbia, S. C.
Scope: Latin America
        Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican
        Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay,
        Venezuela.

Sub Study Directive Three. To HHQ 364th CA Area (B) Portland, Oregon.
Scope: Asia
        Republic of Viet Nam, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Republic of Korea,
        North Korea, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sinapore, India.

Sub Study Directive Four. To HHQ 365th CA Area (B) Seattle, Washington.
Scope: Moslem Nations
        Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Jourdan, Lebanon, Saudi-Arabia,
        Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libia, United Arab Republic
        Other: Israel.

Objectives

Each Sub Study Directive instructs unit to study the full range of civil
military roles of the indigenous military in terms similar to those identi-
fied in the Study Methodology for the general Study Plan.

The elaboration of specific models for each region will be achieved by
direct relation between Central Study Staff and participating units.

Study Teams (7) of 354th CA Area (B) will study Team One; Political, Team
Two; Economic, Team Three; Public Utilities and Services, and Team Four;
Security and Safety, across all countries indicated in the Study Plan.

The four contributing Units, will study the whole range of roles by areas.
It is expected that this method will allow for greater reliability of
finding, and for an effective inter-coordination of research efforts.

Final elaboration of Study Directives to participating Units will be
made after consultation with those units, in order to assess their needs
and requirements, as well as their possibilities, given the constraints
of the Study Plan.

REFERENCE FOUR

BUDGET

Items	Amount	Sub Total
Non-military documentation	2,250	
Travel and non-government transportation for briefings with military and civilian agencies, and coordination with participating CA units, and consultant travel	2,906	
Telephone and telegrams	569	
Materiel and equipment, rental of Xerox, mimeograph, typewriters, calculators and mimeograph mat reproducer, including graph drawing materials	3,600	9,325
Three professional consultants (for a total of 80 days at $90 per day)	7,200	7,200
Grand Total	16,525	

CRIAF-PO

REFERENCE FIVE

PROJECTED STUDY SCHEDULE

	CSS		Dec. 71
16 Dec. Submission Study Plan to USACDC	Briefing Training	Briefing Training	
16 January, Briefing to CA participating units	Exchange		Jan 72
16 February, Completion of training by CA participating units			Feb 72
16 March, Interim Status Report, CDC	Preparation sub-study plans	TASKS	Mar 72
		TASKS	Apr 72
			May 72
1 June 1972, Interim Status Report, CDC	Final Product	TASKS	Jun 72
16 July, Completion of sub-tasks by CA participating units	Writing draft report	TASKS	July 72

Milestones		Timeline
16 Aug. Completion first phase study		Sept 72
16 Sept. Interim status Report CDC		
17 Sept. Assembly- ing final draft, first phase		Oct 72
16 Oct. Completion second phase study		
16 Nov. Assembly- ing final draft, second phase		Nov 72
12 Dec. Coordina- tion Draft to CDC		Dec 72
14 Dec. Begins period comments		Jan 73
		Feb 73
16 Mar. Deadline for comments & revisions		Mar 73
16 Jun FINAL REPORT		Apr 73
16 May Assemble final draft		May Jun 73

REFERENCE SIX

STUDY FORMAT

(Volume One: Models, Scenarios, Concepts and Operational Principles)

1. Introduction.

The major objectives are identified, the organization and structure of the volume is explained, and the major highlights of the study are underlined. Volume One contains the summarization of the empirical verifications presented in Volume Two.

2. CHAPTER ONE: General characteristics of the institutional sectors of developing countries, with special emphasis on the governmental and military components.

3. CHAPTER TWO: Conflict in developing countries as a function of internal institutional weaknesses. It identifies conflict conditions independent of insurgency and revolutionary threats. It presents the inherent difficulties and dislocations resulting from change and development. It contains a methodological section concerning the evaluation of change.

4. CHAPTER THREE: Revolution versus Insurgency: analysis of two different phenomena. This chapter presents a general model of revolutionary process, and its special cases. It also presents a general model of the subversive insurgency process. Both models are identified in terms of pre-conditions, determinants, precipitants, phases, and paths between phases. There is a methodological section referring to indicators, and suggestions on how to obtain them.

5. CHAPTER FOUR: The role of indigenous armed forces in revolution and insurgency processes. From the point of view of organizational theory, the chapter interprets the cases in which revolutions and/or insurgencies fail or succeed, and the role of armies in these outcomes.

6. CHAPTER FIVE: Current U.S. Army interpretations of revolutionary and insurgency processes: an analytical review. This chapter relates current U.S. Army interpretations to findings as presented in Chapter Four, and evaluates the operational consequences of different interpretations.

7. CHAPTER SIX: Civil Military Roles of Indigenous Armed Forces in situations of underdevelopment, stagnation, social disintegration, political turmoil, civil violence, revolutionary change and subversive insurgency. This chapter concentrates on typical processes.

8. CHAPTER SEVEN: Civil Military Roles of Indigenous Armed Forces and Internal War: Doctrine. This chapter summarizes preceding ones, and presents an analysis based on Nation Building, Defense Mobilization and Defense Demobilization.

9. CHAPTER EIGHT: Civil Military Roles of Indigenous Armed Forces: Principles of Operations. A continuation of chapter seven, which includes operational principles. Considerable weight is given to the roles of para-military forces.

10. CHAPTER NINE: The link between indigenous armed forces and U.S. Army military assistance and augmentation.

11. CHAPTER TEN: Concepts, doctrine and operational principles. A summary.

12. RECOMMENDATIONS.

(Volume Two: Analysis of Civil Military Roles of Indigenous Armed Forces in terms of functions and operations by regions and countries).

ANNEX 1. Political roles of indigenous armed forces by regions and countries: analysis and evaluation.

ANNEX 2. Economic roles of indigenous armed forces by regions and countries: analysis and evaluation.

ANNEX 3.- Resources Control and Population Control: roles of indigenous armed forces by regions and countries.

ANNEX 4. Safety, Security and Intelligence: civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces by regions and countries.

ANNEX 5. Characteristics and Modalities, past and present, obtaining in Asian countries.

ANNEX 6. Characteristics and Modalities, past and present, obtaining in Moslem countries.

ANNEX 7. Characteristics and Modalities, past and present, obtaining in African countries.

ANNEX 8. Characteristics and modalities, past and present, obtaining in Latin American countries.

ANNEX 9. Draft notes on stability operations.

ANNEX 10. Draft notes on Civil Affairs.

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IDENTIFICATION OF CONSULTANTS' TASKS

1. Special Consultant in Sociological Methodology, Analysis and Documentation.

   a. Tasks: derive dimensions and variables from major CRIAF analytical models. Identify in existing sociological and political science literature which variables have been evaluated and which results have been obtained. Check for concordance and validity different parts of CRIAF study, with special emphasis on findings in relation to similar studies available in the academic field. Revise CRIAF analyses in terms of methodological correctness and content validity. Produce upon request verification studies aiming at validation of concurrent CRIAF's sectional studies. Revise sociological analyses of the study section "revolutionary processes" and "insurgency processes", with major stress on indicators, both descriptive and predictive. Consult Central Study Staff on matters of documentation.

   b. Person indicated: Dr. Jiri Nehnevajsa, Professor of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. Professor Nehnevajsa was until recently Principal Investigator for a regional study directed by the DOD Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization. He has, or may have had until very recently, a TOP SECRET Security Clearance, DOD.

2. Special Consultant in Economic Analysis, and in Insurgency Analysis.

   a. Tasks: give guidance and suggestions to Central Study Staff and Study Teams about economic aspects of study. Advice on role of economic indicators in situations affecting stability operations and civil-military roles of indigenous armed forces. Explain and supervise ad hoc development of "Input-Output Model of Insurgency", and derive consequences of it related to CRIAF's purposes. Advise on sources of information on socio-economic subjects. Revise socio-economic analysis sections.

   b. Person indicated: Dr. Charles Wolf, Jr., The Rand Corporation. Dr. Wolf is the originator of the "Input-Output Model of Insurgency" and has several publications on the subject. He holds a TOP SECRET Security Clearance from DOD.

3. Special Consultant on Area Studies.

   a. Task: advise CRIAF's research staffs on current foreign area studies and their relevance to CRIAF's objectives. The great variety of countries included in the study strongly indicates the need for a special consultant on area studies, with personal acquaintance with the very extensive literature (amounting to thousand of titles) on subject. The consultant must be familiar with the field of civil-military relations, and in stability operations. He must have a doctoral degree or ABD, and ten years experience.

   b. Person indicated: Not yet identified.

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100. A. H. Peterson, G. C. Reinhardt, and E. E. Conger, eds., Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Philippine Huk Campaign, The RAND Corporation, Rm-3652-PR, June, 1963, Santa Monica, Calif. P. 36.

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